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Introduction 
Man in view of historic cultures, if not individually, 
ceaselessly redefines himself. Not every attempt is re-
newable by posterity. Yet he searches for more than daily 
significance. He seeks meaning but not only as a transitory 
apprehension to satisfy immediate needs. He notes that the 
dynamism of life presses upon him, at times urgently, to 
explain himself from a broader horizon, an ultimate point 
of view, not merely a daily one. In these moments he 
releases the fundamental tension that he feels is a question 
unto himself. He means to form his religious conscious-
ness. 
One can trace among the evidence of Western man's 
intellectual and cultural history, a constant search for 
ultimate meaning. From the early Hellenistic communities 
to our own nuclear and technological society, there recurs 
in human consciousness an unrestricted desire to render a 
fundamental explanation for existence. History shows that 
man has diversified this searching desire. Experimenting 
with reality, he reaches out in manifold directions without 
exhausting all the possibilities. Not every concrete direc-
tion succeeds or reveals equal value for the humanization 
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of this task. 
In Western cultures, assuming culture to mean the 
symbol for the totality of human life, one can reflect on 
man's efforts at participation in life and communication of 
meaning and discover that finality has been the drawing 
force. The emergence of thought and action reveal, in 
other words, purpose as an intrinsic principle of their 
exercise. His rational attempts at meaningful living have 
not been the result of random choices. In fact, man tries 
to avoid or incorporate the resurgence of chance in order 
to minimize interference and complete his prescribed 
directions, to reach his goals in life. 
In completing his unfinished nature, the context of 
his rational growth presupposes a teleologica! orientation 
towards reality. By speaking of "teleology," we mean to 
say that man is a purposive being-, that he understands his 
nature in the selection and implementation of means and 
ends or goals; and that nature itself also shares analogously 
with man a telic dynamism. The teleologica! nature of man 
is unique. His growing self-consciousness of what is re-
quired for him to exist meaningfully in a not altogether 
harmless world, returns to him in a teleologica! form. 
Thus, the transformation of his biological and intellectual 
existence exposes varying but successive experiences with 
life whose meaning man appropriates in giving direction to 
his growing processes. 
In this lengthy, usually uneven and difficult process 
of self-realization, and relying upon a sufficiency of order 
and stability characterizing nature's activities, man gradu-
ally learns that the dynamic principles of reality are also 
teleologica! in their history. And since creative survival and 
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ultimacy have an irreplaceable value for man, the teleo-
logica! categories, such as motivational behavior, morality, 
providential meaning and cultic actions (cf. page 180 ff.), 
required for their intelligible achievement reveal them-
selves as necessary conditions of his existence. 
At the same time, within the general structuring of 
cultural history, there tends to arise epochal insights that 
specify man's participatory meaning within a determined 
period. These illuminating instances depict how he has 
articulated his acceptance of the perennial task of finding 
and disclosing the ultimate rhyme and reason of existence. 
A spectrum of interpretations unearths. As a cross-cultural 
phenomenon displaying a divergent universality, each era 
contributes its summary view to the meaning of man and 
reality. These diverse traditions of meaning have had an 
uneven import in the shaping and preservation of the 
culture which accepts their value. Generally speaking, it 
has been the role of formal or institutional religions to 
assume the priority of meaning in cultural awareness. 
Since the post-Renaissance era, however, formal religion 
has met with a cultural ascending competitor for ultimacy. 
The progression of scientific thought and its technocratic 
consequences have produced an understanding of man and 
reality and ultimacy that remains unique in cultural his-
tory. We will come back to this situation in a moment. 
In any event, the settling of man's understanding of 
the totality of life, wherein he affirms a set of symbolic 
forms and acts which relate him to the ultimate condi-
tions of his existence, have been revised again and again 
through Western cultural history. Occasioned by the 
dynamism of life, problems of maintenance have arisen. 
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How to preserve the religious symbolism intact in the face 
of human experiences whose meaning becomes increasing-
ly difficult to justify in terms of the inherited paradigm. 
History shows that unless the symbolism can embrace the 
meaning of these experiences, man yields to the pressure 
of searching for new perspectives. Forced by the dyna-
mism of life, revisions in the meaning of ultimacy have 
often placed the traditional or cultural paradigm in 
jeopardy, all the while, nevertheless, illustrating the 
demand for purposeful categories of thought and action 
to unify the meaning of ultimacy with the changing con-
ditions of life. 
These introductory remarks bring us to the purpose 
of our dissertation, which is twofold: first, our task will 
be to show that Western man's epochal formulation of 
religious consciousness—the quest for ultimate meaning-
has involved definite but variable correlations between the 
concepts of nature, ultimacy and God; second, that the 
correlations among these concepts in their bearing upon 
the formation of ultimate meaning or religious conscious-
ness are suitably understood within a framework of teleol-
ogy. In other words, the experiences of those events and 
judgments in cultural history that man relies upon for 
explaining the fundamental significance of life are only as 
meaningful to him as the teleologica! categories which 
depict and interpret them. 
Our method of procedure will be to examine the 
historical successions of man's efforts at formulating 
ultimacy in terms of a constitutive analysis. Consequently, 
our method will involve recognizing those wide eras of 
cultural significance that permit a generalization of ultimate 
Introduction / ix 
meaning, that is, to arrange our investigation of man's 
pursuit of religious consciousness within a certain chrono-
logical order beginning with the Hellenistic times and 
concluding with our own. As shaping history, we readily 
agree that ultimacy is not an isolated subject but an 
essential ingredient in cultural dynamics. 
In keeping this sense of totality, our specific 
approach to this task will be guided by those instances of 
Western culture where we can focus upon the correlation 
between the concepts of nature, ultimacy and God. By 
discussing the symbolic impact of these concepts upon 
man's self-understanding, we come to discover their signi-
ficance for the formation of religious consciousness and 
vice versa. 
Our analysis shall try to show that man attempts to 
know more than just the data of reality and classify the 
results; he desires to discover beyond these empirical 
facts the full nature of his identity which depends a great 
deal upon his efforts to interrelate his knowledge of the 
world with his efforts at self-realization. Thus man faces 
nature not only to know it but to survive in it. The 
dynamis of his culture becomes the essential component 
in the structuring of the totality of an era. Consequently 
the symbols he composes to reflect his understanding of 
nature include his teleologica! determination to exist in 
and through them. The symbols he chooses in explicating 
reality not only mediate his relation to nature but also to 
the wholeness of reality as he understands it. 
In attempting to sustain the totality of cultural 
dynamics, including the possibility for transcendence, our 
method will proceed within a framework that unites the 
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empirical as well as the speculative aspects of reality by 
coordinating their functional significance with their 
humanistic meaning.1 By analyzing the historical symbols 
man has chosen to reflect his self-understanding and 
nature, we are given clues to the central tendency within 
him, namely, the realization of optimal survival and ulti­
mate meaning. By examining the practical consequences of 
this conviction, we find a criterion for evaluating the 
contents of the cultural complex that supports or resists 
it. Since man is present to himself in thought, speech and 
action, he has the opportunity for discovering the logic of 
his insight as he attempts to manifest it vis-a-vis nature. He 
either succeeds or fails in grounding his anticipation. 
Accordingly, we shall try to decipher the inherent logic 
of those positions of ultimacy within their career and in 
contrast with their competitors, accounting as we can for 
the conditions that allowed for cultural transitions. In 
pursuing our task we shall be further guided by the insight 
that "To find the truth of his own and to interpret that of 
those with whom he communicates, man has to become 
aware of the hermeneutical situation as a fundamental 
principle of practical and theoretical existence and vice 
versa. There can be understanding to the extent only that 
we subject its development to the demands of reality and 
truth, by which logic becomes logical and methods conclu­
sive. To recall these conditions when processing the data 
of culture history is the purpose of constitutive analysis."2 
The Role of Human Consciousness 
In designating these broad eras of cultural history, 
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we come to note the manifestation of certain modalities 
of consciousness. In man's attempt to explain life, he has 
discovered and expressed the truth of being through 
special levels of articulation that include myth, philosophy, 
science and theology. These patterns of intelligibility have 
emerged from human consciousness within cultural cir-
cumstance and each has taken the lead at some time in 
history in deciphering and directing the meaning of life. 
Yet these modalities are not anachronisms belonging 
only to a transitory period of yesteryear. They have re-
tained their vitality and pertinence in every era since their 
inception, but under different guises. They seem to be 
permanent but developing modes of apprehension and ex-
pression that human consciousness recreates within cul-
tural history to reflect and symbolize the directional 
dynamism of being or the finality of life. While it is too 
much beyond our purpose to explore in great detail the 
full ramifications of their significance, what can be 
emphasized within each modality's portrayal of reality are 
recurring correlations between nature and ultimacy on the 
one hand, and, mediated by religious consciousness and 
the God concept, the structure of teleology, on the other. 
Throughout our study, then, we shall try to dis-
close the evidence that even when cultural history reveals 
that any one of these modalities of consciousness loses its 
primacy of value, undergoes transition or substitution 
(for example, the changeover from the medieval to the 
modern worldview), still man searches anew in order to 
satisfy that conscious imperative he feels to comprehend 
the totality of what he can experience. Eventually his 
rehabilitating efforts to understand life amidst cultural 
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changes returns to the question of the final significance of 
reality. 
In describing religious consciousness with respect 
to the issue of teleologica! meaning, we do not necessarily 
imply religion as a denominational phenomenon. Rather, 
to speak of religion here is to postulate its purposeful 
reference to the teleologica! dynamism of man and reality. 
In this way religious consciousness and the consciousness 
of ultimacy merge with one another. As a result, religion 
can signify a wider application than a formal set of beliefs. 
At the same time, it is not to forget that institutional 
beliefs and denominations as well as private preferences, 
have contributed their own historical specifications to the 
search for ultimate meaning. 
In Part One we examine the concepts of nature and 
ultimacy in their import for man's self-understanding, 
showing the emergence of the modalities of consciousness 
as patterns of intelligibility to aid his investigation and 
expression of reality. In so doing, we discover that the 
appreciation of teleologica! categories of being have had an 
uneven history of affirmation and denial. In our times 
alone, the persistent quest to render an ultimately co-
herent account to life has run aground. A dominant 
version of scientific rationality, a mode of consciousness, 
and the concommitant scepticism regarding religious 
values has, for many people, nullified the teleologica! 
significance of reality, and thus turned the presentation 
of ultimacy away from any meaningful reference to 
symbols of transcendence. While development is readily 
acknowledged in the advances of scientific acumen and its 
technological implications, these changes are not proposed 
Introduction / xiii 
upon any teleologica! framework. 
One of the most representative scientist-philoso-
phers, Professor Jacques Monod, has indicated that the 
scientific disclosure of the fundamental meaning of 
nature's activities and structures must be accepted only 
on the basis of accidental or fortuitous occasions ultimate-
ly reduced to the random and mechanical combinations of 
atoms. The dynamism of the universe is without rhyme 
or reason. 
In the past, philosophers and scientists have asserted 
the purposelessness of reality, but in our times the loss of 
transcendence in the religious sense of meaning accom-
panied by the scientific emphasis on reducing the nature 
of life to chance has produced a certain ultimate estrange-
ment of man from the universe and himself. A cultural 
mood pervades his attempts to fathom life's meaning 
without the support of the belief in a final order or har-
mony or purpose to existence. Instead, a secularism has 
emerged whereby consciousness accepts the empirical 
limits posed by scientific rationality as the ultimate 
account of history and being. Man's cognitive capacities 
and spiritual potentialities are confined to his imaginative 
and technological manipulation of matter. 
The nineteenth century portrait of reality as an 
evolutionary becoming, somewhat guided by man's belief 
in the law of Progress—a quasi-form of transcendence—has 
run into certain cultural events that have totally under-
mined this inheritance. Any abiding belief in a principle of 
coherence as a whole, affecting man's existence, has 
receded almost entirely from his attempt to organize 
his life in the twentieth century. There is no real order 
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surrounding man. The appearance of purpose and goal-like 
activities in nature are only surface appraisals of basically 
contingent and transitory entities without an essence or 
a final meaning. Man can only describe things not explain 
them, despite his urge to attempt the latter. The cosmos is 
blind. Man invents his systems of meaning in order to 
struggle through the vissisitudes and pluralistic tendencies 
of energy exchanges. Life is flux and consciousness cannot 
reach beyond the empirical situations of fact investigated 
by science. Aside from a kind of, unofficial or ordinary 
experience of life, expressed in the variety of cultural 
interests, man must be content to cope with life without 
uncovering any ultimate meaning in the sense of ful-
filling himself and explaining the orderly foundations of 
reality. There are no human experiences that could pos-
sibly intimate transcendence or transcendent values. 
There are no objective references to higher or spiritual 
levels of integration. Man is alone in a goalless, evolution-
ary process of apparently no end, in which death by 
disintegration completes his destiny. The formation of 
religious consciousness on these terms is a lost cause. 
This prominent secular mood has not manifested 
itself over night. The apprehension of reality as finite 
and contingent received added momentum by the con-
tributions of evolutionary theory, which claimed to 
eliminate any teleologica! significance to the processes 
of nature in its origin or destiny. In the successive chap-
ters of its acceptance by scientists, some, like Professor 
Monod, hold that evolutionary theory is the only realistic 
interpretation of nature. Existence is an infinite field of 
chance. 
Introduction / χυ 
In addressing this scientific and secular paradigm 
of cultural consciousness, the conclusion of Part One 
especially critiques the exclusivity that Professor Monod 
places upon what he considers the epitome of scientific 
consciousness. From among his peers, we note both 
evidence and theory that challenges the absolute denial 
of teleologica! categories as a viable mode of scientific 
explanation. At the same time, we have tried to demon­
strate that scientific empiricism may be a legitimate 
approach to understanding material being, but it does not 
by the logic of its success preclude thereby other modal­
ities of consciousness and ways of conceptualizing and 
disclosing the truths of reality, even within the plane of 
rationality. 
Starting with the ancient Greek civilization and their 
attempt to interpret existence within the categories of 
mythic consciousness, we have selected what historians 
would allow as most typical writings that indicate the 
cultural beliefs of these people. Our point is not merely to 
indicate that myths were the vehicle of interpretation for 
them but that mythic consciousness was a permanent 
mode of interpretation within man's nature that allowed 
him to express his highest thoughts and feelings about the 
meaning of existence. 
The dialectical dynamism between human con­
sciousness and reality soon produced another perspective 
by which man could apprehend and express his under­
standing of his world. Logos manifested itself as reflective 
consciousness searching in its way for those expressive 
categories and symbols that could convey its interpreta­
tion of nature. While it is not possible to explore all the 
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factors and reasons for cultural change, the dynamics of 
culture seems to arrange moments where a particular 
paradigm of explanation becomes enshrined in the minds 
of the people to the neglect of other paradigms and 
modalities. We have tried to show how these conditions 
for change have mutually influenced the relations be-
tween nature, teleology and man's pursuit of self-realiza-
tion. 
In moving to the development of medieval values, 
we have selected among those Christian thinkers the one 
that Roman Catholicism approves as its most representa-
tive agent to describe the philosophical and theological 
perspective synthesizing the middle ages. From there we 
examine the factors that forced such a revolution in the 
understanding of man and his world that left behind for-
ever the medieval complex. The modern era with its highly 
mechanized and optimistic trend of thought then offered 
its version of the meaning of nature and ultimacy with its 
accompanying implications for man's self-knowledge, 
implications that touch outlives today. 
Part Two continues the critique by offering a 
general description of religious consciousness based upon 
the innate and unrestricted experience within man to 
know the totality of being and his attempts to symbolize 
its meaning. From this examination of the basic directions 
that the pursuit of ultimacy flows in reference to the pole 
of consciousness, and having examined the various eras 
that summarize man's pursuit, we hope to show that the 
dynamism of this quest reveals itself to be teleologica! in 
essence, even where its specific cultural presentation does 
not survive the dynamics of change. 
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The meta-story of Part One shows that in counter-
ing the prevailing cultural norms or paradigms of ultimate 
meaning, man in his historicity continually renews the 
quest for religious consciousness. In our era, as mentioned 
above, the tendency to completely dismiss religious 
symbols as subjective anachronisms is the underside of the 
ascending paradigm of scientific rationality that denies 
any evidence or possibility of transcendent goals for man. 
By determining the final limits of reality and conscious-
ness, the scienti fie-technological paradigm of meaning and 
its consequential mood of pessimistic secularity have 
become a religious issue. 
It is not their positive values that are our concern 
here; rather, it is the emerging conviction that man lives in 
a world without any real sense of the sacred or eternal 
order to things; that life is utterly relative, admitting 
short-term purposes only. 
However strange it appears upon reflection, man's 
confidence in rational investigations of nature have un-
covered, as Professor Monod insists, the absence of a 
rational order to the universe. The natural forces and 
energies are blindly moving in a mechanical manner with-
out any design except by chance. According to this way 
of looking at things, man is without any experiential or 
experimental foundation for symbolizing an ultimate 
coherence to life. He is adrift in a constantly changing 
environment, making the best of the contingencies that 
chance deals him. The optimism of the nineteenth century 
crashed upon the social upheavals and dilemmas of our 
time. Consequently, history no longer implies an up-
ward cultural development of value. With the scientific 
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endorsement of chance, an abiding sense of purposeless 
isolation characterizes man's final outlook on today's 
future. 
Part Two takes up this lingering problem of cul-
tural meaninglessness by reexamining natural evidence for 
traces of meaning that could substantiate belief in the 
formation of religious consciousness. Moreover, by using 
our historical survey in Part One, we propose that the 
source of this formation is the directed dynamism of man's 
self-conscious quest for ultimacy; that the framework 
within which man continually acts and reflects is teleo-
logica!, with only the cultural content undergoing revision; 
that in every modality of consciousness expressed in our 
major delineation of cultural history, the same fundamen-
tal desire to know being in its plenitude persists un-
diminished by time and circumstance. Cultural history 
from this universal perspective provides an index then of 
those successive plateaus which man has reached in his 
efforts at forming this most comprehensive of viewpoints. 
The empirical data of culture with its behavioral conse-
quences can be inspected. Cultural eras may present 
differing content of ultimate value but man remains 
self-consistent in pursuing the goal of transcendence. 
Each modality of consciousness contributes to the desire 
to know being. Each modality, as seen in our analysis of 
Part One, seems unable to subside until the experience of 
a comprehensive vision occurs that integrates all the 
coincidental manifolds or stratas of being. In a way, each 
is looking for a unified field theory that explains the 
mystery of life's dynamism. 
Even where ultimate insights and paradigms have 
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opposed one another, there is a transitional unity that 
sustains a constant drive toward meaning. The failures 
of the past have a positive value in that they reveal the 
progressive dynamism still of consciousness to recognize 
the insurpassable limitations of attempting ultimate 
meaning within the borders of any modality. 
In the final portion of Part Two we suggest evidence 
and theory that the possibility or hypothesis for trans-
cendence, for fulfilling religious consciousness as an actual 
living experience, resides within man himself. And that 
the immanent source for this achievement is the teleo-
logica! dynamism of his consciousness. In the unrestricted 
desire to realize ultimate meaning, whose presence sur-
faces in every major period of history, man is effective 
in this achievement to the degree that he chooses the 
appropriate ordering of those existential symbols that 
direct the inner transformation to its goal. Where he fails, 
the hunt continues. Our conclusion is that the proof or 
worth of this hypothesis lies in its testing the creative 
force of consciousness in the integration of those symbols 
that produce or initiate the process of transcendence, a 
process that would seem to include and yet supercede 
all the modalities of consciousness as expressed in cultural 
history. 

Part One 
Nature and Ultimacy 
as Themes in Western History 

1 
Mythological Beginnings 
The Hellenic world was unhampered by foreign 
invasions from the eleventh to the sixth century.1 Neither 
internal revolutions, imperial rulers nor temporal and 
ecclesiastic bureaucracies tampered with the emergence of 
Greek culture. The transition from archaeos to classic 
Hellinism developed without foreign interference, freely, 
so to speak, from aristocracies and widely separated local 
clans into the polis. The sociological and political struc-
tures were affected by the increasing population and the 
emergence of a mercantile economy.2 Gradually, Greek 
culture was transformed into a colonization of small, 
city-states. The polis was the autonomous, nontribal 
community that required no national, complex adminis-
tration. Citizenship was extended to all classes. In keeping 
with the insistence of independent self-government, the 
transition from the older forms was uneven. Sparta, for 
example, kept a rigid aristocratic constitution while 
Athens enjoyed an eventual urbanized democracy. It was 
not until the fourth century when the Macedonian hege-
mony consolidated its empire that the polis passed into 
oblivion.3 
4 / Part One 
The golden age of Hellenic culture associated with 
the greatest city-state of Athens emerged out of the pre-
servation of Achaean and Mycenaean cultural traditions 
that originated far earlier than the pre-socratic philoso-
phies of the sixth century.4 Among the earliest attempts 
to establish a continuity between the past Mycenaean 
society Iliad its descendants are the epics ascribed to 
Homer, his Illiad and Odyssey. 
The Homeric Myth 
In the cultural literature of his day, Homer stands 
as the personification of the whole body of epic saga. The 
cosmic portrait and the society of the gods and men sym-
bolized in his epics communicated a common body of 
convictions throughout the areas of Asia Minor, Italy, 
North Africa and Macedonia. These two epics became a 
perennial source of mythic inspiration, influencing both 
religious and moral ideas for generations. Moreover, these 
stories have prevailed historically as being a descriptive 
review of cultural Greece at the time of its feudal aris-
tocracies. 
The primary resource for the materials of his two 
compositions lies, as it will for the Greek philosophers, in 
an older, immemorial tradition—the myths handed down 
by the Ancients.5 While accepting their authenticity, 
Homer foreshadows a divergence, nevertheless, from the 
inherited tradition in that his stories, unlike those of his 
later competitor, Hesiod, do not center on the establish-
ment of the cosmic order by the gods. Instead, he 
presumes the cosmos in general, and synthesizing the 
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mythic tradition with actual historical events, describes 
the Olympian pantheon as a reflection of the regimes and 
idiosyncracies of the kings and princes of Mycenae.6 
Homer is not primarily interested in disclosing 
heavenly events occurring upon the divine sphere of 
activity. His concern is not theogony or cosmogony. The 
attitude of Homeric man towards his gods was in keeping 
with his anthropomorphic conception of them. In the 
sacral architecture in Greece, Sicily and southern Italy, 
one finds the basic proportions of statue and temple the 
same as those of man himself. The gods of the Homeric 
world were shaped like human beings, although they were 
far more ingenious, handsome and vital than ordinary 
men. According to W. Willi, "there was no ethical, no 
metaphysical, and above all no genealogical distinction 
between god and man. Only immortality separated them; 
but this immortality served more to legitimize the lineage 
of the hero than to establish the god as essentially differ-
ent from man."7 Human activity does not serve so much 
as a vehicle for a higher, divine purpose; rather, the stories 
of the gods narrate sufficient insight to explicate earth's 
happenings, especially for the ruling class—the chieftains 
and warriors of the Aegean world.8 The common people 
were separated from the nobility by rank, prestige and 
power; so too, the gods from mortals. Homer spied the 
virtues and the vices, the ambitious maneuverings as well 
as the ruses and strategies—the normal prerogatives, in 
other words, of the ruling class in their zest for preferen-
tial treatment and accomplishment. Admitting that Zeus 
is the divine center, Homer still portrays him as a badgered 
head of the household amidst his sacred duties. 
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Impulsive by nature, Zeus is often harassed by his 
numerous relatives, thwarted by his spouse and intimi-
dated by his progeny. He resembles a human father, who, 
in this case, happens to be a king and thus must deal with 
public opinion—that is, with his warriors and nobles 9 As 
an absolute monarch, however, the king could put aside 
established precedents, overrule his family advisors and 
insist on his royal prerogatives. Like an aristocratic king, 
Zeus' judgments were right not because they were correct 
but because they were his decisions 
Homer seems to have transferred the drama of the 
court to the heavenly pantheon, including a little irony. 
For the myth portrays the gods, along with their other 
qualities, as capricious, vain and dishonest A Homeric 
hero, then—Achilles, Hector or Odysseus—is easily the 
moral superior of them all, even father Zeus Perhaps what 
Homer is pointing out is something very pragmatic that 
men do not worship the gods because they are good, but 
because they are powerful, better to play it safe with a 
ritual sacrifice than incur the wrath of a temperamental 
deity 10 
Even then there was no guarantee for history (as 
we shall see in a moment), and well-laid plans go astray as 
the whims and caprices of the gods have their unpredict-
able courses Anything of the nature of personal com-
munion with the gods by men in general was out of the 
question, except for a favored few who were carried by the 
gods to Olympus during their life, but none after death. 
In the Homeric vision of eschatology, human immortality 
is highly questionable. 
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Moira: the Mythic Core of Homeric Eschatology 
Homer's panoramic survey of the gods involves 
their relationships with men in a complete spectrum of 
feeling—victory and disgrace, hopes and tragedy. The 
entire field of response is recorded in the mythic tales. 
In the background, however, is a startlingly ambiguous 
factor, the intrusion of destiny or fate, called Moira.11 
The role of purpose and design in divine and human affairs 
includes Moira, who impartially accompanies every sort 
of scheme and activity, insuring both physical and moral 
boundaries in the universe. Gods and men have their 
legitimate territories and positions in the cultural scheme 
of things and transgressions release an unexplained com-
pensatory process that eventually furnishes retribution. 
Homer weaves human purpose within this context of 
Moira. At times Zeus can only confirm Moira, thus i i-
dicating that there is something more ultimate than div'.ie 
power.12 
To appreciate the impact of Moira, one has to re-
call that the name means allotment or share, as well as 
death and doom. Later in Hesiod's presentation of myth, 
he describes Moira as a daughter of Night, who along with 
her sisters, Moirai, prosecute transgressions against gods 
and men and do not pause until they have exacted due 
punishment from the transgressor.13 Moira, then, sym-
bolizes a dark power who fixes decline and death. 
While it belongs to the nature of the divine to 
assist, to bestow and to inspire, since it is one with the 
abundance of life, then death separates itself from life 
by an impassable chasm. Homer depicts the gods on the 
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side of burgeoning vitality, which the deities confront 
on all its sides. For man to encounter them, he must be 
active, moving forward with nature's dynamism. Then 
the gods can encompass the living with their strength 
and knowledge. The gods can do all things for the living 
except control the nocturnal aspect of existence, and all 
that necessarily leads to it. Their oneness with nature 
shared with mankind is in no way compromised by their 
inability to surmount the scales of Moira, for who can not 
stay in the path of life is no longer enriched by a deity. 
For Homer, Moira personifies doom. She introduces 
only catastrophes and irreversible errors, such as the fall 
of Troy and the bitter quarrel between Achilles and 
Agamemnon.14 There are moments and events which 
appear to be headed for destruction, and yet, at the last 
moment, a deity intervenes. These savings are "beyond 
Moira" (hyper moiron), in the sense that as the conse-
quences unfolded, Moira had not appointed them for final 
dissolution. Once Moira decrees, the gods must with-
draw.15 There is no exception ever. 
The Ambiguity of Destiny 
The face of destiny does not imply fatalism in the 
myth. Homer never hints that events are predetermined. 
Destiny means eventual death, besides destruction and 
catastrophes, and though men and gods often feel frus-
trated by its appearance, it does not relieve matters. Death 
is not part of life, but it is part of order. Limitation and 
cessation, while alien to life and the creative productivity 
of the gods, are yet lawful experiences that affect the 
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entire cosmos. Nothing escapes the power of the gods, 
and nothing escapes fate. These two fundamental ex-
periences intersect throughout nature, and Homer has 
a certain unresolved paradox connected with their mutual 
confrontation. 
The gods are in charge of life. They attempt to 
temporize with Moira, fully realizing that her demands 
eventually overrule. Yet Homer never portrays Moira as 
stronger than the gods. He does not contrast them from 
that perspective. The gods, unlike men, possess a knowl-
edge of when Moira will visit anyone, anywhere. She is 
not superior in knowledge to the gods. Once they know 
her shadow is approaching, they take their leave, for life 
has nothing in common with death. Hence the myth 
describes man's existence after passing through death—not 
in symbols suggesting a continuing vital force, but in 
those depicting a shadowy and misty realm.16 Everything 
there is less than the imitation of life. In this underworld 
of existence, man measures himself only in terms of past 
images. Whether life is unconditionally preferable to 
death has no meaning. For the deceased, direction is only 
backwards, releasing an eerie melancholy from which all 
the magic of life has departed. Into the house of Hades, 
(the Zeus of the underworld), have come the dead to 
dwell forever—vigorless and hopeless. 
While the idea of fate clarifies the idea of life, the 
myth is at a standstill over how fate, the negation of 
existence, can be an essential part of the cosmic, ordered 
existence, which the gods seek to display and preserve. 
Moira and the gods operate independently of each other. 
Homer does not theorize, but follows the pragmatic 
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trails of human existence from birth until death. And in 
some way history, with its tragic dimensions of human 
life, must still come under the domain of Zeus. 
Destiny: the Ultimate Melancholy 
One explanation may be that a certain static am-
biguity is unremoved from the myth. Homer's presentation 
of the myth finds little to say about a dynamic historical 
orientation—in a word, the future. The divine-human 
operations present us with a theocratic culture that 
remains fully rounded. Hints regarding a qualitatively 
different future are not broached. The cosmic order and 
regularity have been fixed in such a way that nature's 
objectivity encloses history once and for all. Spontaneous 
and creative enterprises receive no importance for alter-
ing essentials in Homer's view of culture. The weight of 
the myth is always towards the objectivity of the world 
and its enduring processes, and not inward toward the 
myth of the soul with the possibility for unheralded po-
tentials. The perspective on life gleaned from the myth 
is so tightly pragmatic that it does not leave room for a 
broader horizon of genuine progress that may not always 
be a repetition of the past. 
Homer has so externalized the myth that there is 
little prospect for unprecedented development. To a great 
extent, the heroes, resembling the cosmic laws, are set in 
their biographies. Enshrined forever in their goodness or 
badness, 17 they are strangely unable to learn from passing 
through crises. The great Odysseus, for example, whose 
decades of wandering through an eventful life, beset by all 
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sorts of challenges, should have returned home with a 
presence and quality of stature that his departure twenty 
years before could have no grounds for anticipating. 
Instead, he returns home untouched by time, the same as 
ever. Throughout his escapades he had been counseled 
and assisted by the gods, urged on to complete his task. 
The thrust of life had been always the proving ground for 
him in his contact with the gods. But the heroes eventually 
go the way of the cosmos. Things wear down in nature. 
Man grows weary. Old age sets in. Consciousness dims. 
The buoyant energy of the spirit gradually loses its vitality. 
Man apparently is not destined for immortality—the 
natural condition of the gods. 
While the myth carries a reverent awe for the 
prolificacy of life, it does not hide from the inevitable. 
Homer's sense of realism does not banish, nor gloss over, 
the inexplicable. Yet with all its affirmation of life, the 
ambiguities of the myth, necessary and unresolved, can 
lead to a pessimistic realism. The heroes are abandoned by 
their tutelary deities. Destiny will follow its own timetable 
which life can neither decipher nor overcome. The 
inscrutableness of the best of plans laid low, life verging 
away from its heroes (let alone the ordinary person), 
places a burden upon the myth that Homer admits is 
simply the perennial situation. Within man's world of 
order and goals runs a nullifying occurrence that persists at 
cross-purposes with the positive meaning of life. Teleology 
stays rankled: if the living Zeus decrees all, then how can 
Moira keep life unconsummated? 
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The Hesiodic Myth 
While the cosmos is viewed by Homer as the con-
text for the life both of gods and men (and thus more 
ultimate than either of them), nevertheless he still 
acknowledges the real ultimate, Moira, but leaves the 
meaning of death undeveloped. Posed by the myth, the 
antimony between mortality and immortality is now 
taken up anew by another Greek poet, Hesiod, whose 
major writings develop other strands of the inherited myth 
left untouched by Homer. 
Let us first compare Hesiod's presentation of the 
myth in a synoptic outline. R. Lattimore remarks that 
for Herodotus, "Homer and Hesiod were contempor-
aries."18 But Lattimore follows recent scholarship that 
tends to put Hesiod later, possibly into the early seventh 
century. In any case, Hesiod reintroduced other portions 
of the inherited ancient myths. 
Less conservative in his approach to the sacred pan-
theon, he proposes a different set of symbols and arrange-
ments which would give meaning to Greek life, not from 
the vantage level of aristocracy but more to the emerging, 
diverse classes of citizenry of which the author belonged 
in the role of farmer. A cultural transition is now magni-
fied in the mythic symbols. For the first time, the divine 
ancestry is situated into a definite genealogy, thus em-
phasizing the initial primacy of the female principle, 
recalling the cultic, fertility motifs involving annual rites 
of seasonal passage.19 
In Hesiod's Theogony one finds a type of causal 
thinking, clothed in symbols, but consistently portraying 
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generation as a real form of becoming. Nature gods come 
first, and by the device of mating and producing more 
specifically differentiated progeny, they determine the 
original stages of cosmologica! development. "In Hesiod's 
view," according to N. Brown, "the present order of the 
universe can only be understood as the outcome of a pro-
cess of growth and change."20 This process of divine 
emergence and differentiation comprises the most spectac-
ular part of the independent activity of the gods. A cosmo-
genetic myth describing the panoramic dialectics involved 
in its history unfolds, reflecting cultural change. 
Hesiod's other mythic presentation, Works and 
Days, presupposes the cosmic structure and ordination of 
the Theogony. For Hesiod, work and justice have to be the 
fundamental institutions of mankind's world. The empha-
sis was brought upon the author as he observed the social 
complications involved in a transitional period where the 
peasant classes wanted a share in the transforming of 
culture, and the aristocracy, resistently indifferent, contin-
ued its political and economic advantages.21 Hesiod thus 
expounds his dignified view of human labor, its mixed 
blessings and hardships, tracing the problem of toil to its 
original crisis. The myth narrates how mankind once lived 
in a golden age without needing to work,22 and how 
Prometheus' theft of fire23 from Zeus brought retribution 
upon humans in the creation of Pandora,24 the first 
woman, who ushered in grief and harassment into the 
world. Hesiod speaks for the man that Homer overlooked, 
the man in the streets, portraying symbolically the diffu-
sion of power in the Greek city-states struggling for 
existence. These newer cultural formation were supported 
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by the capitalism of the merchants, farmers and craftsmen 
who were now competing for status with the leisured 
class.25 
The Myth of Cosmic History 
The mythic cosmogony assumes that there was 
something existing from the beginning. Some primitive 
substance was there molded into the universe. According-
ly, the universe begins from Chaos.26 The story continues 
with the predominance of the powers of nature, whereby 
the various nature-personifications from the Sky to the 
Underworld are properly disposed only after a strenuous 
battle between the older and younger generations of gods. 
The prolonged showdown terminates with Zeus' superior 
forces of law (Themisto), justice (Dike) and preeminent 
wisdom (Metis). Having won the day, the universe is 
organized as the purposeful cosmos.27 
The myth is constructed to show the divine cosmos 
under two different aspects: the historical process cul-
minating in Zeus' supremacy, and the dispensation of his 
rule. The Theogony acutely dramatizes cosmic becoming 
as generation by progressive proliferation and differentia-
tion. The entire process covers the divine, the physical and 
the human, originating in and sustained by an immanent 
creative energy called desire (Eros). Hesiod's understanding 
of life is not a duality between activity and inactivity nor 
between the forces of creativity and inertia-, rather, the 
present tripartite structure of the cosmos has been the 
continuing and successive result of an ordered process 
of growth and change. Desire is that all-encompassing 
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primordial force intermingling with the Void and Earth 
to produce the cosmos. Earth, the mother, and Zeus, the 
king, are the beginning and end of the cosmic history, the 
direction of which process moves from a natural to a more 
anthropocentric order, allowing for the transitional stages 
of cultural history to be portrayed in the various heavenly 
conflicts. These tensions between the older structures and 
boundaries and those of the newer spontaneous and 
diverse expressions of creativity are here submitted (in-
stead of merely annihilated) to the synthesizing power of 
Zeus' wisdom, the eventual ruler. 
While still acknowledging the ultimate authority of 
Zeus, found equally in the Homeric myth, Hesiod removes 
its static repetitive quality by introducing creative pro-
liferation, enabling man and nature to develop in multi-
directions beyond the limits envisaged by Homer. What 
opens up the future is Hesiod's subservience of Moira to a 
new goddess. Dike, the principle of just order.28 Fate is 
now subordinate to the creative potentials of order. Nature 
is not so tightly bounded as in Homer's presentation. The 
cosmos is seen as inherently dynamic, full of latent his-
torical tensions. Recurring polarities transfused throughout 
the world continue to rise and fall, teeming with change 
and stability. Zeus achieves his universal domination, 
among spontaneity and unpredictableness in his domain, 
not by brute might, but by astute recruiting, on a more 
political basis, the pre-existing forces contained in the 
universe. His norjnative insight is not repression, but like 
an experienced father balancing and resolving the family 
feuds, governing by positive direction and just order. 
The independence of Moira is transformed into obedience 
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to Zeus as the way to peace and order. 
The everyday problem through the eyes of Hesiod 
is the city-states' necessity for establishing law and organ-
ization without doing violence to the people's free cultural 
development. Repression, refusing to deal positively with 
the creative and inexorable possibilities awaiting the 
citizens of the future, will only visit upon the land a con-
tinuous cycle of retaliatory violence and havoc. Hesiod 
admits the presence of unruly forces-those freakish and 
destructive veerings in both man and nature symbolized 
by the furious queen of battle, Athena. Yet one must 
remember that she was born, not from the earth, an 
unruly genesis, but from Zeus' head.29 To insure that she 
would have an affinity for him in spite of herself and not 
be opposed entirely to his ruling, he took the precaution 
of swallowing Metis, thus making Athena the child of 
wisdom. Even the forms of destruction and war are subor-
dinated and controlled ultimately by the ruling power of 
Zeus. 
Likewise, the social structures and policies must 
erect and preserve themselves "according to nature," 
recognizing that the erratic displays of nature are always 
brought eventually under the guidance of Zeus. Nature 
becomes the prototype for society. In nature one often 
finds opposing forces bringing forth newer forms and 
hybrids that somehow reconcile the competition without 
destroying each other without trace. The leaders of society 
must be careful not to abolish unfailingly and unfairly 
the continual emergence of new cultural forms. The 
cosmos has more of a genuine future than Homer 
supposed. Consequently, the state must reconcile the old 
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and the new by incorporating the polarity into a new 
order, allowing for the freer exchange and interplay of 
roles and functions. The myth underscores political inter-
cession which promotes creative reinterpretation within 
society. 
Hesiod views the remoteness of the gods differently 
than Homer. Their distance allows for a new freedom for 
man. The poet himself exemplified this advance. His 
departure from the accepted form of issuing his poems 
anonymously—he claimed that the Muses30 visited him and 
instructed him to compose—and his critical revision of the 
inherited tradition already displays a new independent 
spirit emerging with the new polis. The favoritism of the 
gods towards their heroes is a passing stage. Zeus has 
evolved history to a point where his just will, rather than 
fate or the pragmatic exigencies of placating the divine, 
becomes the dominant force operating uniformly, regu-
larly, and pervasively throughout the cosmos. Zeus is no 
longer a magnified version of an Aegean king. The cen-
trality of justice, the daughter of Zeus, is integral to his 
eternal reign. The myth portrays her sitting beside her 
father, thus placing her "in the context of the universal 
order guaranteed by Zeus."31 She will complain to her 
father when men do wicked things. No unjust cause will 
triumph with her watchful eye. Sooner or later the wrongs 
and abuses will be righted. Exploitation and insubordina-
tion to the fixed order (hubris) will not go unheeded. The 
moral ambiguities of a divine order with unpredictable 
exceptions and favorites have receeded from the horizon 
of a new age of moral integrity, uniting both divinity and 
man under its stable progression. 
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Hesiodic Eschatology: Moira Clearly Subservient 
to Dike 
In the Iliad (18.115)we are told how Achilles grieves 
over his forthcoming early death but finds consolation in 
knowing that even the powerful Heracles could not escape 
Moira. Hesiod contradicts this older presentation by 
pointing out how Heracles clashed with Moira and 
wounded her.32 A mere mortal gained communion with 
the gods, overcoming death. Admittedly, he is the only 
exception mentioned. But how provocative! As Nilsson 
mentions, "it is the apotheosis. Heracles was a mortal man 
and became a god."33 To what extent Hesiod meant this 
incredible triumph to be in any way paradigmatic of man-
kind, or even of a special group, remains undisclosed by 
the poet. Moira, while retaining her role, has certainly 
lost her autonomy. The insecurities and unanticipated 
failures of life recede from the absurd into the domain of 
divine order. Man is now freer and thus more responsible 
under Dike, recalling the echo of a lost era of blissful 
freedom with the gods. 
Is Zeus' plan for history slowly regaining its former 
inheritance? Will the ultimate conflict—death—be trans-
formed into a hope similar to Heracles' victory? No 
answer is fittingly rendered. Yet man is freer. History is 
more than a cyclic repetition of static forces. Man can 
choose among a rich and varied series of options readily 
available in society to promote cultural changes. Man 
can even opt to oppose Zeus. In fact, this horrendous 
choice had been made in the past, thus incurring a uni-
versal "Fall" affecting mankind in dire ways. The full 
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recapitulation remains untold. We are left like before with 
Homer's myth, except the gloom of fate's insecurity has 
been brightened and replaced by the knowledge that 
destiny serves justice. While Moira has no independent 
status superior to Zeus, the ultimate significance of death 
is not fully revealed. We are told that men will receive 
everything that is their due, a due that is measured by 
Zeus' justice. Given the orientation of the myth, the 
resolution of whether or not man can attain immortality is 
not an irrevocably closed issue. The definitive answer, like 
the myth, remains incomplete. 
Myth: the Cultural Imperative 
Belief in myth allowed the Greeks to find the sig-
nificance of their age, for myth presented the divine and 
human models for interpreting human existence. The myth 
justified their world in terms of a theogonie, cosmogonie 
and theomorphic conviction. Life was not meaningless. 
Instead, there exists a cosmic order that permeates every 
level of reality. Nature, including mankind, and the 
heavenly bodies express a divine sanction depicted sym-
bolically in the society of the gods. The myth provided, 
as for their ancestors, an interpretative framework large 
enough to include the entire ambit of their human ex-
perience. The myth's functional presence in consciousness 
illuminated the experience of participating in a cosmic 
reality in which divinity, the natural world and the various 
facets and segments of society coalesced meaningfully 
into a cultural totality. Even when the Greek philosophers 
developed linguistic forms that expressed fundamental 
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convictions about reality without using the mythical mode 
of thought, the mythic tradition was always presupposed 
and never completely abolished. Human culture in the 
Greek polis was evermore than its tangible immediacy of 
familial and commercial tasks. The events of daily life and 
human enterprise were enlarged by a symbolic objectivity 
that assured the people of their participation in a cosmic 
drama of sacred consequences: human life became a tan-
gible microcosm of the divine vitality personified in the 
myth. It could be said, as Malinowski did of his Melanesian 
researches, ". . . there exists a special class of stories, 
regarded as sacred, embodied in ritual, morals, and social 
organization, and which form an integral and active part 
of . . . culture. These stories live not by idle interest, not 
as fictitious . . . but are to the natives a statement of a 
primeval, greater, and more relevant reality by which the 
present life, fates, and activities of mankind are deter-
mined, the knowledge of which supplies man with the 
motive for ritual and moral actions, as well as with indica-
tions as to how to perform them."34 
Myth bore a scale of values that enabled the people 
to understand themselves beside the forces and movements 
of nature. It linked them to the mysterious, ancient past 
as well as to the unforeseeable future, while inspiring them 
to enter into a harmony with a sacred world order. Oppo-
sitions, antagonisms, even failures, were truly there in the 
context of life, but these features were not incoherent 
exceptions to the overall cosmic order. They were toler-
able ambiguities that eventually yielded, in dialectical 
fashion, to the supremacy of law and wisdom. However 
sinister and threatening the human condition may appear, 
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whatever the ambivalent mixture of good and evil affecting 
the lot of mankind, the myth symbolized all these forces 
and phenomena, antithetical or otherwise, into an intelli-
gible harmony measuring justice (Dike) to everyone. 
The Evolution of Myth 
The mythic inheritance in its transmission through 
history may undergo modification in its symbolic meaning. 
Again, not all of the rich tradition is necessarily conveyed 
at any one period. Homer's use of the tradition was aptly 
suitable to the one strata of society that dominated Greek 
history. On the basis of a projection into the future 
generations, his presentation is insufficient to anticipate, 
let alone meaningfully account for the future currents and 
cultural changes in Greek history. Within the consistency 
and the import of the mythic signification of the Odyssey 
and the Iliad— Greek civilization as Homer knew it—the 
emergence of Greek city-states and their decline could not 
have been conceivable nor appreciated. 
The heroic age, so well epitomized by Homer, is 
still remembered but is no longer in prominence. Notable 
events have taken place that demand a reinterpretation of 
cultural reality, especially man's place in society. Enter 
Hesiod. His dramatic rendering of the myth portrays the 
significance of cultural change and development, allowing 
for new social émergents and latent commercial forces to 
materialize, while still maintaining the entire panorama of 
cultural transition within the guidance of divine wisdom. 
The unpredictable diversity found" in the cultural 
expressions of Greek society preceeding Alexander's 
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colonialization now had a rationale. The mythic symbol-
isms included a broad recognition of the origin, powers 
and latent energies of nature (Theogony) in conjunction 
with a new realization of man's basic worth in an enlarging 
non-aristocratic context (Work and Days). These factors-
nature's dynamic proliferation, and the new emphasis on 
the citizen's individuality—continually interacted to pro-
duce newer cultural forms in opposition to the more con-
ventional societal patterns portrayed by Homer. Just from 
the economics of the time, the cheaper technology of the 
Iron Age permitted the growth of private property and 
investment. Politically speaking, kingship and its accom-
panying aristocratic structures were passing into the more 
republican texture of the city-states. The decentralization 
of political power and the rapid emergence of a mercantile 
economy stimulated unprecedented variations of social 
strata. Hesiod's achievement with the myth accounted for 
the new cultural differentiations and sustained a sense of 
cosmic security amidst the transitional forms of the life 
community. 
Myth: the Foundation of Religious Consciousness 
In providing a fundamental pattern for living, the 
myth, by its orienting, directing and motivating the total 
life of the community, would seem to derive its power 
from the inner conviction of its meaningfiilness. That is, 
it functions in consciousness with those symbols that 
unite man's self-understanding with his experience of life 
in an ultimate context. For the Hellenic mind, myth 
connected everyday living with the divine cosmos. One's 
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life in society participated in a sacred order: the cosmos is 
alive with soul and intelligence (zoon empsycbon ennoun, 
as Plato reasserted in the Timaeus 30b-c). Man's self-
understanding, symbolized by the contents of the myth, 
could always be inspired by a tangible referent: the detect-
able presence of cosmic order witnessed in the steady 
movements of the heavens and the rhythms of nature. 
This teleologica! referent bore a consistent authority that 
insinuated the experience of participating in ultimacy. 
Whence the relationship of myth to the Greek religious 
consciousness. The daily, particularized experience of the 
cosmos united to its universal symbolization in the myth 
could evoke the conviction that the events of one's life 
possessed a sacred purposeness beyond its mundane and 
contingent appearances. Myth thus becomes the vehicle 
for religious consciousness, and from this perspective, 
mediates the search for the divine ultimate and the human 
ideal. Moreover, the life orientation of this search is 
simultaneously and integrally related to the establishment 
of the order of society or Hellinic culture. In this way 
then, myth, as the cultural imperative, symbolizes religious 
consciousness. 
Examining the myth as a whole, one finds an 
unusual degree of freedom in the symbolic correlations to 
the changing social conditions. The implications of myth 
are more than just a designation as "mythopoetics" to 
indicate an idiom of literary expression or artistry. The 
features of Greek life are guided by the myth, and at the 
same time intrude upon the myth's capacity for expansion 
and alteration. For myth to be significant in the lives of 
the people, it must be able to integrate their experiences 
24/Part One 
of living with its symbolic intelligibility. It is not that 
Hesiod, for example, is superior to Homer, but that each 
presents adequate symbols of the life community that 
pertain to its cultural continuance in being. 
In briefly reviewing the Greek inheritance, we have 
attempted to show that the expression of mythology may 
be located in time, while the vitality of mythic conscious-
ness is not confined to the empirical circumstances of the 
Hellenic versions. Myth turns out to be a constituent of 
man's being and, as such, emerges constantly in his efforts 
to objectify his cultural standards of humanization. The 
Greek world was an important and typical synthesis of 
how man uses mythic symbols to record and direct the 
search for ultimate meaning. Fascinating as it is, we must 
leave the richer implications of a philosophy of myth 
and turn now to the development of cultural history, still 
within the Hellenistic era, but moving into a different 
level of interpretation: philosophy, or the presence of 
logos. 
2 
Philosophical Beginnings 
In appreciating the changing and unpredictable 
circumstances of life that could have pressured for succes-
sive mythic interpretations over two hundred years, a 
series of unprecedented events from the sixth to the fourth 
century contribute a new perspective to the meaning of 
myth as a religious and cultural phenomenon. 
During these two hundred years of cultural dynam-
ics, there emerges, alongside of the uneven preservation DÌ 
mythic thought, a reflective mode of consciousness that 
addresses itself to the same themes and content symbol-
ized in the myth. In addition, a new contribution is made 
to the Greek heritage by the construction of a philosophy 
within the mythic framework. Due primarily to the efforts 
of Plato, it has bequeathed a lasting influence upon West-
ern man's self-understanding. The debt the philosophers 
owe to the mythic foundations of Hellenic civilization 
is incalculable. The presentation by Homer and Hesiod, 
as E. Voegelin remarks, "was a spiritual and intellectual 
revolution; for inasmuch as it established the types of 
cosmic and ethical forces, as well as the types of their 
relations and tensions, it created, in the form of the myth, 
26/Part One 
a highly theorized body of knowledge concerning the 
position of man in his world that could be used by the 
philosophers as the starting point for metaphysical analy-
sis and differentiation."1 
From the sixth century in the Greek colony of 
Ionia come the earliest accounts of philosophical reflec-
tion. These ancient philosophers were theorists and men of 
empirical science. They had been instructed in the techni-
cal skill which had been introduced from Babylon, Egypt 
and India, and which enabled them to pursue their parti-
cular interests in astronomy and celestial phenomena. 
Although they made numerous calculations and collected 
observational data about eclipses and meteors, along with 
the peculiarities of their Ionian weather, still these intel-
lectual labors did not satisfy their inquiring minds. 
Inquisitively, they sought a first principle (arche), a 
beginning that sustains itself as an explanation, that under-
lies the tangible objects of their investigations into the 
realm of nature or physics. In the review of his predeces-
sors' investigations, it is Aristotle's contention that in re-
stricting their pursuits these scientific philosophers were 
unable to obtain a clear notion of more than one—at best 
two—of the four causes that comprise a causal analysis of 
nature.2 The majority of these pre-socratics, according to 
the stagerite's description, made a material cause the 
principle of everything. For example, Thaïes selected 
"water," Anaximander "the limited," Heraclitus "fire." 
Fascinated with the world of change and stability, the pre-
socratic philosophers explored nature, gradually experienc-
ing a differentiation of consciousness that developed a 
new method of speculation and a new form of expression. 
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Their self-reflective experience discovered that nature's 
order could be intelligibly explained by reflective con-
cepts as well as mythical symbols of gods. Logos was born. 
A brief survey is in order here to show how these Greek 
thinkers sought to convince their followers that the logos 
in man could also express his experiences of ultimacy. 
The Logos Experience of Ultimacy 
In surveying the contributions of these men, we 
shall highlight as far as possible the normative insight 
that each proposed as the clarifying unity for their ex-
periences of life. For the most part, our citing of these 
men will be a chronological task. 
Thaies. In assessing the constitution of the world, 
Thaïes believed that the cosmos is not only divine, but 
that the universal cause of everything is water. His asser-
tion should not be entirely surprising, for the mythic 
tradition maintained by his Greek culture already indi-
cated that from Océanos, the god of the primeval waters, 
have sprung all gods and mankind.3 
Anaximander. Agreeing with Thaïes that there is 
only ultimate substance in process, Anaximander differed 
from his mentor in noting that the sustaining arche of all 
determinate phenomena could not itself be determinate. 
In some way, while containing all contrasts and specific 
qualities witnessed in nature, it had to be other than these 
elements of actuality. That one arche without limiting 
characteristics he posited as the "boundless" or "un-
limited" (apeiron).4 The somewhat abstractive termin-
ology introduced here is never completely secularized, 
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that is, removed from its mythic influence. While he does 
not personify the gods in his philosophical descriptions, 
yet Anaximander refers to "the unlimited" as immortal 
and ageless, the familiar phrase that Homer cites to charac-
terize the gods.5 
Anaximenes. In returning to the approach of Thaïes, 
Anaximenes thought his predecessor's principle of "the 
boundless" too vague to account for nature in her diver-
sity. The problem of how the oneness of reality becomes 
the many goes unanswered. In the place of "the bound-
less" he selects air or vapor (aer), and like Thaïes with his 
water principle, he considers air the divine substance out 
of which the entire cosmos is made.6 
The Pythagoreans. Uneasy with the solutions of 
the lonians over the problem of the individual behavior of 
things, the pythagoreans took a different tack. Instead of 
searching for a material substrate, they were inspired by 
their investigations in acoustics and musical harmony to 
apply these studies to the cosmos. They spoke of the 
cosmic harmony, associating order with form and shape, 
postulating that the principles of being were mathematical 
in character. Nature in its diverse patterns and laterations 
is the result of geometrical proportions and arithmetical 
multiples. The cosmos is a symbolic world of number or 
form. Much more intelligible than matter, "form" or 
"mathematical truth" became the essence of things.7 
Their emphasizing mathematics as a fundamental 
function of human knowledge is curiously aligned with 
their religious association of theoria with praxis. Com-
bining scientific research in their mathematic diciphering 
of the world with an explicit religious rule of life, "the 
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teachings of Pythagoras," Frankfort remarks, "belong 
preponderantly to the sphere of mythopoeic thought. 
This can be explained if we remember his orientation 
He taught a way of life. The pythagorean society was a 
religious fraternity striving for the sanctification of its 
members."8 Pythagoras attempted to synthesize philoso-
phy with the Orphic beliefs and initiation practices. Un-
like the Homeric Olympian religion where only a favored 
few were carried to Olympus during their life time—and 
none after death—the Orphic tradition conceived man 
primarily as a fallen god who can be released by asceticism 
and sacraments from the prison of the body to regain his 
original divinity. The pythagorean affirmation of immor-
tality connotes more substantiality to man's posthumous 
existence than Homer depicts in Hades. 
Although he excoriates the poets like Pindar and 
Aeschylus for the irreverent treatment of religious issues, 
Plato remains greatly indebted to these religious and 
philosophical traditions in many ways, seen in his selection 
of form, for example, as the intelligible principle of the 
cosmos and his overt eschatology described in the Gorgias, 
Phaedo, Republic and Phaedrus dialogues.9 
Heraclitus. A former member of the pythagorean 
society, Heraclitus views the world as ceaselessly striving 
for existence. Being is becoming. Nature's restless changes 
reveal perpetual transitions that are aptly symbolized by 
fire's conflagration (ekpyrosis). Always in flux between 
tensional opposites, the cosmos is nevertheless directed by 
the divine logos that measures the temporary phases and 
transmutations of nature by an eternal standard. He re-
tains his linkage to mythic thought by having logos use 
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Dike or justice to keep the strife of oppositions within 
bounds, distributing order and measure to the cosmic 
forces.10 
Parmenides of Elea. In total opposition to the 
Heraclitean flux, for Parmenides "being" is the primal 
one—unmoveable, infinite and itself forever the principle 
of permanent stability. Change is nothing, growth is 
impossible. The cosmos is a homogeneous plenum within 
which motion is an illusionary appearance. In making the 
literal interpretation of the Olympian pantheon obsolete, 
the absolute oneness of being and god become identical.11 
With Heraclitus and Parmenides, extending unto 
Aristotle, there emerges a more critical stance towards the 
mythic dimension of the cosmos. A re-mythologizing sets 
in, whereby these later philosophers (some more than 
others), openly debunk the anthropomorphism of their 
predecessors and the public cult of the pantheon, while 
maintaining the substance of the myth in its divine impli-
cations. Although the trend remains uneven until the 
full-blown abstraction by Aristotle, cosmogony and 
cosmology are becoming less dependent upon the symbols 
involving the mythic theogony. The mythic language is 
there in their assertions but it is being stretched to cover 
more rational and empirical categories and thus distances 
itself from the pure mythology. 
The next generation of philosophers in the middle 
of the fifth century retained Parmenides' tenet that the 
pbysis is one and corporeal, but reject his refusal of the 
manifold of nature. For them, the oneness of being is not 
impaired by admitting the experience of corporeal plural-
ity. 
Philosophical Beginnings /31 
Empedodes of Sicily. Empedocles attempts to re-
concile the permanency of the One with the evidence of 
change, which he thinks Parmenides dismisses too easily 
as illusion. Keeping Hesiod's terminology, he posits that 
instead of only one immobile plenum, there are four 
fundamental and eternal elements—the roots, as it were, of 
all things. Mutations arise from the simple combinations 
of these immutable particles. Interestingly, he retains a 
mythic description of the four: fire is Zeus or Hephaestus; 
air is Hera (Zeus' wife); earth is Aidoneus (another name 
for Hades); and water is Nestis (a deity of the sea).12 The 
process of seasonal change, growth and decay is the 
responsibility of the two cosmic powers, again described 
mythically as Love (Philotes) and Strife (Neikos).13 These 
active forces attract and repel the elements in the never-
ending alterations of nature and its cyclic processes. 
Anaxagoras of Athens. Anaxagoras agrees with 
Empedocles in the attempt to reconcile the Eleatic theory 
of being with the fact of change. But he does not think 
that the ultimate, immutable particles are the four ele-
ments. Instead, he asserts that beings are made up of many 
qualitatively different particles, although in experience 
one will predominate in order to produce variety in nature. 
Thus he preserves the individual while allowing it 
to change into something else—as wood into fire and 
smoke, or food into living flesh. His prominence, as 
attested by Aristotle, however, comes not from being a 
variant interpretation of Empedocles' adaptation of Par-
menidean thought, but from his introducing the divine 
mind or nous as that creative power that initiates the pro-
cesses of nature from its primal commingling.14 Nous 
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does not create motion but instigates the rotatory motion 
that accounts for the dispersion of things and their changes. 
In making the divine mind guide the vortex in a specific 
direction, the telic aspect of cosmology begins to emerge, 
while its full explicitation has to wait until Socrates. In 
fact, in studying cosmology, Socrates mentions his dis-
appointment that Anaxagoras never reflectively plays out 
this insight to full advantage when he had the opportu-
nity.15 Even Aristotle mentions how Anaxagoras uses his 
insight without consistency, often employing it as a deus 
ex machina resolution when he could not explain certain 
aspects of nature.16 
The Atomists. The efforts of Anaxagoras and Em-
pedocles in preserving being with motion and design were 
met with the atomists' rejection of a final cause for the 
exaltation of change. In a way, Empedocles with his four 
elements mixed together to form complex beings, may 
have prepared the transition to the wholly mechanical 
vision of Democritus and Leucippus, the founders of 
Atomism. 
They eliminated the vital principle inhering in 
bodies as in the hylozoism of the Ionian philosophers, 
and the symbolic representations of love and strife of 
Empodocles, along with the nous of Anaxagoras. Motion 
now was explained as the result of absolute necessity. 
For them the only basic realities are the "atoms and void, 
and the various universes, of which there may be many, 
and all individual things in them, are simply produced by 
chance comings-together of atoms in their endless move-
ments in the void. This applies to the human soul and the 
gods as well as everything else."17 
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The world represents a vast machine with eternally 
existing atoms or dense, impenetrable bodies, always in 
motion with unlimited opportunities for combining and 
dispersing. Finality or teleology is a veil of appearance 
that results from the mechanical interplay of atoms 
colliding from fortuitous convenience in the void. They 
converge by chance and disband by chance. Any tempor-
ary equilibrium emerges from the concurrence of mechani-
cal collisions over a period of time whereby these atoms 
accidentally affix themselves into a composite whole. 
Chance is not understood by the atomists as the unfore-
seen impedence of determined activity. On the contrary, 
there is no way for accidental occurrences to interfere 
with a definite process, for nothing is ever intended. 
Teleology does not exist in reality. 
The world happens from uncalculable, blind forces. 
The imperceptible and impenetrable atoms have no in-
herent principle of dependence. Their changing occlusions 
to form beings arise without purpose or design. Yet these 
atoms bear divine imprints, strange as it may seem, for 
they are eternal, unchangeable in themselves, and self-
sufficient. Aristotle attributes to Democritus the doctrine 
that chance explains being, and, since he neglects the final 
cause, all natural motions occur by an unplanned 
necessity.18 
Since everything is by necessity, there is no room for 
chance, actually, and yet, at the same time, the latter is the 
only explanation of everything. Mentre points out that: "to 
say that chance is nothing is the same as saying it is every-
thing, that it is the active god of things; nothing is indeter-
mined, but everything derives from indétermination."19 
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Epicuras. Later, after Aristotle and the Stoics, 
Epicurus reinforced the anti-teleological worldview. He 
improved the rigid determinism of his predecessors by 
introducing the "swerve" theory, in order to justify some 
semblance of human freedom. The diversity in being 
results from the normal linear fall of the atoms through 
the void occasionally and spontaneously curving from their 
course and colliding into entanglements. From absolute 
determinism to absolute indeterminism was guaranteed 
by this new addition. Armstrong remarks that it is "abso-
lutely necessary that atoms and void should behave accord-
ing to their nature. But Epicurus recognizes arbitrary 
undetermined chance as a separate principle alongside 
physical necessity."20 Order issues out of chaos. Posterity 
has preserved his philosophy from the inspirational pen of 
Lucretius in the De Rerum Natura. 
Socrates of Athens. From Socrates to Epicurus, 
however, there was an increasing resistance against the 
Atomists' explanations. Left unchallenged, the serious 
introduction of chance as an all-pervasive principle would 
shipwreck the mythic inheritance of the religious dimen-
sion, not to say its destructive effect upon the notion of 
the world as cosmos. 
Although Socrates' career indicates that he pre-
ferred moral matters to the study of cosmology,21 what 
he taught about the telos later came to fruition, in differ-
ent ways, in Plato and Aristode. His own interest in it was 
mostly devoted to the teleologica! function of morals. 
This emphasis on understanding man as a moral being must 
not be focused just to the acquisition of particular virtues, 
but in a composite sense whereby the intellectual and 
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moral virtues support and fulfill the examined life. A life 
of virtue impelís man to his self-realization. The end of 
every natural process, in man or nature, is always a natural 
good that brings the nature to its fulfillment. In man this 
process follows a dialectical inquiry into the nature of the 
good and the true, allowing man to voluntarily complete 
his nature as he accepts responsibility for his newly-found 
knowledge. As mentioned in the Phaedo, the telic charac-
ter of man's self-development is in the foreground of a 
world that in its cosmic movements and natural effects is 
directed by beneficent powers. While remaining somewhat 
ambiguous on the details, Socrates has joined for the first 
time the notions of teleology with providence.22 The 
finality inherent in the cosmos and its inhabitants brings 
together these two notions, but its elaboration must wait 
for Plato's theory of creation and human destiny. 
Plato. Plato follows his mentor and presents his 
appreciation of the orderly cosmos especially in the 
Timaeus dialogue. The corporeal world moving in time and 
space can best be described in mythological language 
(eikos mythos). 
As the sacred story unfolds, one learns that a divine 
craftsman (the demiourgos), fashions an already existing 
amorphous mass moving in a disorderly manner (the 
chaos), into a world-soul, and the material elements which 
constitute its body into a living organism.23· The demi-
ourgos, strictly speaking, is not a creator god. The cosmos 
proceeds, nevertheless, according to a plan or pattern 
(paradeigma) derived from the divine realm of the forms or 
eternal ideas. The paradeigma cannot be seen by the logos 
of man in its eternal being but only as embodied in the 
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cosmos. The world is an eikon, an image of the eternal 
model. The role of the demiourgos is, as Hooykaas states, 
"a regulating power bringing reason into reason-less 
matter, rather than a creator in the biblical sense."24 
Strangely, cosmology cannot be a science. The fact 
of mobile matter—the region of becoming and decay, 
the experiential data which provoked such controversy 
among the philosophers seeking a scientific answer to its 
restless presence—disqualifies itself, in Plato's eyes, from 
certainty in truth. Man's scientific mind, whose goal is 
certain truth, is not made for such flimsy attractions. 
The generation of the cosmos was a mixed result of 
reason and necessity.25 The latter Plato understands as 
matter, blindly determined by necessity, that is, purpose­
less. Still, the natural world is pervaded with the mathe­
matical and harmonic relations of the world-soul, which 
subdues the intransigent stuff as best as it can. Matter, 
being associated with chance or the errant cause, flaws the 
world at times. Nevertheless, the world is good, beautiful, 
orderly and, unlike the mechanistic portrait of the Atom-
ists and the Sophists, images the supremely intelligible 
mind that intended it. The demiourgos' motive was no­
thing less than that the cosmos should symbolize him as 
closely as possible, given the limitations of the matter 
available.26 
Although teleology abounds throughout Plato's 
dialogues, Aristotle still criticizes him for using only two 
causes in his explanations of nature's purposefulness: the 
formal and the material.27 W. К. C. Guthrie points out 
that there was no difference between Plato and Socrates 
on the matter of the final cause. In fact, "a genuine cause," 
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Guthrie insists, "must for Socrates be a 'final one,' the 
telos or end in view, and Plato represents him as finding 
this in the forms, which combine formal and final in 
one."28 And there is the remark in the Laws (966e) where 
he tells us that all motions arise from conscious awareness 
of an end. One cannot help but wonder why Aristotle 
insisted that Plato omitted the final cause among the 
principles of being. 
Plato makes a radical departure here from every one 
of his predecessors. While admitting that the heavenly 
bodies, along with all the tangible inhabitants of the 
cosmos, variable in beauty and utility, form a grand 
eikon of the ultimate, supreme god, still the intelligible 
world—the sublime realm of forms—is coterminous with 
the order of divine existence.29 Plato clearly marks for 
the first time the transcendence of the divine realm. The 
tangible realm of the physis is not divinity. The physical 
world of the pre-socratics is by its very constitution never 
in contention with the immutable and eternal realm of 
God. For Plato, the tangible world of the senses is essen-
tially symbolic of a higher order, pointing human intel-
ligence beyond the ceaseless mobility of matter and its 
configurations to contemplate the distant archetypal 
ideas palely reflected in matter. 
Just the reverse is the true state of man. While there 
is an unbreachable separation between matter and divinity, 
no indissoluble chasm exists between man (who is essen-
tially the spiritual soul), the psyche, and divinity. Thus, 
man has divinity within himself but fails to recognize its 
presence. His rational faculty, in conjunction with his 
bodily senses, is too weak in its power of apprehension. 
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The corrective to this frail condition is the path of philoso-
phy. The divine superabundance of intelligibility is too 
realistic for the untrained faculty of reason to apprehend. 
But the inclination to the rational good, to follow a life of 
philosophical reflection, gradually overcomes the limita-
tions that the ordinary man meets in attempting to under-
stand the world at large and his personal destiny. 
Hackforth remarks that the divine is a kind of con-
tinuum spread throughout the cosmos as a whole.30 
Beginning with sense impressions, man moves ever more 
toward the intelligible, departing more and more from a 
material context of experience. A philosophical ascent 
opens whereby the dialectics of reasoning turn eventually 
into a religious ascent, for man's search for the intelli-
gibleness of being is his search for the absolute divine. 
Plato thus constructs a philosophy of religious conscious-
ness that concludes in the practical realization of its goal: 
immortality among the gods is to possess the wisdom that 
philosophy pursues.31 The path of philosophy opens into a 
teleology of self-realization. 
Aristotle. With Aristotle one moves from the thé-
ogonies of the myth to a theologia. The study of the gods 
has become, as also for Plato, a philosophical enterprise. 
In his treatise, First Philosophy, or more commonly 
known as Metaphysics Aristotle makes a threefold division 
of scientific knowledge into physics or cosmology, which 
encompasses all the tangible realm of the cosmos—mathe-
matics, an abstract science dealing with imagined matter 
as in number and the relations between figures as in geom-
etry, and theology. Following the lead already provided 
by Plato, Aristotle equates the pursuit of metaphysics 
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as the study of being qua being.32 Metaphysics, in other 
words, considers the most intelligible of subject matters: 
the constitution of being itself in terms of its ultimate 
principles. Wise is he who studies the most profound 
subject matter, for the lover of wisdom will desire to know 
about the ultimate cause and nature of reality.33 
This quest to know the ultimate reality, or being in 
itself, involves Aristotle in carefully trimming away the 
imagery and narrative qualities of the myths, thus leaving 
the implied bare processes and event of the cosmos that 
lend themselves to the more systematic inferences using 
less dramative and more abstract rational categories of 
thought.34 He analyzes these basic features of being from 
the most universal perspective permitted rational dis-
course. He will study everything from the point of view of 
the principles and causes of being qua being. The theo-
centric character of this science, according to J. Merlai, 
is brought out in the equation that being qua being me?.ns 
divinity: "When Aristotle speaks of being qua being, 
ancient readers up to the time of Plotinus seem to mean: 
only of God can it be said that He is, whereas everything 
else is not only being but also becoming."35 The theo-
centric core of the myth is preserved. 
Agreeing with Heraclitus that change is manifested 
alike in physical motion, in the growth of living organ-
isms, in man's moral and intellectual development, what 
could be more obvious than the flux of life?36 But sheer 
change is impossible to conceive. Life is not wholly in-
determinate and void of form and stability. Concrete 
individuals, while they may undergo changes, nevertheless 
reveal sufficient stability and definiteness that enable 
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reason to grasp them as individuals with a universal nature, 
a physis. 
He also agrees with Plato's emphasis that the form 
or universal dimension of things is the object of scientific 
knowledge.37 But he will not allow the forms of nature to 
reside by themselves in some transcendental realm dis-
connected, as it were, from their terrestrial moorings in 
the sensible world of human experience. Instead, the 
forms are essentially immanent within things, belonging 
to the heavenly bodies as well as to changeable beings. A 
natural entity resides with its own form and complimen-
tary matter. In a living organism, form is the entelechy 
that unfolds and organizes matter into becoming the 
specific nature that distinguishes the entity.38 
Copleston has remarked that "the Ethics of Aris-
totle are frankly teleologica!."39 To restrain this judgment 
only to moral activity would overlook how pervasive is 
the conception of form as the end or immanent purpose of 
change and development. For Aristotle, it is true that in 
examining the phenomena of nature everything tends to 
fulfill its specific essence or form. Hampered though it 
may be (and sometimes deficient in its results), nature 
manifests a dynamic process that for the most part 
achieves completion of individual natures. By allowing for 
nature's mistakes or failures, Aristotle acknowledges the 
margin of chance and avoids the formal rigidity of the 
Atomists' determinism.40 
It is equally true for him that in all the sciences, 
theoretical as well as practical, and in his theories of art, 
rhetoric, drama and politics, the complete explanation of 
reality perforce requires teleologica! categories. The 
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panorama of the cosmos, through all its details and pro-
liferations, is interpreted as the progressive actualization of 
the potential to receive form. A philosophical investigation 
of reality discloses that these forms spread themselves 
within a hierarchy of species, realizing themselves in a 
spectrum of variated existence, all drawn in some mysteri-
ous manner by the ultimate immaterial formless, the final 
cause of the universe, the supreme unmoved mover—God.41 
From the primal fact of motion in the cosmos, Aris-
totle argues in the culminating eighth book of the physics 
that to escape the infinite regress of dependent causes, 
there must be an eternal first mover, who, he goes on to 
describe, is living, most good and enjoying an eternal 
activity of self-contemplation. In this absolute transcen-
dence, God draws the world towards himself as the goal of 
his desire. 
This telic process is not quite the same as in Plato's 
version. In the Timaeus, God is the eternal knower and the 
independent Forms are the eternal, immaterial archtypes 
of being in all its diversity, but existing autonomously by 
themselves. The Forms, then, are the standards to which 
the divine craftsman looks to model the cosmos. Plato has 
the demiourgos acting more as an efficient cause and the 
separate Forms as the formal and final causes. This separa-
tion between the divine knower and his objects of con-
templation is eliminated in Aristotle's telic version of the 
unmoved mover's conscious life and his relationship with 
the cosmos. 
Admitting the Platonic theory of transcendental 
forms, Aristotle denies their separate, autonomous exis-
tence and places them within the self-awareness of the 
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divine intelligence. The forms are the immanent ways in 
which God contemplates, their dialectical structures being 
the articulation of his thought. Being both subject and 
object of his own infinite self-knowledge, he contemplates 
the forms which are the categories of his divine conscious-
ness. Being the highest and best activity that can be exer-
cised in reality, his self-contemplation inspires the cosmos 
with desire for it and the nisus towards reproducing it— 
everything in its own way and to the degree possible. From 
the acorn becoming the oak tree, or the child achieving 
adulthood, to the placement of the immovable stars and 
the eternally fixed motion of the planetary bodies, the 
cosmos is following its teleologica! course, drawn con-
tinuously through the ages by the eternal divine intelli-
gence.42 Teleology for Aristotle is more than a useful 
concept; it is a universal characteristic of being. 
The Relationship between Myth and Philosophy 
Few histories of philosophy would deny that the 
early stirrings of Western philosophy have begun in ancient 
Greece. Yet it is surprising to find that modem authors 
minimize and even attempt to sever Greek philosophy 
from its mythic origins. 
Philosophical reflection for the Greek mind is in-
spired by a tradition positing an image of the world in its 
totality. The various strands of this common tradition 
existed and were accepted, long before the schools of 
philosophy and science rendered their interpretation of 
reality. In the Phaedrus (274-c), Socrates insists that the 
ancients already knew the truths of life and formulated 
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them in myth. In reading through the dialogues, one can 
hardly ignore Plato's reinteration of myths as a source of 
inspiration for his philosophical excursions. Western philo-
sophy was not only born out of the myth—those treasured 
doctrines that unveiled the meaning of the cosmos as well 
as the historic destiny of mankind—but presumed the 
myths as in a religious context. Among the ancients, even 
Aristotle, that most rational and critical of men, empha-
sized that according to the forefathers of myth the entire 
realm of nature is surrounded by the divine.43 
Almost in unison, then, the ancients saw that the 
mythic tradition must be honored by anyone attempting 
to philosophize. Unlike the more rationalistic impulse, 
say, of the seventeenth century, the ancient philosophers 
did not view the progress of philosophical consciousness as 
a rebellion from tradition. These thinkers sought to pre-
serve an intimate and necessary connection between logos 
(the act of philosophy proper) and mythos (the inherited 
tradition) unimpeachably sacred, and therefore surpassing-
ly true. 
H. Frankfort exaggerates when he mentions the 
"peculiar intellectual courage" of the Greeks which 
allowed them to "discover a form of speculative thought in 
which myth was entirely overcome."44 
The same can be said, only more so, of F. M. Corn-
ford, when he states that "after the primitive stage of 
genuine mythmaking . . . there may come a time when 
rational thinking consciously asserts itself and the fore-
most intellects of the race awaken out of the dream of 
mythology. . . . This happened in sixth-century Ionia and 
what the Western world calls philosophy or science was 
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born."45 
That truly mythical thought passes beyond concrete 
images in favor of rational thought after a single, definable 
transitional stage is aptly summed up by W.K.C. Guthrie: 
"The birth of philosophy in Europe, then, consisted in the 
abandonment, at the level of conscious thought, of mytho-
logical solutions to problems concerning the origin and 
nature of the universe and the processes that go on within 
it. For religious faith there is substituted the faith that was 
and remains the basis of scientific thought . . . that the 
visible world conceals a rational and intelligible order."46 
In examining the mythic narrative of the Greek 
poets, one does not find a haphazard amalgamation of 
irrational scenes between gods and their fickle relations 
with men loosely strewn together for cultural assimilation. 
Without denying the ambiguities throughout the mythic 
tradition, one can discern, nevertheless, a symbolic repre-
sentation of intellectual shrewdness, as seen, for example, 
in Zeus' patiently clever triumph over the powers of 
obstruction and disorder. In a very gradual, astute manner, 
Zeus achieves a certain check and balance that keeps the 
disruptive forces from turning the cosmos back into 
chaos.47 Guthrie's insistence that "pre-philosophic man" 
could not discover "a rational and intelligible order"48 
is unsubstantiated by a close examination of the mythic 
tradition. One does not have to await a Plato or an Aris-
totle before recognizing a cosmic intelligibility depicted 
in the cosmogonie myth. 
Modern authors would go too far in their strict, 
hierarchical and chronological separation of myth from 
philosophy. The division between them is not as definitive 
Philosophical Beginnings /45 
as the mythic language found in philosophical statements 
would show. While most philosophers reject the anthro-
pomorphism of the mythic deities, there is no consistent 
evidence that the religious symbols nor the significance of 
myth as such is pronounced "primitive" or a "fantastical" 
affair of immature minds. Even Plato notes the oppro-
brium brought upon the gods in the minds of citizens by 
the poets' extravagancies, but he does not dismiss mythic 
consciousness as a bad dream. 
More than any other Greek philosopher, Plato re-
tains the myth in full force with the pursuit of philosophy 
and ultimacy. Mythos and logos are distinct, but always 
connected. He remarks, for example, as have his prede-
cessors (except for Parmenides), that the mythic descrip-
tion of Oceanus—the great water principle of Thaïes, the 
source of gods and men in the Iliad (14.201,302)—can be 
interpreted anew, philosophically, to indicate that every-
thing in nature results from a flowing stream of change 
(Theaetetus 152e). For Plato the reflective effort of philo-
sophy does not so much "overcome" myth as it extends 
the continuum of knowledge, while keeping its inseparable 
origins (archaeos) in mythic consciousness. Philosophy in 
its way becomes a rational articulation of mythic con-
sciousness. 
In examining the Republic, the Phaedrus and the 
Timaeus, one finds that Plato brings into the organic con-
nection of myth and philosophy his notions of divinity, 
man and cosmos, as essential to creating the polis. Since 
the nature of the soul or consciousness (Phaedrus 245c) is 
immortality, and since the cosmos is truly a living creature 
likewise endowed with soul and intelligence (zoon 
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empsychon ennoun. Timaeus 30b-c), Plato understands 
the cosmos as the cosmic projection of the soul. Man 
seems to be and act as an individual, but a truer estima-
tion is that human consciousness is a cosmic substance— 
the idea or form of the cosmos itself. Man-in-the-cosmos 
resembles the larger forces of nature as a pulsating move-
ment toward achievement and decline. He participates in 
the cosmic drama of emergence and dissolution through 
his own growth, affecting cultural consciousness, which 
reflects the serene and stormy movements of the universe. 
Just as the Timaeus projects man's soul upon the cosmos, 
so in the Republic his soul is projected upon society. 
Society declines. Cultural changes take place. New inter-
pretations are taught about reality. Plato sees these events 
as reflections of the level of consciousness in men. 
In creating his new myth of man, Plato illustrates 
his vision of reality by rejecting Homer and Hesiod. It is 
a conflict in one's state of awareness. Those mythic mes-
sengers proposed a series of symbolisms that truthfully 
expressed the cultural consciousness of their time. Yet 
myths can become obsolete. Plato dismisses the poetic 
symbols in terms of their bizarre descriptions of the 
society of the gods, since they bring ridicule from the 
people and, what is worse, undermine their belief in the 
truth of the myth itself. In their memetic portrait of man 
and divinity, myths were too far removed from reality to 
justify their continuance as part of the education of the 
polis (Republic 598d-600e). Moreover, they were not 
aware of the new truth regarding the immortality of the 
soul. Thus their problems with death and Moira. 
Plato points out in the Phaedrus that growth in 
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philosophical awareness produces conflicts between older 
and newer ideas and perspectives. The level of conscious-
ness alters, necessitating a newer expression or arrange-
ment of symbols signifying the acquired insight. The 
symbolic forms change under the pressure of new knowl-
edge. The former myths correlating self-awareness with 
one's understanding of the cosmos need revision. Life is 
the occasion for man to perform his self-exploration, his 
self-inquiry, the zetema (Republic 368c). This self-inquiry, 
the search for wisdom, brings about experiences of greater 
and greater insight which must transpose themselves for 
communication into a newer or revised set of symbols. 
The knowledge of the order within consciousness, ob-
tained through zetema, is an event that takes place by the 
soul growing into it. The welling up of the myth within 
man's consciousness continually augments his logos. In 
this way, philosophy and science respects the order of 
consciousness as symbolized in myth. 
Through self-inquiry, the opposition of the new 
myth to the lesser forms of yesterday also brings the in-
sight that these older myths expressed truths of the soul 
for their day—merely in a less differentiated manner or 
level of consciousness. The philosopher's duty in fidelity 
to his level of understanding submits a new set of symbols 
signifying the acquired insight. Stirred by the myth-
making forces of his soul, man gradually elevates his 
understanding of the meaning or logos of reality, until he 
finally recognizes that myth is the symbolism of his soul. 
For Plato the experience of mythic insight and the 
growth of philosophical meaning accompany each other as 
self-inquiry continues. The maturation of meaning in man 
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takes place only when he attempts the program in a 
holistic manner. The Pbaedrus (246 ff.) points out how 
that process must involve the entire man—body, mind 
and spirit, or soma, nous and psyche—-all functioning in 
an organismic way. For Plato human life is a process of 
increasing self-consciousness, whose experiences are ex-
pressed and recognized in the symbols of the myth. As 
the forces of nature are repeatedly in competition to 
attain their proscribed goals, so man, in his constant 
internal growth and in his relationships with society, will 
meet all those cultural forces that can accentuate or 
smother his self-inquiry. The internal dynamism—the 
myth of his soul—impelís him to face these opposing issues 
of destruction and order, both in himself as well as in 
culture and cosmos, seeking for a resolution. Here the 
goal of human growth and the finality of the cosmos are 
identifiable in the myth of the Timaeus. Man is to achieve 
the experience of immortality, to live the life of the "good 
gods," and thus understand one day that the cosmos is a 
finite reflection, a symbol, of the soul's infinite conscious-
ness. 
Equally so, in the Republic Plato attempts to show 
how the idea of culture, the good polis, was both a para-
digm of divine construction as well as an elaboration of the 
well-ordered soul. In the Timaeus one finds that the 
account of the polis given in the Republic must be treated 
as en mytho (26c). In the Timaeus myth is the symbolism 
of consciousness as a totality, thus including cosmos and 
culture, nature and man. Culture will then feel those 
rhythms and seasons that are part of the nature of reality. 
But the central symbol throughout is the soul, which has 
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furnished the model of order for both cosmos (Timaeus) 
and culture (Republic). The realms of being are fully per-
vaded by consciousness. The order of the cosmos is con-
substantial with the order of culture and of man. Man's 
problem is to recover conscious remembrance (anamnesis) 
of the soul's cosmic nature, a remembrance that is evoked 
by self-inquiry and stimulated by the mythic symbols. 
Summary and Conclusion 
The decisive belief about reality for the Hellenic 
people was that they lived in a cosmos that was the great 
society of the gods. The world as a creation of the gods 
and as the result of natural causes is fused together in 
Greek culture, and associated with heroic figures of the 
past whose careers and exploits portrayed various arrange-
ments with nature's forces and the will of the gods. The 
strands of this fundamental conviction were communi-
cated among the people by a series of stories, considered 
sacred, depicting primordial events and episodes elaborat-
ing upon the cosmos in all its ramifications. 
These sacred stories, the myths, expressed more 
than imaginative descriptions of the cultural patterns men 
were to imitate. In their cosmic scope, they freed men 
from their sense of contingency and daily limitation 
struggling against the awesome forces of nature and fears 
of destiny. Myth provided the ultimate meaning, purpose 
and proper ordering of life. Myth conveyed the feeling 
that the universe, even though one may not understand it 
completely, is nevertheless coherent. The myths communi-
cated and reinforced a symbolic experience of participating 
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in a cosmic and sacred world in which the gods, nature 
and culture blended together in life-enchncing ways. 
Attunement with this cosmic order guaranteed true 
humanity. In the days of Homer and Hesiod, then, men 
expressed their experiences of ultimacy in the symbolic 
realism of myth. 
Later in their history, and without dispensing with 
this cosmic belief, some Greeks began an investigation of 
life. They preferred a perspective and a terminology less 
dependent upon the narrative symbols of myth, and 
proceeded to found a method of speculation whereby 
their experiences of the phenomena of the world could be 
expressed readily by means of rational concepts and dis-
cursive logic. The experience of nature's order was avail-
able to reflective categories of thought rather than by 
mythical symbols only. A differentiation of consciousness 
has ensued. Meaning has expanded itself into the modali-
ties of logos: philosophy arises from the mythic forces 
of consciousness. Thus, the realm of philosophy does not 
necessarily undermine the contribution of mythic thought. 
It reinterprets those same experiences of reality that 
relate to the myths, the logis exploring what is already 
guaranteed by the mythos. 
The myths had given a finality to Greek culture by 
providing a direction to consciousness in its pursuit of 
ultimate meaning. Because the mythic tradition was so 
fundamental and comprehensive in integrating the facts 
of life in a positive and enriching manner, the Greeks 
accepted it with the quality of ultimacy. Equally, now, the 
occurrence of philosophical meaning—the love of wisdom 
with its discursive patterns of methodical expression— 
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presented itself with similar recommendations. It would 
seem on the surface at least, that two authentic expres-
sions of consciousness would try to annul one another. 
The Quest of Ultimacy in Myth and Philosophy 
The two most articulate philosophers, Plato and 
Aristotle, approached the problem of religious conscious-
ness in its relationship with myth and philosophy in 
different ways. We shall allow these two Greeks to repre-
sent the culmination of the Greek resolution, since both 
critically incorporate the findings of their earlier pre-
decessors. 
Aristotle acknowledges the cosmic conviction and 
the debt that philosophy owes to the mythic tradition. 
Beyond this sincere accolade, his rational speculations, in 
principle, refuse to incorporate the traditional religious 
imagery that is customarily found in myths. Yet, he in-
corporates the mood and the perspectives of myth. He 
prefers, nevertheless, to explicate his experience of man, 
nature, culture and ultimacy by means of scientific-
philosophical disciplines. Logos for him means only the 
array of rational interpretations that comprise the whole 
of systematic philosophy. His methodologies led him to 
investigate being and express his rational findings without 
direct reliance upon the mythic symbols employed by 
Homer and Hesiod. Logos achieves a prominence formerly 
accorded to myth. With the purging of the pantheon, 
Aristotle removes the polytheistic tendencies that range 
among the people's imaginations, and replaces at the 
conclusion of his natural philosophy and metaphysics, a 
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single, eternal divinity. All the sciences can aid man 
in the eventual discovery of this prime mover and source 
of the intelligibility of being. Methodical research in-
to the empirical clues of the cosmos can disclose their 
ultimate dependency upon the divine consciousness. 
The tenor of being, aside from the rarity of chance 
malfunctions, is entirely teleologica!. The dynamics 
of the cosmos follows a divine plan. From the lowest 
species of matter and life to the divinity itself, Aristotle's 
conception of existence always bears reference to fi-
nality. Individuals persist in existence in goal-directed 
ways that reveal their natures. 
The growth and stability of species displays for 
Aristotle a hierarchically-ordered world, whose descrip-
tion by the myth has now been transposed into the logic 
of philosophical categories. Man is a teleologica! being, 
understanding himself by ordering his thought and action 
towards his fulfillment. Like everything else in the cosmos, 
he resembles divinity, but unlike the rest of the world 
that strives instinctively to fulfill its nature, he does 
it self-consciously. He chooses to oblige his nature. The 
goal or finality of his nature is nothing less than the self-
conscious approximation of divine wisdom. 
Man performs this achievement by living a life 
of deepening contemplation, whereby he enjoys the 
exercise of the highest ranges of intellect (nous) upon 
the most noble of objects. Here religious consciousness 
and human happiness converge: in his life as a philo-
sopher, man most imitates divine wisdom. 
Philosophical Beginnings / 53 
Plato's Retention of Myth for Developing 
Religious Consciousness 
Plato, on the other hand, presents a unique associa-
tion between myth and philosophy. Philosophical inquiry 
presumes the cosmogonie myth, but not as a distant 
acknowledgment to tradition. Philosophy, science or any 
form of logos are in reality differentiations of self-con-
sciousness in its dialectical interplay with the world at 
large. The experience of life can be absorbed and trans-
lated into various patterns of communication without 
necessarily annuling others. Plato recognizes that at differ-
ent periods of man's investigation of life, certain categories 
of thought or symbols may take precedence in his mind 
that best convey the meaning of his experiences. Culture 
itself can symbolize the collective unity of many under-
standings of life within the community. But times change, 
and men continue to mature or decline. Likewise for 
society. In recognition of this universal phenomenon, 
Plato retains mythic consciousness as an essential horizon 
within man's nature, containing within itself both the 
symbols of its current interpretation of life and an indef-
inite depth (Heraclitus) and height (Parmenides) of 
inherent power that can lead the soul to unlimited per-
fectibility. 
How is man to remind himself of these possibilities 
residing within the possibilities of his soul? For there are 
human experiences yet to be endured within and beyond 
history whose anticipation cannot be expressed in less 
than mythic form. Logos is often too literal in its meanings 
to express, for Plato, the dynamic continuity between 
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self-consciousness, culture and the cosmos—especially in 
its historical developments. Only myth can begin to 
express the mode of being of self-consciousness as process 
and result. For man is that special kind of being that is 
enabled to explore his own nature and discover that his 
life principle participates in the eternal power that orders 
the entire cosmos. 
Moreover, Plato clearly assures man that his con-
sciousness possesses an ontological validity which survives 
beyond its conditions of concrete vitality in the finite 
world. As we are told in the Pbaedrus: "All that is soul is 
deathless" (psyche pasa athanatos, 245c). Man is called to 
participate in a deathless vision that takes him beyond the 
restrictions of time and space—a transcendental realm 
(epekeina), no less. Plato characterizes the immanent 
dynamism that makes this ascension from matter a real 
possibility as a "heavenly growth," whereby one takes 
responsibility for developing those immortal qualities that 
reflect the eternal essence of consciousness.49 Plato sums 
up this task of fulfillment through self-knowledge by 
remarking how man, in gradual fashion, awakens vague 
intimations of immortality by cultivating his "love for 
wisdom." Experiences with life reverberate insight that 
continually opposes its former assumptions. By being 
faithful to the congruent impulses for the truth, the 
beautiful and the good, man further arouses the purpose-
ful quest for moral and intellectual wholeness. He can in-
volve himself in a continual renewal of insight, surpassing 
the former propositions of logos and unveiling the sym-
bolic boundaries of yesterday's comprehension of life for 
breaking new ground. It is not a specialized breakthrough 
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in science or art that commends such a scrutinizing task, 
but the hope, stimulated by the mythic descriptions of the 
forces within, of surpassing these acquired boundaries 
and directly experiencing the cosmic source of selfhood— 
the unalloyed Good in its eternality and unchangeableness, 
the ultimate reality. 
Endowed with this mythic remembrance and the 
intentional effort to recover his origin, man can endure his 
corporeal finiteness, knowing full well its temporary 
dimension. Man the microcosm is reminded of his soul's 
nature through the myth of the Timaeus which has cast 
the soul's meaning upon the construction of the cosmos. 
Similarly, in the Republic, he understands the extension of 
his soul upon culture. And behind both stories is the myth 
of the human soul itself portrayed in the Phaedms. Man 
can appreciate the struggle of nature in achieving its 
seasonal accomplishments because he knows first hand the 
internal struggle to discover and express in his personal 
and cultural existence the good, orderly, humane life. 
Plato has remythologized the mythic inheritance. 
The search for the meaning of human existence can no 
longer rely entirely upon the poets' viewpoint. Amidst the 
gods of Homer and Hesiod, man remained too mortal. 
Destiny and death in the mythic form of Moira has now 
been transformed into its absolute opposite—eternal life. 
Man's self-awareness takes on a new quality of ultimacy, 
for his conscious experience of transcendence, prepared 
for by striving after wisdom, and intimated by the mythic 
symbols, reaches out in full consciousness to eternality. 
Similar to Aristotle, Plato suggests that the stars 
and planets surrounding men symbolize the divine order to 
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which they are called, for these heavenly bodies reveal the 
eternal, changeless essence of reality. Fidelity to one's 
nature, attuning one's personal existence to the macro-
cosmic order, is the hallmark of both philosophers. Con-
tinuity in the symbolism would suggest continuity in the 
experience of ultimacy. Yet for Aristotle the human con-
sciousness, for all its grandeur, falls short in its attainment 
of divine happiness—something which for Plato is the 
normative and teleologica! conclusion of man's nature. 
Man's life is a process of succeeding myths in which he 
makes the transition from belief in the gods outside him-
self to the dawning understanding that they symbolize 
forces and movements within himself. To speak of the 
sacred, the divine, the ultimate dimension of reality, is, 
for Plato, to speak of the goal of life already at work in 
the hidden areas of man's soul, drawing him forward to 
the climax of transcendence in which he realizes himself 
as the embodiment of religious consciousness. Whatever 
the philosophical assimilation of specific mythic imageries 
may be, philosophy itself, though based upon the logos 
and its distinction from myth, continues to see reality with 
the eye of myth. It might sharpen and change this eye. 
But at the same time it remains dependent on the myth-
ological process. As a result, we have to expect not only 
changes of myth by philosophy, but also of philosophy 
by myth. 
The Myth in Decline 
Both Plato and Aristotle mark the acme of an 
intellectual epoch that soon witnessed the dissolution of 
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Hellenic civilization with the result that "philosophy 
became more and more divorced from the active engage-
ment of men in the ordering of society, more and more 
concentrated in groups ('schools')."50 
Plato's hopes of a spiritually reformed, national 
Hellenic empire became lost in antiquity as the Alexandri-
an reign gave way to the emergence of the Roman empire. 
Now with the demise of Greek religious consciousness, 
"the substance of nature itself became divorced from its 
spiritual significance, and cosmology and physics tended 
toward naturalism and empiricism. In the same way that 
from the Orphian-Dionysian dimension of Greek religion 
there developed the Pythagorean-Platonic school of 
philosophy and mathematics, so from the body of Olympi-
an religious concepts, emptied of their transcendent 
meaning, arose a physics and and a natural philosophy 
which sought to fill the vacuum and to provide a cohere .t 
explanation for a world no longer inhabited by the go Is. 
The general movement was from symbolic interpretation 
of nature to naturalism, from contemplative metaphysics 
to rationalistic philosophy."51 
This emphasis upon rational naturalism can be 
found in the Roman preference for their Stoic and Epi-
curean schools which, however, "contributed little to the 
natural sciences directly and which showed little concern 
for the metaphysical and theological significance of the 
sciences."52 To these features of Western civilization must 
be added another important culturalizing factor which 
brings to bear upon philosophy and science its own intrin-
sic purposefiilness, namely, the phenomena of Christen-
dom. In line with the assumption that philosophy and 
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myth belong together, we have to expect once more that 
a modified mythology makes itself see different things and 
reject old ones. A feeling for religious ultimacy, a concern 
for individual destiny, and the understanding of the world 
as a cosmos are still preserved in the atmosphere that 
Christendom inherits. All these mythic factors, however, 
will soon be revised anew while keeping their value within 
a teleologica! framework—a Christianized teleology. 
3 
Religious Consciousness 
and the 
Worldview of the Middle Ages 
The Contribution of Christendom 
While a number of mythological elements continue 
to be formative for religious consciousness and the cate-
gories by which it approaches reality, the development 
of Christianity adds a more personalistic, as well as a new 
socio-religious, aspects to the notion and conception of 
teleology. 
The emergence of Christianity during the height and 
fall of the Roman empire ushered into society entirely 
novel concepts of God and the origin of nature, as well as 
the purposeftil destiny of man. Gradually, Latin Christen-
dom, under the credentials of the Roman Catholic Church, 
established itself after the fourth century as the single 
most dominating force in the structuring of medieval 
culture.1 
Over the centuries the Church designated itself as 
the corporate union of all believers in Christ, its founder. 
This unum corpus Christi was not merely a sacramental 
or sfiïritual congregation, but also a tangibly organic and 
earthly society, as suggested in the writings of St. Paul.2 
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Without delving into the history of the various 
oppositions to the Church's claim to influence society on 
its own monarchical terms (expressed in the various types 
of caesaropapism from the Eastern emperors and patri-
archs to the feudal aristocracies in the Western empire), 
our point is that Christendom as embodied institutionally 
during these centuries developed its own teleologica! 
categories that symbolized the ecclesia as the mediating 
vehicle for determining the religious consciousness of the 
West and the world. 
Since the Church is not a random association, but 
is conceived as an organic, living entity, it must needs 
function with direction in order to bring about its purpose 
for existing. Authoritative guidance and recognition is 
indispensable for the proper operation of the various 
members of this body, as it would be in a multi-faceted 
community. Using the analogy of a human body, mention-
ed in various texts of the New Testament, the members 
and their functions (or offices) were unified by the con-
trolling principle of the head. The form of rulership over 
these members was, like that of the empire, monarchic. 
One sole leadership could best guarantee the well-being of 
the body and protect it from disruption and schism. Under 
the ruling power of the head, the unum corpus could 
achieve its finis, namely, the salvation or spiritual redemp-
tion of the members. 
The thrust of the medieval Church, considered 
especially from the point of view of its leaders, the popes, 
"regarded it as their duty and office to rule, for they 
claimed that the cura et sollicitudoíor the whole of Chris-
tendom was in theirhands."3 In their minds, Christendom's 
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privileges coincided with the cultural geography of the 
known world—at least in principle if not in fact. Conse-
quently, a practical implication of this universal ruling 
power consisted in the subordination of the temporal-
material realm of life to the sacerdotal-spiritual. Trans-
posed to society, this medieval principle meant that the 
temporal ruler should subordinate his office to the rulings 
or direction of those who represent the divine sphere, 
namely, the sacerdotes. With the head over the members, 
the soul over the body, and the spiritual over the material, 
the formation of medieval culture preserved a hierarchical 
order between heaven and earth within a teleologica! 
framework.4 
Intertwined with this papal-hierocratic outlook was 
the accompanying reenforcement of an intellectual trend. 
During the first few centuries, Christian thinkers used the 
Western philosophical heritage not as a discipline in its 
own right, but as an apologetic tool to defend and aug-
ment the credibility of Christendom. 
After the Patristic period, as the development of 
feudal society with its lords, vassals and serfs began to 
associate its progress with the ecclesiastical order of the 
Church, the social and intellectual interests within the 
Church fostered new waves of investigation into the world 
at large. The scientific-philosophical disciplines had not 
only their own subject matter and methodologies, but 
could be pressed even further into service to transform the 
revealed truths of the biblical heritage into a unified and 
coherent complex of teachings, broadly called theology.5 
Interestingly, while the legacy of Roman law pro-
foundly influenced Christendom's self-understanding as a 
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social reality, it was more the intellectual legacy of Hellen-
ism that the medieval thinkers appropriated to construct 
their grand systems of philosophical and theological 
enterprise.6 All in all, the mythical heritage of the Greco-
Roman worldview was reinterpreted in light of the Judao-
Christian event, forging a new myth—the Christianized 
cosmos. 
The Cautious Assimilation of Greek Thought 
The Greek heritage now underwent a careful scru-
tiny. Since the biblical viewpoint was at odds with these 
"pagan" resources, three major tenets demanded a cau-
tious examination: 
1. The deification of nature. Greek thought, for the 
most part, identified divinity with nature, which as a living 
organism, produced all beings by generative processes. 
The Genesis account of creation, on the other hand, 
revealed that the biblical God does not coincide with 
nature, but transcends the entire universe.7 
2. The world as a self-sufficient cosmos. The world 
for the Greeks was a complex ordering of various forces 
moving through seasons and phases. These eternal transi-
tions were guided teleologically with wisdom, mythically 
portrayed as the god Zeus, and later philosophically dis-
cerned as the one, supreme and divine unmoved mover of 
the cosmos. In contrast, the biblical God was a creator of 
a finite wo rid of creatures. In his sovereign will this God 
initiated the world out of nothing, set the entire, finite 
world in its place and sustains it on its course through 
history. Consequendy, there is an absolute dependence of 
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nature upon the divine creator who is the ultimate cause of 
its contingent existence. 
3. Platonic Optimism. For Plato, man is capable of 
entering through the path of philosophy into a self-trans-
formative gnosis that leads to eternal fulfillment. Although 
every major Christian thinker utilized the various writings 
of Plato, as well as Aristotle, they were very careful to 
limit the optimism of man's nature and his natural reason. 
The Platonic contribution here was the most dangerous 
teaching because it left no room for the incarnation and 
salvation wrought by the founder of Christianity. 
In the Christian viewpoint, man's reason could in-
terpret the world. That is, reason could delve into the 
world's structures and processes with scientific precision. 
But man could not truly find the lasting happiness for 
which he hankered, on his own. The reason for his failure 
is that his nature is defective-, a kind of ontological impo-
tency keeps him from ever realizing total fulfillment by his 
own powers.8 As a creature, he is finite though immortal-
capable upon occasion of reasonable actions, but requiring 
the agency of the Church to achieve over and above his 
natural inclinations the hope of blessed happiness, living 
in the company of the biblical God. 
What allowed man to overcome this disparity was 
the differentiation of consciousness called faith (fides). 
Faith was a synthesis of consent with intellectual specula-
tion: "to believe is to reflect with consent."9 Unable to 
initiate this conviction on his own, man requires the 
assistance of a divine impulse in order to desire the reality 
offered as salvation. Salvation is the goal or finis of life, 
and man makes the meaning of the content of salvation, 
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assented to by this act of faith, his ultimate purpose. 
The general contours of the teleologica! cosmos 
were acceptable to the Christian thinkers provided certain 
elements dangerous to their credentials were expunged. 
Since it would take us too far afield to examine every 
attempt during the "Scholastic" period to synthesize the 
ancient tradition with the Christian message, we shall now 
turn to the thirteenth century. This proved to be culturally 
the most fertile ground for achieving the most complete 
synthesis of Western thought within a Christian frame-
work. 
The Teleologica! Portrait of the Medieval Cosmos 
The enormous medieval interest in learning accom-
panied by the growth in universities was further stimulated 
by the rediscovery in the West of the Aristotelian corpus, 
along with Byzantine, Jewish and Arabian writings. Hither-
to, it had been mainly the neo-platonic elements that 
influenced the Church theologians, especially St. Augus-
tine. From the tenth to the fourteenth centuries Europe 
opened its doors to the importation and revival of ancient 
learning from Eastern quarters. 
The Church had a serious interest in this new arrival, 
for it offered a complete worldview that could be argued 
with realistic premises. Among the Christian thinkers who 
attempted to harmonize these new imports with the more 
traditional acceptance of the Augustinian complex was 
St. Thomas Aquinas. As far as the Roman Church is con-
cerned, his synthesis of these various strands of learning 
best summarized their importance for medieval man's 
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ultimate destiny. His life (1225-1274) spanned those 
years when the ancient revival had its most controversial 
impact upon Christendom. And so it is in his works that 
one can find how the biblical version of the world was 
reconciled with the "pagan" cosmos. 
The Thomistic Synthesis: Christian Teleology 
Aquinas accepted the organic naturalism of Aris-
totle and the metaphysical structuring of the cosmos. But 
he reinterpreted both within the context of a Christian 
supernaturalism. 
Aquinas retained every basic insight that Aristotle 
attributed to nature—everything except the fact that the 
eternity of matter gave way to the creation acts of a 
creator God revealed in the Genesis account. The finality 
of natural forms was hierarchically affirmed, and its 
overall climax for origin and destiny was the supreme 
unmoved mover or first cause, now transformed into the 
biblical designations. 
Nature's regularity has been instituted by God, and 
the interdependence among beings can lead man's logos, as 
it did for Aristotle, to the causal knowledge of the exist-
ence of God. Natural beings, through the regularity of 
their growth and activities, indicated that performance is 
for purposes. Following the lead of Aristotle, Aquinas 
discerned an ordered world throughout the cosmos.10 
The finality of the species reflected a spark of eternity, 
for when individuals perish, at least the species continues. 
And so the cosmic order is preserved. Among the species 
there is a relative finality. Each is subordinated to another 
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with a descending progression from the fixed heavenly 
bodies in their recurring patterns, to the earthly elements. 
For Aquinas, every being that acts in any way does 
so for a purpose, an end, i finis.11 Even among the orders 
of nature that are nonrational (as manifested in the in-
stinctive behavior of animals and the specific processes of 
plant and mineral realms), purpose is in evidence. Through-
out the cosmos each specific essence of every individual 
releases an immanent principle of activity, which lies at 
the root of corporeal and intellectual dynamism, and 
explains not only its transition from the state of potential-
ity but likewise its orientation in a determined direction. 
For the mode of activity will be consonant with the 
specific nature. The constancy in a structure or activity 
can never receive an adequate explanation unless one 
accepts the view that it is determined in its particular 
direction. This means that the ultimate explanation must 
be sought in that end or finis to which it is directed, for 
the motivation and regulation of the process or ensemble 
is determined and specified by it. 
For Aquinas a hierarchy of ends swept across the 
horizon of existence. The composition of man within this 
grand spectrum is unique. Man is most akin to the divine 
person whom he calls "father." Made into the image and 
likeness of God according to the biblical symbol, man, as 
an intellectual being, possesses a freely-proposed, self-
informed intention, and can promote self-direction 
towards it. Although his total nature as an intelligent, 
living, corporeal being limits the scope of his freedom by 
the very determination of his psychosomatic nature, 
nevertheless, he is able to embrace beyond his own natural 
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form or essence the forms of other realities. His conscious-
ness permits man to universalize himself. Becoming freer 
through the act of knowledge, extending himself beyond 
the limits of his corporeal matter, man can enjoy the 
significance of that act as it fulfills him. Thus he dis-
covers the teleologica! nature of his being in the very acts 
which attempt to realize its achievement. 
The entire ground that allows such liberty is the 
immateriality of his intellectual operations. Mind is spirit 
for Aquinas. Free from corporeal matter, man can com-
pose his plans and purposes and reflect directly over his 
composition, revising where need be before, during and 
after its execution. No other creature enjoys such liberty 
of awareness. Only man can judge his judgments-, only he 
can investigate the nature of realities and impose himself 
anew upon his environment.12 The rest of nature has no 
such reflective options. Man represents a limit for them, 
which they approach in varying actuality. The greater the 
actuality of their forms, that is, the less infused with 
materiality they are, the less their natures are subject to 
the restrictions of determined matter. Natural beings, 
either by way of sensible apprehension or by way of pure-
ly corporeal form, an instinctive impulse, fulfill the chores 
of their predetermined destinies, preempted from the 
discriminating possibilities of the human species.13 
In surveying the cosmos, Aquinas witnessed a 
graduated series of ends, so arranged that the attainment 
of one would lead of its nature to the attainment of an-
other. He discerns in each being an immanent finality for 
the good of being itself—a relative transcendent finality 
in the levels of creatures in the hierarchy of being, and an 
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absolute transcendent finality by which everything in the 
cosmos is ordained to God.14 
The order of the universe is the certain indication 
of its finality, for it is its very establishment. The order of 
the universe, in other words, is the constitution of its 
teleologica! determination. Aquinas perceives the perfec-
tion of the universe in this order: "the goodness and per-
fection of the universe consist in the order of parts to one 
another."15 
The entire order of the universe is the realiza-
tion of a divine plan in a divine mind. It is a teleologica! 
masterpiece of the divine architect, who in contem-
plating his own essence sees the infinite capabilities of 
imitation, and freely decrees the existence of creatures to 
render a distant representation of the divine being's 
perfections. 
In his most famous work, the Summa Theologiae, 
a philosophical-theological writing in which he incorpor-
ates the medieval worldview within the framework of 
Christian salvation, Aquinas mentions: "the principle 
intention of this sacred doctrine is to impart the knowl-
edge of God, not according to what he is in himself, but 
also according as he is the cause of things and their end, 
especially of rational creatures, intending the exposition 
of this doctrine, we will treat first of God, second of the 
movement of the rational creature towards God, and third 
of Christ, who, according as he is man, is for us the way of 
moving towards God."16 
Inspired by faith, man views the cosmos as a 
contingent sign of divine order drawing him towards his 
immortal destiny. 
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Summary 
The thirteenth century's synthesis of Greek science 
and Christian theology established a distinctive teleologica! 
approach to God, nature and man that, for the most part, 
endured into the seventeenth century. Under the guidance 
of Aquinas, the unification of Aristotelean cosmology and 
Christian theology could buttress the already teleologica! 
notion of institutional Christendom as an organic body of 
believers having a transnaturai or supernatural purpose. 
The world was intelligible and orderly. Man's mind could 
detect traces of consistent interdependencies among the 
cosmos that rationally demanded an explanation. The 
purposeful cosmos required a purposeful and ultimate 
cause. Thus, with the addition of faith in the biblical 
revelation, the Greek unmoved mover became the bible's 
personal God. Reflective faith now posited that the meta-
physical first cause could be identified with the purpose-
ful creator of biblical theology. 
The unique position of man, an image of the divine 
exemplar, was considered to be at the center of the uni-
verse. Moreover, as each species realizes its potentialities, 
that is, fulfills its nature, all the various levels and dimen-
sions of teleologica! formation illuminated the hierarchical 
impression of an orderly cosmos. Man was upon the earth 
which, in the Ptolemaic scheme, situated the earth at the 
center of the cosmos. The movements of the heavenly 
bodies in concentric circles fixed permanently in their 
course, added further to the interpretation of reality as a 
graded hierarchy, a causal chain that led from dense 
matter to the most spiritual substance, entirely contingent 
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upon its divine architect. 
God, the first and final cause, continues to work 
through his created cosmos. The natural laws of the 
objective cosmos reflect his eternal truths and follow out 
their proscribed patterns of activity. Nature's intelligibility 
unfolds in the discerned purposes of its existence, appre-
hensible by man. Man himself achieves his end by aligning 
his dynamism with the divine purposes as interpreted by 
the agency of God's principal instrument, the Church. 
Nature was for man's purposes, but man was to know, 
love and serve God and his representatives on earth in 
order to be eventually happy with Him in eternal beatitude. 
The medieval picture manifested a total plan, 
rationally appealing and realistically supportive of the 
concrete conditions of feudal society and the hopes of 
transcendence. Christian faith in this ultimate plan and the 
reality symbolized by it became the medieval equivalent 
of religious consciousness. 
The Turbulent Progress into the New World 
The scientific ideal of the Aristotelean-Thomistic 
synthesis and the ideal of a unified Christendom brought 
European civilization to a cultural height that never before 
or after so centered itself around the Church. And yet the 
age of cosmic teleology, as one might address the last 
2,000 years, did not outlive the splendor of its medieval 
version. 
As medieval society grew in population, the cultural 
forces belonging to the ordered civilization instigated 
new interests that could not be satisfied within the 
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hierarchically structured classes and attitudes that had 
prevailed. To speak of the Renaissance is to characterize a 
movement or spirit that perhaps concludes the complex-
ities of medieval society more than being a rupture from 
its predecessor. Every aspect of culture seemed to be 
subject to changes that could not have been anticipated 
by the middle ages. 
More and more men took a new interest in them-
selves and their environment, and thus attempted to 
reorder the world in less hierarchical and organic fashions. 
The excitement of the new trade routes, the discoveries 
of new lands, the proliferation of the mechanical and 
inventive arts brought about enormous pressure for new 
economic bases and expanded men's outlook beyond 
feudalism and the guilds. 
A new consciousness of living life upon this earth 
with all its marvelous potentials opened up for enter-
prising minds and energies. Every medieval institution 
underwent readjustment. The national prosperity of the 
middle class, the emerging centralized monarchies, and 
the new class of bankers and merchants completely out-
distanced the traditional regulations and older forms of 
social and business intercourse. Rather than a single 
homogeneous humanistic spirit, one found diverging 
streams of humanism which emphasized nationalistic 
differences and interests. Mutual rivalry could be de-
tected on every front of human endeavor, not the least 
of which was the effort at education and scientific knowl-
edge. For it was to scientific endeavor, more than any 
other single factor, that the new world, the modern 
world, was to owe its inspiration and destiny. 
4 
Early Modern Cosmology 
Transition from Organismic Cosmos 
to the Mechanized Worldview 
The cosmologica! movement of the early modern 
period of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries may be 
described as a sustained polemic against medieval scientific 
statements and the authoritarianism of Aristotelean 
thought among the universities. Collingwood remarks that 
the "doctrine specially selected for attack was teleology, 
the theory of final causes."1 
The innovative natural philosophy of the Renais-
sance refrained from viewing motion as a manifestation of 
a teleologica! cause in preference to the more Pythagorean 
approach of change as a function of structure. An empha-
sis on the immanence in nature of the formal and efficient 
causes still retained the organic outlook of the internal 
energies of the Greek period, but the double-tiered world 
of the eternal, heavenly spheres and the earth's mutable 
matter was beginning to be suspect. 
When the heliocentric hypothesis of Copernicus 
(1473-1543) received the necessary data to support it, 
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the belief in the radical difference between heavenly 
matter and earthly matter, along with the hierarchical 
structured cosmos, with the earth as its center, suffered a 
fatal blow. Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) introduced a 
pantheistic cosmology as an interpretation of the Coper-
nican Revolution—a variation, as it turns out, of the 
ancient theory of Democritus, except that the plastic 
matter-filled-infinite-space became composed of matter, 
form, spirit and God, all in one.2 
The new astronomy implied "a denial of any quali-
tative difference between terrestrial and celestial sub-
stance."3 Tycho Brache's (1546-1601) research and ob-
servations of new stars and comets led him to conclude 
that the heavenly bodies were not incorruptible. He wrote 
Kepler (1571-1630) who, taking over from there, intro-
duced elliptical motion for the planets which further 
weakened awe for the so-called perfect, circular motion of 
the heavenly bodies.4 Kepler and Brache both maintained 
that the heavenly bodies move quite freely, and Kepler 
suggested that the scholastic concept of an internal prin-
ciple of motion in things should be substituted by a "vis," 
a mechanical power or energy, itself quantitative and 
producing quantitative changes only.5 As the astronomers 
developed more precision in their analysis of their data, 
they began to think that the purpose of astronomy was 
not to just save the appearances, as Copernicus professed, 
but to reveal the truths of nature.6 
The mathematical realism in cosmology could not 
be better expressed than by Galileo (1564-1642). "Philoso-
phy is written," he said, "in that vast book which stands 
ever open before our eyes, I mean the universe; but it 
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cannot be read until we have learnt the language and be-
come familiar with the characters in which it is written. 
It is written in mathematical language and the letters are 
triangles, circles and other geometrical figures, without 
which means it is humanly impossible to comprehend a 
single word."7 The echo of Pythagoras returns, but in the 
shadow of Francis Bacon's (1561-1626) inductive pro-
cedures for describing the phenomena. 
Galileo was not interested in using the teleologica! 
terminology of the scholastics, for the question of purpose 
was not as important as "how" bodies moved.8 The 
Aristotelean approach in more qualitative and substantive 
terms yielded to a more quantitative interpretation that 
expressed the process of motion itself in mathematical 
terms. Space and motion must now be seen as fields of 
geometry. The real world became for Galileo, as Burtt 
remarks, "a world of mathematically measurable motions 
in space and time."9 
The important realm of life lies in the exact measur-
ability of its contours. For the Greek and Scholastic world-
view, man as an integral part of nature is no longer an 
essentially prominent figure. His citizenry in the world is 
as a spectator. The greatness of man consists in his knowl-
ing the primary qualities—number, figure, position, mag-
nitude and motion—which, of course, cannot be separated 
from material bodies. In knowing these qualities, man is 
in contact with the true realm of scientific knowledge, a 
knowledge that is absolute, objective and immutable. The 
ultimate characteristics of nature are essentially mathe-
matical; the other qualities of sensation, although usually 
more noticeable in man's experience of the everyday 
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world, are merely the subjective effects on the senses 
of the primary qualities, which alone are objectively 
real. 
For Galileo, mathematical constructs do not re-
quire final causes. With the universe identifiable with 
quantitative definitions, Galileo preserves teleology in 
protology. Nature is not merely a "given"; it is given to 
man by the mediation of man. 
The Revision of God's Role for the New Universe 
In our modern age of nuclear technology, religious 
questions raised by the advantages of mathematical ap-
proaches to nature may seem superfluous to the scientist. 
In the Renaissance environment of these astronomers, 
however, this type of question was profoundly serious. 
For these men, religious consciousness was woven with 
their careers in academic duties.10 Galileo is not trying to 
eliminate God from his science, nor demonstrate the 
independence of the changing world from divine causality. 
In the hierarchical cosmology of the scholastics, God is 
the obvious final cause of the cosmos. But in the world of 
material and efficient causes mathematically interpreted, 
there is no necessary recourse to finality. Nature in its 
changing material atoms can be sufficiently explained in 
mathematical relations. How events take place in nature is 
not a problem without the explanation of teleology. 
Galileo belies the friction between his Christian 
belief in the Divine Creator and the unnecessary role of 
God as final cause by transforming God into the Efficient 
Cause of the atoms' motion. The biblical God is not so 
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much the supreme good or end of creation as he is the one 
to account for the first presence of the atoms. This could 
be reconciled with the Genesis account of the world's 
inception from nothing. Collingwood states: "Both God 
and man are regarded by Galileo as transcending nature; 
and rightly, because if nature consists of mere quantity 
its apparent qualitative aspects must be conferred upon 
it from outside, namely by the human mind as trans-
cending it; while if it is conceived no longer as a living 
organism but as inert matter, it cannot be regarded as self-
creative but must have a cause other than itself."11 Later 
speculation by scientists and philosophers refined this 
insight, and gradually God was eliminated altogether, as 
the atoms were viewed self-sufficient to explain their 
activities. 
Reenforcement from Descartes and Hobbes 
For Descartes (1596-1650) too, mathematics was 
the key to unlock the secrets of the province of nature. 
With his criterion for the discernment of truth in the clear 
and distinct idea, he proposed to construct a cosmology, 
relying upon the guidance of mathematical principles, 
that would achieve a complete explanation of the material 
universe. 
Instead of substantial form, corporeal substance is 
totally identified with extension, since the essence of. 
bodies consists in threefold dimension. In the scientific 
study of the objective, physical world, only principles that 
accord with extension and its quantitative modes are legiti-
mate. All physical phenomena, including the movement 
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of bodies (local motion), may be explained in terms of the 
mathematical relations between matter and motion. 
Efficient causality explains all. Natural purpose has no 
business in the physicist's world. The homogeneity of 
matter nullifies the need for it, since there is no intrinsic 
principle of movement in bodies. 
Matter has been invested by God from the begin-
ning with a constant amount of motion; for Descartes 
there is no entropy. Motion, then, is local—the only type 
amenable to the continuum of matter. Consequently, "all 
that manner of causality which is usually drawn from the 
end has then no use in physical and natural things."12 
Yet there is external finality. The providence of 
God, and not chance, has disposed the coordination of 
bodies. "Descartes grants to the mathematical and general 
physical laws a consequent kind of necessity. Once God 
wills them to be, he abides by his own decision and is not 
going to change his decree in favor of another set of 
truths. This follows from the immutability of God. Given 
a free act of the divine will, God remains unchangeably 
and uniformly faithful to his actual choice of laws and 
truths. In this way, both the infinity of the divine power 
and the stability of human scientific knowledge are 
assured."13 Any attempt to pursue further into the 
arrangement is to be presumptuous in disclosing the 
hidden plans of divine wisdom. 
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) did not agree with his 
French colleague. Although Descartes conceived of his 
famous writings as raising man to his highest degree of 
perfection, Hobbes would not concur in that ambition 
until even man's mental activities could be properly 
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understood as physical motions in his material body. 
In his philosophical writings, he uses scholastic 
terms with his own nuances added: " . . . if I first know 
that a thing is rational, I know from thence that the same 
is man; but this is no other than an efficient cause. A 
final cause has no place but in such things as have sense 
and will; and this also I shall prove hereafter to be an 
efficient cause."14 His view on causality is consistent; 
everything is reduced to mechanical determinism. 
Friend of Descartes though he be, he will not hold 
for the Frenchman's dualism. The activity of the res 
cogitans is a variation of the res extensae. Thinking and 
willing are movement, and since geometry is the science 
of simple motion, the geometrical mechanics of absolute 
necessity will serve quite nicely to explain human nature. 
The world is self-sufficient in its mechanics. God is either 
part of nature, being corporeal, or else a bodiless being, 
and thus outside our investigation. At best we can prove 
our desire and belief in an eternal power called God, but 
not in the existence of divinity. Man produces only emo-
tive names at best in applying them to this God, the 
unknown power of the universe. For Hobbes, the origin 
of religious consciousness is the individual's fear of an 
"unknown, threatening force in the universe."15 
Summary 
More and more the use of experimental methods 
and the successful employment of mathematics to mech-
anics increased the tempo of the scientific revolution that 
radically altered man's conception of nature by eclipsing 
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the older Aristoteleon view of cosmology. Social and 
economic conditions prompted an increased interest 
in the technical processes of various trades. Scientists 
and craftsmen joined in a mutual vision that saw the 
unlimited utility of applying the new philosophy, con-
solidated presendy by Newton, to concrete problems 
of engineering and manufacturing. A new era of pro-
gress was underway with the scientific rationality of 
classical mechanics insuring its irrevocable triumph for 
mankind. 
A cultural shift was emerging in the scientists' 
conception of divinity. The mechanical interpretation 
of nature, the rise of the experimental method, the more 
direct, empirical contact with reality that opened un-
imaginable possibilities for using the powers of nature in 
practical ways to benefit society stirred the feelings for 
a new kind of naturalism that looked upon the medieval 
conception of a static cosmos as totally irrelevant. The 
God of the cosmos is to be reinterpreted in light of the 
scientific rationalism that began to dominate Western 
culture. 
The religious conviction of the fundamental re-
lationship between the God of creation and the status 
of the universe had to manifest changes since the break-
down of the medieval conception of the scale of being 
and its teleologica! implications. The correlation between 
divinity and nature during the seventeenth century pre-
sented divergent conceptions that affected the Christian 
drama of man's destiny, each in a different way. 
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The Cosmologica! Trends and their 
Teleologica! Implications 
In the seventeenth century, one finds four general 
theories of nature competing for attention: 
1. The Aristotelean-Thomistic school. The late 
medieval, or more traditional approach, retained the full 
Aristotelean corpus with various commentaries by the 
scholastics. Its empirical methodology sought the spon-
taneous characteristic behavior in natural things, arising 
from their form and directed to an end consonant with the 
dynamics of their nature. The form, or immanent dynamic 
source, for the nature's operation included the real pre-
sence of a coordinated principle—matter—which was the 
basic potential of the nature. It was a speculative ap-
proach whose end was the discernment of the intelligible 
order of the cosmos. Regularity and causal inferences were 
guidelines for apprehending the stability of nature's pro-
cesses. This approach was still endorsed, mostly by natural-
ists and medical doctors. William Harvey's investigation of 
anatomy and his demonstration of the circulation of blood 
are a perfect example of this teleologica! methodology.16 
2. The school of filosofo geometra. Emphasizing 
the laws of the physical world as a realm of mathematical 
relations, this school substituted a mathematization of 
space and time for the Greek notion of cosmos. The 
approach in general was not new. Ancient and medieval 
astronomers used its procedures. But the emphasis on 
mathematical realism makes the world intelligible only 
when it is measurable. The material world could thus be 
investigated successfully without the help of final causes 
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because nature's movements were reduceable to measur-
able quantity. By doing so, the Greek intuition, which 
had been retained as an element of the Christian world-
view, gained new momentum. As such it came to polar-
ize the overall outlook of the age (cf. third school). Final 
causes, goals, intentions and the like are qualitative dis-
tinctions which have no place in the world of mathemati-
cal facts. Galileo, for example, would consistently relegate 
these internal modifications of the mind to the same 
status as merely phenomenal characteristics, like color, 
sound and other subjective qualities. Already the ground-
work for the dualism between matter and mind, later 
utilized by Descartes and Locke, can be found in Galileo's 
distinction between the quantitative and mechanical 
character of nature and the secondary, non-quantitative 
region of man's mind and its dispositions.17 
Yet purpose is present, if not in the immanent 
teleologica! manner of the Aristoteleans, then for sure in 
the consciousness of their science. For the real "purpose" 
of mathematical hypotheses is not to save the superficial 
appearances of nature at the sensible level but to unveil 
and resolve motion and matter into its fundamentally 
mathematical basis. The formal physical causes of Aristotle 
are replaced, for Kepler and Galileo, by a mathematical 
univocity, for the real world is dynamic motions in mathe-
matical continuity. Emphasis now veers from God as the 
final and supreme good of the cosmos, to God as first 
cause of mathematially-charted efficient causes making up 
natural phenomena. 
3. The school of corpuscular philosophy. The third 
school was more empirical and experimental in its methods 
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than the mathematical approach. It saw the world not in 
the homogenetic plenum of cartesian matter, but filled 
with corpuscular or atomic units of matter. The ancient 
atomic theories associated with Democritus and the Epi-
cureans were resuscitated in a new context. 
All the inner operations of nature and all the fabric 
of the universe could be resolved into the behavior of 
minute particles of matter and the variet of nature could 
be mechanically explained in such terms as size, configura-
tion, motion and position. Before, the existence and 
motion of atoms were merely the fortuitous collision of 
their falling through the empty void; now the mechaniza-
tion of these atomic particles reveals a rational coherence 
that could explain the uniform changes of behavior of 
bodies when subject to external influences. 
Instead of searching for the final causes, which do 
not relate much about nature, one should examine the 
efficient causes, the internal mechanism, and the shape and 
composition of matter, along with the elastic forces 
involved in its motion. Here was the atomic world of men 
like Stensen (1638-1686), Roverval (1602-1675), Hooke 
(1635-1703), especially Boyle (1627-1691) and later 
Dalton (1766-1844). And among the more popular 
spokesmen could be numbered Hobbes and Francis 
Bacon. 
At this point of our survey, i.e., before discussing 
the fourth theory, it is important to cite two most 
significant men whose writings were highly impressive in 
shaping the entire movement of science and this century's 
concept of divinity. 
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Francis Bacon and the New Experimental 
View of Life 
Bacon, like Descartes, dispensed with the ancient 
heritage for enabling man to contend with nature. Ancient 
theories were dead and fruitless, especially the pursuit 
of final causes in nature, for these are "like virgins con-
secrated to God, produring no offspring."18 
With his New Learning, Bacon thinks that he is 
introducing a new methodology for investigating the 
latent treasures of nature, which are hidden within the 
mechanical domains of its elements.19 Bacon minimizes 
his dependence on Aristotle, but admits that what he has 
to say about methodological procedures in investigating 
nature is already present in the Organon of Aristotle. The 
Greek scientist-philosopher had pointed out that true 
morphology, for example, requires the examination of 
material and formal causes in terms of makeup and 
arrangement leading up to a natural event. In understand-
ing the kind of materials, conditions and interactions of 
activity, the investigator is better able to grasp the out-
come. The mind sweeps back and forth across the entire 
process in its exposure to the task, and repeats this scru-
tiny until the significance of the causal relations are dis-
cerned.20 Bacon, however, does not maintain, as Aristotle 
does in his study of nature, that one can infer or demon-
strate divinity's existence. According to Bacon, only 
Christian faith in the revealed word of God can assure man 
that there is a creator of the material world, who is all-
powerful in designing the universe, and that he is wise and 
benevolent in his governing of his creation.21 
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Credit must be given to Bacon and the influence of 
his writings because to him more than to anyone else, and 
to his concern for setting up tools for what he classified 
as objective knowledge, the impersonal character of the 
"scientific method" owes its construction. In obtaining 
knowledge he admits that Aristotle's division of the four 
causes is proper, but that formal and final causes only 
retard the growth of real advances in understanding nature, 
for these causes distract the scientists from investigating 
the antecedent causes wherein advancement lies.22 Knowl-
edge gained by the new methods frees one from the 
responsibility to integrate these findings into a moral and 
metaphysical, even religious, context, the way the 
medieval approach preferred to structure knowledge. Pro-
fessional knowledge is for power to dominate nature. 
Baumer remarks that Bacon's "favorite word was power, 
and he used it to denote two ideas. First of all, there was 
God's power which natural philosophy revealed in the 
same way that the study of Scripture revealed God's will. 
There was also, however, man's power and this was the 
denotation that he used more commonly. Over and over 
again, in the Novum Organum and elsewhere, he referred 
to 'human utility and power,' 'the power and dominion 
of the human race over the universe,' and similar ideas 
By means of his power man could establish a veritable 
utopia on earth. . . . a utilitarian 'kingdom' or 'empire of 
man over things' in which the emphasis was on the relief of 
man's worldly estate."23 
What gave added impetus to Bacon's scheme was 
that he saw the right and duty to dominate nature as a 
religious sanction. Bacon demythologized nature by 
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undeifying it, which, because of its correlate (i.e., the God-
concept), could not be done without mythologizing it in 
a different way. As for Bacon, this turn remained biblical 
in oudook. 
The biblical passages in the Genesis story sufficient-
ly liberated man from nature as understood by the Greeks. 
Unlike the Greeks, Christian man could not only surpass 
nature but should conceive of this task as his restoration 
from the "Fall" he has suffered. Man should have no fear 
to investigate God's works. Understanding scientific 
knowledge from this religious perspective purifies the mind 
from its misconceptions about nature and restores man's 
biblical dominion over nature. Scientific research thus 
becomes, for Bacon, a duty in Christian charity.24 
Hooykaas points out historically that "as in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, religious sanction was indis-
pensable in order to make a thing flourish, science and 
technology profited greatly from this change of out-
look."25 The ancien regime had had its day, now man-
kind could look forward to Utopian triumphs over nature 
and build the future of the Nova Atlantis. 
The Contribution of Robert Boyle and the 
British "Virtuosi" 
One of England's first chartered scientific groups 
formed a Royal Society of London for the promotion of 
Natural Knowledge in 1662. While their common attrac-
tion among themselves was their keen interest in science 
and mathematics, nevertheless, some took it upon them-
selves to promote lectures that showed how Christianity 
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and the new science were reconcilable. Boyle was a leader 
in this responsibility.26 
As one of Bacon's admirers, he readily dismisses 
Aristode's doctrine of the four basic elements and tries 
to reinterpret scholastic vocabulary in mechanistic terms. 
Chemical experimentation showed him conclusively that 
matter could not be reduced to only four elements. More-
over, he views the vocabulary of "substantial forms," 
"essence" and the like as only coverings for our ignorance. 
Nature is not a collection of substances. It is a system of 
mechanical laws. The particles of matter with local mo-
tion, one particle striking against another, are the sole 
explanatory principles in the system. Because of matter, 
science may be corpuscular; on account of motion, it is 
mechanistic. Consequently, final causes are totally extrane-
ous to nature's systematic investigations. 
Interestingly, Boyle wrote a treatise called "A 
Disquisition About the Final Causes of Natural Things, 
wherein is Inquired Whether, and with what Cautions a 
Naturalist Should Admit Them? To which are Subjoined, 
by way of Appendix, some Uncommon Observation about 
Vitiated Sight."27 In this work, he understands final cause 
in two senses: first, that by which man reasoned to God 
from the uses of things (he called this the physico-theologi-
cal or metaphysical view of teleology), and secondly, when 
using final causes about natures, man must be extremely 
cautious. He agrees with Bacon that science should search 
diligently among the antecedent causes to explain nature. 
Yet the scientist should not forget that it is the biblical 
God who not only has created matter but is the ultimate 
cause for motion and its laws.28 God's "general concourse" 
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a term repeated by Boyle to indicate the providential 
direction of the mechanical operations of nature, extends 
itself even to individuals "only so far provided for, as their 
welfare is consistent with the general laws settled by God 
in the universe, and to such of those ends as he proposed 
to himself in framing it, as are more considerable than 
the welfare of those particular creatures."29 
Although Boyle does not want man to lose his 
dignified place in subscribing to the laws of matter and 
motion, nevertheless, he still considers man's body (as 
Descartes similarly does) to be an engine endowed with 
will.30 The primary argument for God and providence is 
the exquisite structure and symmetry of the universe. 
In one passage, he remarks that events occur "as if there 
were diffused through the universe an intelligent being, 
watchful over the public good of it, and careful to admin-
ister all things wisely for the good of the particular parts of 
it, but so far forth as is consistent with the good of the 
whole, and the preservation of the primitive and catholic 
laws established by the supreme cause."31 His references 
to God based upon nature must be viewed in mechanical 
terms and not in the animistic tradition from the aristo-
telean-medieval worldview. Thus, Boyle is convinced, from 
his chemical studies of matter and his Baconian interest 
in the practical control of nature, that no better symbol 
than the great mechanical clock at Strasbourg could be 
cited to analogize nature. Nature, he tells us, is like "a 
rare clock, such as may be that at Strasbourg, where all 
things are skillfully contrived, that the engine being once 
set a moving, all things proceed, according to the artificer's 
design, and the motions of the little statues, that at such 
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hours perform these or those things, do not require, like 
those of puppets, the peculiar interposing of the artificer, 
or any intelligent agent employed by him, but perform 
their functions upon particular occasions, by virtue of 
the general and primitive contrivance of the whole en-
gine."32 
In his description Boyle was also mocking with his 
"puppets" the still lingering animistic worldview. In 
addition to the clock symbol, he employed another one, 
"the atomic alphabet," by which the fundamental proper-
ties and their permutations could be best explained. F. L. 
Baumer mentions that "these two metaphors of the clock 
and the atomic alphabet, particularly the clock, were quite 
common in intellectual circles by the late seventeenth 
century. They implied a radically new conception of 
nature, a "new philosophy" which Boyle sometimes called 
the mechanical, sometimes the corpuscular philosophy."33 
Together, the mathematical and mechanical principles are 
the "alphabet, in which God wrote the world."34 
Boyle's Voluntarist Conception of God 
In keeping a religious or metaphysical relationship 
with the Christian God, Boyle nevertheless was adamently 
opposed to using terminology that might give the hint of 
deifying nature. In his writings, he constantly associates 
organic and vitalist images of nature with egregious errors 
and proposes new images of nature in terms of legal and 
mechanical metaphors. God, the creator, is the single, 
transcendent source of order and design in creation. It is 
important to note that when Boyle speaks of divine laws 
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governing nature, he is resisting "necessary relations in 
creation, including those integral to organic and spiritual 
views of natural processes."35 The character of law is 
something imposed rather than immanent. He remarks, 
"sometimes, when it is said, that nature does this or that; 
it is less proper to say, that it is done by nature, than, that 
it is done according to nature; so that nature is not to be 
looked on, as a distinct or separate agent, but as a rule, or 
rather a system of rules, according to which those agents, 
and the bodies they work on, are, by the great author of 
things, determined to act and suffer."36 The "natural 
laws" are not immanent and intrinsic to physical beings, as 
the ancients and medievalists held, but legislated by God's 
will. Nature by itself is not inherently teleologica!. The 
discernable purposes are mechanically arranged, but always 
leave the freedom of divine ordination unimpaired. While 
God ordinarily confines the motions of matter to the 
regular laws originally established, "yet," as Burtt teils 
us, "he has by no means surrendered his right to change its 
operations in the interest of some new or special pur-
pose."37 
As a scientist, Boyle's empirical observations com-
piled irregularities in the general even run of nature; as a 
Christian believer in miracles, he upheld these mysterious, 
extraordinary interpositions by divine will. God, then, 
might at any time, "by withholding his concourse, or 
changing these laws of motion, that depend entirely upon 
his will . . . invalidate most, if not all, the axioms of natur-
al philosophy."38 This interdependence between science 
and religion shows itself in the conception that Boyle 
proposes as the ideal of the scientist. God's freedom allows 
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him to alter the laws of nature at will and so the task of 
the natural philosopher is to clarify this divine dialectic 
of will and law toward creation as a continuous vocation: 
one becomes "an inquiring minister of natural creation."39 
Boyle wants to avoid making the laws or rules of 
nature too fixed and permanent, as Descartes had pro-
posed, for then nature could appear as self-sufficient or 
independent of God. At the same time, he wants to under-
score the rational, mechanical order of the universe. In 
order to retain the concept of lawful order in the realm 
of things, but without making nature autonomous in its 
processes, Boyle places the basis for purpose in nature in 
the free, autonomous and transcendent will of God. He 
states that "the laws of nature, as they were at first arbi-
trarily instituted by God, so, in reference to him, they are 
but arbitrary still."40 God can thus intervene as he wills 
with the mechanics of his creation. Boyle thus protects 
the divine freedom over nature and the radical contingen-
cy of creation, but his voluntarist teleology puts a strain 
on man's ability to know the world with reasonable cer-
titude. Inadvertently, Boyle has produced a strain of 
sceptism that will emerge more vividly in the philosophers 
of the Enlightenment, and take the great work of Kant to 
resolve the conflicting strands of mechanistic and teleo-
logica! explanations, the freedom of God, and the necessi-
tarian aspect of scientific laws. 
4. The school of Classical Mechanics. With the de-
mise of the aristotelean-medieval approach to the study 
of nature, the seventeenth century revolution in science 
saw two concurrent trends—a physico-mathematical view-
point and a more atomic, experimental viewpoint--converge 
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upon one another. In either emphasis, the concrete world 
was no longer conceived as "a finite and hierarchically-
ordered, therefore qualitatively and ontologically-differ-
entiated, whole, but as an open, indefinite, and even 
infinite universe, united not by the identity of its funda-
mental contents and laws; a universe in which in contra-
distinction to the traditional conception with its separa-
tion and opposition of the two worlds of becoming and 
being, that is, of the heavens and the earth, all its compo-
nents appear as placed on the same ontological level."41 
Classical mechanics ushers in a new era in which 
scientific thought achieves its own rational consistency 
without the customary integration of humanistic values 
and purposes. These factors, like the ancient formal and 
final causes, are inconsequential because these concepts 
do not apply to the realm of mathematical ontology, nor 
are they very productive for a mechanical philosophy of 
life. 
In 1687 the Philosophia Naturalis Principia Mathe-
matica was published. Isaac Newton's (1642-1727) genius 
synthesized the prevailing trends in natural philosophy. 
Leaving aside the impotent Aristotelean view, Newton 
agreed with Bacon and Boyle that nature is written in 
corpuscular elements and not in the homogeneous, un-
differentiated matter of Descartes. On the other hand, he 
agreed with Kepler, Galileo and Descartes that it is a 
mathematical syntax that binds the moving corpuscular 
texture of matter together. He joins experimental and 
observational data with mathematics, tracing the quantita-
tive properties of nature and reducing them to mathemati-
cal formula. As Buchdahl explains it: "Nature is no longer 
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an ordered 'cosmos,' but has become a 'universe,' a system 
all of whose parts are related to one another. These 'parts' 
are pictured as quasi-geometrical points, their supreme 
paradigm eventually becoming the point-particle of New-
tonian dynamics. Each individual 'point,' instead of being 
an 'instance' of a class or species, 'designed' to express 
some final purpose through the grand-pattern of harmoni-
ously related forms, outside which there is still room for 
freedom and accident—each such Newtonian particle must 
be conceived of as being a nodal point in a mesh of inter-
locking lines, each of which is the picture of natural law. 
Nature is not individual natural forms but a horizontal 
mesh of laws."42 
Newton's work on terrestrial mechanics showed 
more than ever before that the celestial bodies were not of 
essentially different composition than the structure of 
earthly matter. He respects, but is not interested in, 
ultimate or metaphysical explanations in his research. He 
is simply taking the empirical facts, forming a fitting 
theory in mathematical terms drawn from the study of 
the phenomena, deducing the mathematical consequences, 
and rechecking these conclusions with experimental 
verification. An hypothesis has no standing with Newton 
unless it is subjected to such experimental confirmation. 
In this regard, Huyghens (1629-1695) and Leibniz (1646-
1746) later fault him for hedging on the cause for gravita-
tional attraction. Newton answers his critics by postulating 
that God's will (similar to Boyle's divine voluntarism) is 
the ultimate cause, but he himself will not offer any 
hypothesis on the secondary causes. 
In 1692 an Anglican chaplain, Richard Bentley, 
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wrote Newton to ask how his mechanical principles of 
natural philosophy could be used to defend Christianity 
against the attack of the atheists. Newton answered in four 
letters admitting how his laws failed to account for some 
aspects of the solar system's structure and thus it was 
necessary to involve God as a further explanatory princi-
ple.43 
In questions considering the origin of the universe, 
Newton, true to his atomic, corpuscular philosophy, 
wrote in his Optics: "God in the beginning formed matter 
in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable particles, of 
such sizes and figures and with such other properties and 
in such proportion to space, as most conduced to the end 
for which he formed them."44 God was not only neces-
sary at the beginning, orienting and impelling planets into 
elliptical orbits about the sun, he was required, at times, 
to conserve them in their continuing motions. Here we see 
how Newton's religious suppositions frequently enter into 
his writings to save the appearances, as it were. He replied 
to the problem of why the planets do not gravitate toward 
the sun by stating that God intervened to maintain the 
stability of the system. He was thoroughly against chance 
as an explanation for particles becoming bodily units. 
Our complex world runs on material and efficient causes as 
well as the will of the Christian God who providentially 
keeps the entire system functioning in harmony. In a letter 
to Bentley (1692), Newton expresses a sentiment typical 
of his era: "When I wrote my treatise about our system, 
I had an eye on such principles as might work with con-
sidering men for the belief of a deity; and nothing can 
rejoice me more than to find it useful for that purpose."45 
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Conclusion 
In the decades that followed, Newtonian thought 
became the scientific creed of the eighteenth century; its 
enormous momentum expanded into the twentieth cen-
tury. Scientists continued to improve his calculations and 
showed that the solar system could maintain itself without 
intervention of the divine. By the time of Laplace (1749-
1827), the use of God as zdeus ex machina was no longer 
expedient. Newton's telic employment of the divine 
engineer to account for the irregularities in the system 
finally caught up with its presumption. With the advanced 
research in the mathematical and experimental investiga-
tions, Laplace's Systeme du monde (1796) could confi-
dently assert that all the irregularities in the solar system 
may be explained as periodical and thus equalize one 
another. 
Furthermore, Newton's voluntarist presupposition 
of the lawful structure of creation based upon and 
governed by its divine author included his belief that God 
made the solar system at a single moment in time. Its 
lawful motions revealed God's purpose for it. Laplace 
countered Newton's implied deism by proposing his 
nebular hypothesis: the universe is the result of a great 
gaseous nebula cooling and condensing into concentric 
rings from which the planets eventuated. "Its significance," 
J. H. Randall states, "lies in its viewing celestial phenom-
ena as essentially processes of development in time rather 
than as eternal recurrences."46 The analytic physics of 
this French tradition emphasized the quantitative correla-
tions of phenomena. Their ideal was the elimination of 
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uncertainty in physical matters. The laws of mechanics 
would compliment this ideal by determining, through the 
indefinite perfectibility and universal applicability of 
scientific methods, the entire course of events for the 
future. With the refinements of the universal laws of 
mechanics, nature, understood more and more as a self-
contained energy system, could be relieved of its provi-
dential supervision. The cosmic designer whose active 
concurrence with his laws of mechanical order had been 
such a profound supposition for Christian scientists was 
expunged gradually from scientific thought. God, for 
Newton, had become a deus ex machina and, as in the 
later phase of Greek tragedy, this concept once more 
destroyed the consciousness that had produced it. The 
deus ex machina here understood as expression and 
failure of religious consciousness. After the eighteenth 
century, God's relationship to nature and science became a 
debatable hypothesis. 
The Philosophers of Classical Science and their 
Understanding of God, Nature and Teleology 
With John Locke (1632-1704), a current of impor-
tant interest begins in earnest with the human understand-
ing of causality. The conditions for his questioning the 
role of sensation and the faculty of reasoning have already 
been prepared by the tensions between the corpuscularian 
theory with its reliance upon hypothesis and the apparent 
certainty of the idea of knowledge derived from the 
sensory level. 
He appreciates the corpuscularian philosophy but 
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is sceptical of any causal explanations. Yet he is equally 
sure that nature acts in a causal manner from his observa-
tions of its constancy.47 From his analysis of the simple 
ideas of cause and effect, Locke cannot discover any 
essential connection between them. In spite of this barrier 
to understanding causality, he insists that everyday sense 
experience reconfirms, as particular instances, the exis-
tence of causes and effects. He upholds, therefore, the 
presence of causality in nature but denies accessibility to 
its intellectual comprehension.48 
In noting man's rational inability to resolve the 
dilemma, Locke offers a solution by attributing the causal 
connection to the "arbitrary determination of that all-
wise agent who has made them to be, and to operate as 
they do, in a way wholly above our weak understandings 
to conceive."49 Man can arrive at experimental knowledge, 
but not at universal knowledge; he can not really know the 
essence of things.50 Philosophically speaking, Locke is 
the first major thinker who casts suspicion upon the con-
fidence of the mind in its certitude about the mechanistic 
world, a suspicion that enlarges throughout the Enlighten-
ment as, paradoxically, classical science entrenches its hold 
on all fields of knowledge. 
Locke is quite modest in his philosophical empiri-
cism. He expects man to live with a few certainties and 
many safe probabilities about the world. Definitive solu-
tions to life's problems are too difficult to come by both 
in society and in science. After all, since human knowledge 
is the analysis of the actual contents of sense perception 
and the operation of reflective reason dependent upon 
sense data, one does not have any innate idea of God. 
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Locke, however, will not concede to Bacon and 
Hobbes that a philosophy that stresses sense experience 
can ascertain nothing about God. At the same time, he 
wants to avoid Descartes' use of God as the functional 
guarantor of our knowledge. He feels that he supplies 
an adequate demonstration of God's existence from an 
empirical origin, and thus further avoids any rationist use 
of God as a deductive principle. Man has no direct ex-
perience of the infinity of God nor a perfect idea of 
infinity. Thus the proportion between God's own nature 
and man's knowledge of it is very tenuous, to say the 
least. Man must be content with a very limited under-
standing of the divine realm. 
Starting from the empirical experience of existing 
in the world, Locke attempts to show that since man can-
not come from nothing, nor is he self-made, then his 
existence must ultimately depend, like everything else, 
upon an eternal first being or producer of both his exis-
tence and the known world. Only an a posteriori demon-
stration of God's existence is referred by Locke.51 He 
does not go into the question of whether or not the idea 
of a causal principle of inference regarding man's finite 
ideas about himself can truly lead to a transcendental, 
(and thus non-empirical) source in legitimate reasoning. 
His compatriots will view his attempts differently. Berke-
ley attains God by reifying Locke's finite ideas, while 
Hume will question this conversion and refrain from mak-
ing any final contribution to God's existence through 
demonstration .s2 
For George Berkeley (1685-1753), if one is engaged 
in studying the natural world, then one is not in "the 
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business of physics or mechanics to establish efficient 
causes, but only the rules of compulsions or attractions, 
and, in a word, the laws of motion."53 
Sensitive to Locke's criticism of the corpuscularian 
theory, he wanted to protect the general certitude of 
ordinary experience while acknowledging the legitimacy of 
Newtonian science as a mechanical system of mental 
constructs. He also wished to protect the spirituality of 
God by not associating him too closely with the experien-
tial province of the natural scientist. 
To speak of causes, including final ones, belongs to 
the province of metaphysics or theology. Berkeley ex-
plains it thus: "Modem thinkers consider motion and rest 
in bodies as two states of existence in either of which 
every body, without pressure from external force, would 
naturally remain passive-, whence one might gather that 
the cause of the existence of bodies is also the cause of 
their motion and rest. For no other cause of the successive 
existence of the body in different parts of space should be 
sought, it would seem, than that cause whence is derived 
the successive existence of the same body in different 
parts of time. But to treat of the good and great God, 
creator and preserver of all things, and to show how all 
things depend on supreme and true being, although it is 
the most excellent part of human knowldge, is, however, 
rather the province of first philosophy or metaphysics 
and theology, than of philosophy which today is almost 
entirely confined to experiments and mechanics."54 
God's action, as an incorporeal agent, is the real 
cause of motion. The naturalist is concerned only with phe-
nomena; he is unable to explain anything about causality. 
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Like Locke, he insists that true causality exists-, but more 
confident than Locke, Berkeley maintains that man can 
penetrate behind the phenomena of nature, as it were, 
arriving at the metaphysical level where exists the "real 
and true causes" of phenomena.55 He writes, " . . . when 
we enter the province of the philosophia prima, we dis-
cover another order of beings, mind and its acts, perma-
nent being, not dependent on corporeal things, nor 
resulting, nor connected, nor contained; but containing, 
connecting, enlivening the whole frame, and imparting 
those motions, forms, qualities, and that order and sym-
metry, to all those transient phenomena which we term 
the Course of Nature."56 
Berkeley replaces the necessity of efficient causality 
at the phenomenal level with customary lawlike operations 
of the universe, guaranteed by the free and changeable 
will of the author of nature. Like Descartes, he holds that 
the true notion of causality is ultimately unavailable at 
the level of physical science, but is traceable to God's 
will at the level of metaphysics. For how can natural 
processes reveal and sustain his activity in nature in a 
uniform manner? In his The Principles o f Human Knowl-
edge Berkeley states: "By a diligent observation of the 
phenomena within our view, we may discover the general 
laws of nature, and from them deduce the other phenom-
ena; I do not say demonstrate, for all deductions ofthat 
kind depend on a supposition that the author of nature 
always operates uniformly, and in a constant observance 
of those rules we take for principles: which we cannot 
evidently know."57 
Granted that God is the author of nature, natural 
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processes may not impinge upon the divine author's 
freedom. God may or may not reveal and sustain his 
activity in nature in a uniform manner. The God of Des-
cartes, the supreme principle of efficient causality, is now 
replaced by a certain lawlike sequence of operations in 
nature. Inadvertently, Berkeley is providing the nominal-
istic metaphysics for Boyle and Newton's concept of 
science. Still, in attempting to keep God or metaphysical 
notions away from physical science, Berkeley cannot avoid 
reference to God in order to provide a genuine explanation 
of causality discernable by common sense. For Berkeley 
science is unintelligible without God.58 Unfortunately, 
his division of physics and metaphysics still prolongs the 
scepticism of the mind to know reality with assurance. 
Scientific knowledge, the atoms and forces of mechanistic 
Newtonian thought, was for Berkeley, "convenient fic-
tions, put forward in order to interconnect those phe-
nomena so that we can manipulate and classify natural 
things."59 
The Elimination of Teleology in Nature 
Unlike his predecessors who contended with the 
pedestrian observation that causes take place in the ob-
jective world, David Hume (1711-1776) proposes a new 
tack for explaining this common experience among men. 
The idea of necessary connections, commonly presumed, 
is not really discernable from the external world, although 
it seems that way; instead the idea of causality is pro-
jected upon reality. 
An ordinary day confronts one's observations with 
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myriad events continuously happening all around the 
observer. Consequently, "this idea of a necessary con-
nection among events arises from a number of similar 
instances which occur of the constant conjunction of 
these events; . . . after a repetition of similar instances, 
the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one 
event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it 
will exist. This connection, therefore, which we feel in 
the mind, this customary transition of the imagination 
from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment 
or impression from which we form the idea of power or 
necessary connection."60 In his famous illustration of 
motion being apparently transmitted through the impact 
of two billiard balls, the proper observation in each in-
stance proclaims a constancy of conjunction among the 
objects. There are no grounds for asserting causal connec-
tion between the balls, although the idea of connection, 
he admits, arises in the mind nonetheless. 
In his Treatise of Human Understanding Hume 
critizes the traditional scholastic axioms on causality— 
namely, every beginning must have a cause of its existence 
and every effect must equally have a cause of origin. 
Having already shown that ideas like events are distinct 
and separable, he points out that the idea of cause and the 
idea of effect are likewise unconnected in our mind. Any-
one who takes the trouble notes that he can easily imagine 
one without the other. Therefore, "the separation . . . of 
the idea of a cause from that of a beginning of existence is 
plainly possible for the imagination, and consequently the 
actual separation of these objects is so far possible that it 
implies no contradiction nor absurdity . . . "61 
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With a similar line of reasoning, Hume can dis-
solve the causal concept for the fiction that it is, and thus 
would eliminate the support for teleological explanations 
as well as Berkeley's spiritualistic metaphysics. The analy-
sis of causality shows it to be merely a habit of expecta-
tion. Our ideas are as broad as our experience, and since 
we have not observed a creator creating worlds, no amount 
of generalizing can rightly establish the divine creator. The 
argument from design (the divine clockmaker) remains 
attractive but our ideas, being finite, at best arrive at a 
finite designer.62 
Yet in his psychological views on the matter of 
induction and causality, Hume exercises discriminating 
approval when it comes to Newtonian physics. In this 
region of experience man can arrive at general causes 
about nature, but not the ultimate causes in the Berkelean 
sense. While endorsing the Newtonian picture of the 
world, one can at best speak of statistical uniformities in 
nature, but it is impossible to speak of final causes. 
Earlier, and thus independently of Hume, was 
Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716). A contemporary of New-
ton and Locke, and influenced by the success of mathe-
matical methods, he attempted to reduce all his thought 
to as few principles as possible. Without denying that the 
worid's efficiency depended upon God, the world (the 
best one there is or could be) has been cast into a self-
sufficient system that does not need God's fashionable 
intervention. Leibniz disagrees with Newton for employ-
ing God as a clockmaker continually adjusting his handi-
work through history. The world's internal forces and 
causes are totally adequate to manifest God's maximally 
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best world; invoking God's extraordinary power to explain 
ordinary natural processes undermines belief in divine 
wisdom.63 
Dr. Samuel Clarke, a British defender of Newtoni-
anism, took exception to the implications of Leibniz's 
attempt to make the world independent of God's con-
course. He wrote: "The notion of the world's being a 
great machine, going on without the interposition of 
God, as a clock continues to go without the assistance 
of a clockmaker, is the notion of materialism and fate, 
and tends (under pretence of making God a super-
mundane intelligence) to exclude providence and God's 
government in reality out of the world. And by the same 
reason that a philosopher can represent all things going on 
from the beginning of the creation without any govern-
ment or interposition of providence; a sceptic will easily 
argue still farther backwards, and suppose that things 
have from eternity gone on as they now do without ai y 
true creation or original authors at all, but only what such 
arguers call all-wise and eternal nature."64 Leibniz's 
attempt to make nature somewhat independent from 
divine intervention was simply too radical for the British 
"virtuosi." 
Butterfield remarks that Leibniz saw "everything 
which took place in the body of man or animal . . . as 
mechanical as the things that happen inside a watch."65 
At the same time, the efficient causes or mechanical 
explanations of things have a complementary relationship 
with final causes. These final causes relate to the perfec-
tion of God's world and thus have teleologica! implications 
that can reveal the architectonic wisdom of the creator. 
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Nature has been predesigned and informed with sufficient 
natural force to achieve its determined ends, without 
subsequent divine aid. With the principle of preestablished 
harmony, Leibniz understands that God conserves or 
directs all substances to achieve their perfect ends,66 as 
well as achieving the perfection of the whole. 
In line with the teleology of perfection, one must 
understand that the perfect world of God does not imply 
that at any given moment in history it has attained its 
maximum state of perfection. The natural substances, or 
monads as Leibniz called them, that comprise the order 
of the universe are always progressing and developing. 
Since man images the infinity of God, his fulfillment 
involves perpetual progress, a theme which was integral to 
the myth of the Enlightenment. 
The Culminating Resolution 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), not unlike his pre-
decessors in noting the enormous impact played by New-
tonian physics in European culture, decides to vindicate 
the new science and its claims to knowledge beyond any 
possibility of doubt. Equally important to him was the 
validity of philosophical knowledge concerning God. 
Observant of the disputes and conflicting strands of 
the scientific and religious tensions reaching back to the 
Renaissance, Kant sought a mediating philosophical solu-
tion. The inherited problems made him keenly aware that 
any investigation of natural science and God would have to 
involve a reexamination, thanks to the British empiricists' 
challenge, of the nature and limits of human knowledge. 
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Raised in the intellectual climate of Descartes and 
Leibniz, and aware of the Humean analysis of empirical 
causality, he attempts to reconcile the sceptical discrep-
ancies between sense experience and universal, certain 
knowledge as epitomized in the new mechanics. Since 
scientific truth exists, he will inquire into the conditions 
for its possibility. Sense data taken by itself is in a state 
of flux—contingent and indeterminent, highly unsuitable 
for scientific objectivity. The sensuous materials of the 
empirical realm alone could not provide the basis for the 
necessary structures of scientific knowledge. 
Yet a union between concept and sense experience 
was required in order that the a priori necessity of reason 
could be extended into the realm of experience, and the 
synthetic a posteriori data of empiricism could be given 
the necessity they seemed to lack for coherent knowledge. 
An alteration in viewpoint was introduced—the 
famous analogy with Copernicus, whereby one reverses 
the customary supposition so that now "objects must 
conform to our knowledge."67 By invoking this new 
supposition, "we can know a priori things only what we 
ourselves put into them."68 Thus synthetic a priori know-
ing regards "appearances, and must leave the thing in 
itself as indeed real per se, but as not known by us."69 
Given this understanding of reason, Kant can now 
preserve the empirical, progressive side of scientific re-
search and provide for the a priori certainty of its claim. 
The object of experience and the object of knowledge are 
identical: the unified realm of sense appearances organized 
by the universal and necessary laws of Newtonian science. 
In this way, experience is kept within the bounds 
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"regulated" by knowledge. 
It should come as no surprise that when Kant 
examined the physico-teleological argument in his Cri-
tique of Pure Reason (1781), he would employ his Coper-
nican method. To speak of the "purposiveness of nature" 
or a "formal teleology of nature" is to speak as though the 
universe had been fashioned by a designer in accordance 
with a plan, embodying the details of the systematic whole 
with different parts or laws relating them. Kant sums up 
the theoretical dimension of man's mind by stating that: 
"the speculative interest of reason makes it necessary to 
regard all order in the world as if it had originated in the 
purpose of a supreme reason. Such a principle opens out 
to our reason, as applied in the field of experience, alto-
gether new views as to how the things of the world may be 
connected according to teleologica! laws, and so enables 
it to arrive at their greatest systematic unity. The assump-
tion of a supreme intelligence, as the one and only cause of 
the universe, though in the idea alone, can therefore 
benefit reason and can never injure."70 
For Kant the idea of God is a necessary and benefi-
cial illusion. He resists the older functional use of God as 
integral to natural philosophy (Descartes and others), by 
understanding the idea of God as a sort of concrete symbol 
of the scientist's goal of a unified theory of the universe—a 
working belief, one could say, in the fundamental intelli-
gible consistency of the world under investigation. 
Final causes in fact do not exist, nor do entities 
organize teleologie ally; rather, they are viewed by the 
observer through the guidance of spectacles, one might 
say, that indicate teleologica! organization. Teleology is an 
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entirely imposed intellectual vista without constitutive 
reference to any physical determinant. The mind can even 
subjectify from the idea of final cause to a divine de-
signer, understanding him as the "ground" of the "unity 
of nature." We thus imagine that the purposive arrange-
ments of nature are in nature itself, or in divine wisdom as 
their author.71 But nature, the order of nature, and the 
source of the order of nature, are alike in being simulated, 
heuristic objects contained within an idea postulated by 
reason. For the scientist the world should be appraised "as 
if" it manifested such teleology. In this construction, the 
idea of teleology or final cause only simulates a certain 
"regulative" force or import for the mind, and no onto-
logica! status may be read into this postulated ground. 
When one, however, mistakenly assumes or ascribes to the 
idea the concept of a real thing, then one exceeds the 
conditions for the possibility of experience and is guilty of 
a "transcendental illusion."72 One just has to maintain a 
critical constraint from imputing existential overtones to 
the teleologica! concept of nature or God. 
Besides being a scientist-philosopher, Kant remained 
a devout Protestant Christian. Although he agreed with 
Hume about the impossibility of demonstrating, specula-
tively, God's existence, he refused to second Hume in 
denying any speculative role to the idea of God. Kant 
moves between the claim of rationalism to possess strict 
knowledge of God as a principle for understanding nature 
and the inoperative theism of Hume. The idea of God as 
a just creator and intelligent designer of the world is useful 
for illuminating the nature of the mind and its formal 
conditions for gaining knowledge. In opposition to any 
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dogmatic stance for yielding knowledge, Kant views this 
speculative significance of the idea of God as a "symbolic 
anthropomorph ism. ' '73 
Although insulated by the critical constraint from 
misconstruing the status of the "object of the idea," Kant 
nevertheless admits that the mind is always "constrained" 
to give such an idea a real object. Moreover, we are virtu-
ally impelled to seek the steps to the supreme and uncon-
ditional author of nature. But due to the deficiency of the 
physico-teleological argument, one must "supplement" it 
with the ethical proof for God. 
If we assume a moral nature for man, then as a 
"postulate of pure practical reason,"74 i.e., as something 
necessitated by our understanding of morality and free-
dom, we must postulate the reality of God. Otherwise 
those practical conditions for the fulfillment of the full 
exercise of moral activity and religion are unrealized. 
Belief in God is, after all, not a theoretical problem but a 
postulate of the moral order. 
Kant's critical purging of the physical conception of 
God exposes it as a necessary subjective construction, 
enabling him to reach out to the certitude of practical 
reason and claim objective reality for God. Kant shifts 
the traditional meanings of the relationships between 
science and religion into new contexts. Neither is a com-
petitor for man's commitment any longer. Each charts its 
own independent realm without infringement by the 
other. Burtt remarks that for Kant, "science and religion 
occupy entirely different spheres and are given distinct 
functions which are so adjusted that they need never con-
flict. The realm of possible knowledge belongs to science, 
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and science has complete freedom to explore that realm 
by its own method. The task of religion is to enlighten our 
moral devotion and give it cosmic serenity."75 The 
function of religion is not to reen force scientific explana-
tion but to support the moral life. 
Kant does not avoid using God in an innovative but 
still functional way. Instead of the God of nature or the 
speculative God of Leibniz, he becomes, since assent to 
his existence is determined by man's moral need and 
subordinated to its fulfillment, the God of autonomous 
morality. The reality of God is affirmed for the sake of 
preserving the coherence and the reality of the moral 
ideal. Yet, by discussing the issue of teleology, the God of 
morals enters the realm of science again. As such he re-
calls the status attributed to myth: useful and anthropo-
morphic, but otherwise imaginary. 
Summary 
From our survey of the philosophers and scientists 
from the Renaissance to the nineteenth century, we see 
that the contributions and complexities of the modern 
period brought forth at least three distinct but inter-
related trends that effected an intellectual climate within 
which teleology prospered: 
1. First, the mathematicizing and technical power 
over nature. The paradigm for human knowledge was en-
shrined in Newtonian mathematical physics. This ideal of 
scientific knowledge primarily involved a necessitarian type 
of logic, mathematically inspired, and expressed in measur-
able systems of laws regarding the empirical universe. 
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The implications of a mathematical standard for necessity 
and certitude in other sciences (which, nevertheless, they 
accepted as their own ideal), imposes, to say the least, 
a strain upon them. As a result of this widely accepted 
standard, a cultural belief emerged that "precise measure-
ment and prodigious calculation will lead not only to 
widespread human happiness . . . but to a knowledge of 
ultimate reality, which the philosophers have vainly sought 
through the ages."76 That human intelligence could pro-
fess various kinds of necessity in its march to acquire 
knowledge apparently was never seriously entertained. 
Either one's knowledge submitted to mathematical canons 
or it was mere opinion and caprice. Within the method-
ology of this paradigm, there was no reason to employ 
"final causes." Explanation by organic purposes and 
teleology gave way to explanation by mechanical causes. 
Nature is subject to measurable laws whose immediate 
validation no longer needs the religiously oriented view of 
a hierarchical cosmos. 
Concomitant with the new physics was the accentu-
ation on the mechanical arts. The incredible possibilities 
for invention and domination over matter came out in the 
profusion of technical and commercial enterprises that 
foreshadowed the industrial revolution.77 In Bacon's 
mind, the impulse of true natural philosophy was not to 
know the final cause of things but to have command over 
the domain of nature: this is the "new" philosophy. 
2. Second, the emphasis upon God's transcendence. 
Still present in the Renaissance mind was a sense of divine 
immanence in the activities of nature. The dynamic formal 
cause could retain the organic outlook of internal, vital 
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energies inherited from the Greek and medieval legacy. 
But as mathematics abstracts from the qualitative variety 
of nature and articulates its homogeneous characterization 
of matter, the organic concept of the cosmos recedes from 
the consciousness of men into a more mechanically organ-
ized objective universe. 
In the early period of classical mechanics, God is 
called upon as the supreme efficient cause, a functional 
subordinate, one could say, to the philosophical-scientific 
system. With the advances in scientific refinement and 
revision of hypotheses, God is no longer included in the 
organizing principles of science; he becomes, scientifically 
speaking, an unwarranted assumption, a surplus belief, 
relegated finally to private devotion. 
The mechanistic universe mediates the objective 
dichotomy between man and God, which is further in-
tensified by the pragmatic results of commandeering the 
material world. Man's promethean control over nature 
prompts his self-reliance into making God's now distant 
appearance even fainter. The biblical God is variously 
appreciated as the development of scientific progress con-
tinues. From viewing God as the first efficient cause to his 
becoming the impersonal clockmaker, the cosmic archi-
tect, he is gradually screened out from having any intrinsic 
incorporation into the advancement of science. Eventually, 
he is eliminated entirely by the materialism of the French 
Enlightenment. At the same time, teleology underwent a 
kind of demythologizing. In their search for power over 
nature, men no longer saw the necessity for aligning their 
newly found knowledge with the medieval hierarchical 
scheme that portrayed a cosmic order. Nature was not for 
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man's speculation; nature was for bending to man's will. 
Purpose in nature took on a more practical cast with the 
rising commercial and industrial classes. Teleology is 
grounded, its transcendental dimension expurgated. In-
stead of doing away with teleology forever, the wedding 
of science and technology introduced a new form of 
finality—a mechanized teleology. The world has been re-
discovered as a machine, almost a pure form of teleologica! 
organization. Hence the purpose of science is to widen its 
empire. 
3. Third, the phenomenalizing of temporal things. 
The world becomes an art form. In this period, however, 
nature is not imitated but inaugurated. The intrinsic being 
of nature is unknown and unknowable territory. The 
determinants of nature are not apprehended from things 
in themselves. The mind only knows about nature what it 
puts into nature. The Newtonian world is confirmed by 
Kant at the price of the speculative knowledge of God. 
What was a distant, though reassuring, appearance in the 
sky of life turns out to be a dead star upon the horizon 
of scientific consciousness. 
The Romantic Protest 
Before speaking about the cultural teleology forged 
by beliefs in mechanistic nature and the rational optimism 
of human progress (K. Becker calls it a "secular escha-
tology," an almost unrestrained vision of the heavenly city 
on earth78), a brief word must be said regarding a develop-
ment that protested the scientific ideal of the Enlighten-
ment. 
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The scientific temper of mind was challenged by 
what historians refer to as "Romanticism." Randall 
points out that during the close of the eighteenth century 
a reaction set in with great vigor that "emphasized the 
emotional rather than the rational side of human nature, 
a richly diversified development of individuals and groups 
rather than a mathematical uniformity, and, most signifi-
cant of all, the genesis and growth of things rather than 
their mechanical ordering."79 
This reaction showed up especially in the literature 
of the day, in such authors as Goethe, Shelley, Byron, 
Coleridge and Wordsworth, and in the philosophy of 
German Idealism. For them nature was not a machine but 
a vibrant source of inspiration, almost a living companion. 
God, likewise, is not the aloof disconnected and external 
creator of a technological masterpiece, but a spirit dwelling 
in the human soul, stimulated into man's awareness by the 
beauty of nature and self-intuition. 
By emphasizing the neglected emotional and imagin-
ative sides of human nature, the romanticists, in refusing 
scientific analysis as a criterion for understanding man, 
shared a common preference with the upsurging Pietist 
and Methodist movements in that designation of life called 
experience. Personal experience, with its attendant empha-
sis on freedom, individuality and wholeness, spread into 
an evangelical revitalization of traditional Christianity, 
affecting both Europe and North America. Although the 
recovery of the biblical view of God did not address itself 
to the questions regarding the interrelationship between 
God and nature; yet the features of growth, development 
and historicity produced a strain of intellectual insight 
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that would be taken up in the following century with 
the discoveries comprising evolution. 
5 
A Prelude for Recapitulating 
the Story of Teleology 
From our limited investigation, Western man can be 
seen to be perennially interested in understanding him-
self and the world around him. His history is replete with 
epochs that culturally designate those meanings that he 
discovered and upheld as significantly important to give 
direction to his existence. In taking up the historical task 
of completing himself, the very pursuit of this response 
to existence would seem to imply a teleologica! struc-
ture, demanding categories of purpose in thought and 
action alike, if the dynamics of the pursuit are to resolve 
themselves with sufficient coherence. 
Yet man's diverse traditions of ultimate meaning, 
involving modalities of consciousness from myth to 
modern science, have not always agreed that the recogni-
tion of the constitutive principles of reality are teleologi-
ca! in their history. Vigorous opposition arose after the 
sixteenth century and, supported by cultural changes, 
developed a momentum that enlarged its influence upon 
the whole of society. 
One could divide Western history into two ages: 
the age of the teleologica! cosmos and the age of the 
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mechanistic universe. Even though the second age re-
acted strongly against the cultural complex that signified 
the medieval spirit or outlook, nevertheless, in its efforts 
to replace the older perspective, it actually reinterpreted 
teleology anew, and made its tenor even more determin-
istic. To look upon nature as a machine is obviously to 
admit a purely teleologica! entity, one that is derivative 
and purposeful. 
Before delving into this issue in detail, let us reveal 
the various factors that account for the shift in the inter-
pretation of teleology and its correlations with man, 
nature and divinity, as these affected the totality of man's 
life after the middle ages. 
The Age of the Teleologica! Cosmos 
From the Hellenic period through the middle ages, 
Western culture as a whole had accepted and interpreted 
life and history within the horizon of a cosmic teleology. 
The exercise of consciousness upon the world at large 
during these centuries produced distinct mythical, philo-
sophical and scientific categories and modes of thought 
that reenforced a common vision of reality as a basically 
teleologica! enterprise. Man was understood as a self-
conscious, goal-directed being. He could experience inten-
tional purpose as a practical mode of his being. By con-
verting thought into practical action he successfully 
realized his potentialities. With teleologica! guidance, man 
had a richer context in which to define himself by making 
his definition come true in himself. 
The study of nature, while admitting chance causes 
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as exceptional occurrences, also exposed finality in all its 
basic processes. Man could sense himself a part of this 
ordered finality that spanned the world of his experience. 
Philosophical and scientifically conducted inquiries de-
tected the world as a hierarchically-ordered cosmos, 
allowing for the présense of a transcendent goal. Religious 
consciousness confirmed, in different ways, the hierarchy 
of matter and life as a sacred totality, whose origin and 
proper destiny were under a universal providence, and 
proposed in some instances a specific transcendent goal 
as the completion of human life. Existence was meaning-
ful because it was full of purpose discernable by human 
intelligence that itself was purposefully oriented in its 
activities. 
Differences of interpretation and development of 
insight into the symbology of man, nature and divinity 
proceeded in their cultural emphasis during these cen-
turies. But in spite of contrasting cultural patterns, there 
continued from the Hellenic period into the Renaissance 
a theoretical and practical conviction that the fundamental 
context of reality was of a teleologica! nature. 
Since through the optics of teleology one discovered 
the goal of being in all its historical and cultural poten-
tials, the formation of religious consciousness enforced 
and modified the teleologica! categories. These categories 
entered into the symbolic composition of religious con-
sciousness in specifying the latter's bond of unity between 
man, nature and divinity. By integrating the meaning of 
these ultimate symbols as they developed in his experience 
of their cultural formation, man used them to complete 
the quest for human fulfillment. By the nature of their 
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uítimacy, and in their particular arrangement or emphasis 
of meaning, these symbols structured man's life in its 
entirety. And as this symbolic complex underwent 
changes, man began to decipher the differentiations in 
the spectrum of religious consciousness during these 
nineteen hundred years of cultural history. 
The Age of the Mechanistic Universe 
Looking back again over historical epochs, one can 
spy a temptation amongst these periods to preserve them-
selves in their symbols by fixating the content therein. 
Eventually this attitude of mind defeats itself by denying 
its own historicity. 
Exceptions there may be, but the high middle ages 
developed an attachment to its own cultural understand-
ing that viewed its orderly interpretation of reality as 
complete and immutably exhaustive. The historical dyna-
mism of the overall features of reality came to a halt; 
they had arrived at their historical apex. Restricted to their 
medieval versions, teleologica! categories were now closed 
or rounded off, as it were, since they were no longer 
improveable in their meaning. The medieval consciousness 
saw itself, as any consciousness of ultimates tends to do, 
as the culmination of man's quest for the fulfillment of 
religious consciousness. Cultural history had risen to its 
final expression. A divine purpose had supplied the created 
world with all the essentials to transcend mundane limita-
tions; the cosmos had been created for the purpose of 
furnishing the background for the drama of mankind's 
salvation--the transcendental fulfillment of man's nature 
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in an eternal, visible communion with the supreme God. 
The final age of history was here. 
However, further potentialities extending beyond 
the medieval mind were close at hand. History continued. 
Wider opportunities for cultural and religious expression 
asserted themselves. The acceptance of medieval norms 
was no longer absolutely essential to human survival. 
In attempting to narrate the complexities that account 
for the revolution into modern consciousness, a larger 
depiction that envisaged here would be required. Con-
sequendy, let it suffice to point out certain events in 
keeping with the development of our study. 
The teleologica! values symbolizing the unity of 
medieval consciousness could not easily incorporate, 
tolerate or banish the newer forces comprising the cul-
tural pressures at hand. Let us name a few. First, there 
was the growing rejection of the authoritarian Aristotele-
an-Scholastic approach to understanding man and his 
world just because, and to the extent that, it had become 
authoritarian and arbitrary. In opposing this inherited 
tradition, the humanism of the Renaissance gave fresh 
impetus to man's moral and intellectual worth. But even 
this effort at emancipation from the medieval structures 
discovered its shortlived but positive limitations. Secondly, 
there was the discovery of the New World, along with the 
demographics of Europe's expansion of townships. A 
climate was created for exploration and colonization of 
the globe. Countries were caught up in the waves of in-
terest for additional trade routes with the East, extending 
national borders and stimulating the rise of domestic 
commerce. The proliferation of Christian denominations 
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from the Reformation movement brought new problems 
and questions that affected changes in the older, medieval 
replies. Intellectual interests appreciated less the medieval 
concern for contemplating nature for its own sake, than 
utilizing scientific investigations in the practical relief of 
daily problems on this planet. Together with these shifts 
of interests, evaluation shifted, too. 
Thirdly, there was more of an insistence to study 
nature at first hand, which broadened into a sustained 
interest among the philosopher-scientists, who developed 
a more positive, experimentally-grounded science of the 
mathematical structure of nature. When one considers 
these redirections of social energies that created the 
national churches, the national states, the religious wars, 
and the theory of mercantilism, along with the contribu-
tions of Montaigne and Copernicus among others in 
philosophy and the natural sciences, it is not surprising 
that the medieval synthesis could hardly represent these 
times of unparalleled change. 
The weight of the medieval symbols was unbalanced 
by these cultural forces that could not submit, assemble 
nor reassemble themselves into the feudalistic patterns. 
The symbolic ideal of subordinated purposes traversing 
the whole of reality could not restrain the changing 
social horizon any more than its wave of mechanistic 
interest in the hitherto undisclosed malleableness of 
nature. 
The ambitions of the time changed. The older cate-
gories gave way reluctantly to the newer emphasis of re-
directing purpose to power over the future—an earthly 
future. Teleology itself at this juncture is reinterpreted 
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and given a more quantified plane of direction that agrees 
with the Newtonian coordinates; its categorical name is 
"Progress." 
The Triple Coordinates of General Mechanis, 
Progress and Evolution 
To appreciate the newer version of cultural tele-
ology that shaped Western man, and to avoid seeing 
teleology itself as an isolated issue unconnected from the 
dynamics of culture, we have to fill out our prelude by 
noting the impact that mechanism and the optimism of 
progress held for those centuries. 
The First Coordinate: Teleology as General Mechanis 
Various reasons may be protested, but the receptioi 
granted Newton's new mechanics for the next two cen-
turies approached adoration among the intelligentia of 
Britain and the Continent. Not just philosophers and 
scientists, but even humanists, literateurs, politicians, 
artists and merchants found an eclectic but practical in-
spiration in his scientific vision for their lectures, writings 
and projects. For these men, learned or otherwise, the 
potential monopoly of this single vision collectively 
aroused a kind of operational worldview seemingly de-
livering no field of human endeavor unaffected by its 
canons. 
Tawney points out how a new world of economic 
and political thought resulted from an alliance with science, 
whereby a "new calculus" now dealt with "impersonal 
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economic forces."1 The scientists of the Royal Society of 
London were praised in their efforts in bringing "all 
things as near the mathematical plainness as they can."2 
Matson remarks that the temper of the age involved the 
"systematic reduction of all subjects and fields of knowl-
edge to the dimensions and categories of natural science. 
Philosophy tended to become "natural philosophy," 
biology virtually a branch of mechanics, and psychology 
the anatomy of the human machine."3 
Spinoza (1632-1677) had proposed earlier to under-
stand man's moral nature as he would analyze so many 
geometrical factors. While men certainly entertain ideas 
and beliefs in their personal freedom and the finality of 
nature, they labor, according to him, under misconcep-
tions due to their ignorance of the inexorable efficient 
causes comprising all of being. "Nature has no fixed end 
in view," he tells us, "and that all final causes are simply 
fabrications of men."4 For Spinoza, "finality" would 
invert the true notion of causality by subordinating the 
efficient cause to the final cause, thus making "that which 
is first by nature to be last."5 Mechanical determinism 
ruled the forthcoming days. 
Final causes were identified with antiquity. The 
enlightened age demanded new practical arts and sciences 
that would enlarge man's power over his environment. The 
mechanistic philosophy provided a vibrant groundswell 
that arranged science and commerce, the liberal arts as 
well as the servile, to be developed as interdependent, 
interacting parts of the same social fabric. The discarding 
of old, outmolded medieval ways and the fostering of 
freedom in politics and invention in industry allowed and 
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legitimized progress in one sphere to generate new ideas 
in another. The profusion of energies involved in igniting 
the Enlightenment exceeds our task, but its pursuit of 
modernity was fired by the scientific revolution. Every 
field labored to apply the concepts of classical physics. 
The general development of the era shows a sort of un-
restricted trust in conventions which were taken and 
identified as "natural" facts. 
Bornowski examines the century and finds its 
scientific ambitions to envisage "a mathematical finality," 
not only with the more prominent disciplines but even to 
the reaches of "history . . . and geology and mining and 
spinning."6 A profoundly different concept o f human 
nature than that of the middle ages can be read in La 
Mettrie's (1709-1751) work L'Homme Machine (1748). 
Crombie notes that for the French physiologists of the 
Encyclopedie (1751-1777) fame-Diderot, D'Holback, 
Condorcet, Fontenelle and Cabanis—"man became nothing 
but a machine; consciousness became a secretion of the 
brain just as bile was a secretion of the liver; and the 
physical and physiological laws as they conceived them 
were taken as the norm of the laws, not only of mind 
but also of history and the historical progress of society. 
Directly descended from the Cartesian, mechanical 
philosophy and the Newtonian physics, these conceptions 
developed by the eighteenth century French natural 
philosophers and sociologists became the direct ancestors 
of the materialist doctrines associated with Charles Daw-
win's (1809-1882) theory of evolution and its sociologi-
cal extensions into the nineteenth century doctrine of 
progress."7 While Claude Saint-Simon (1760-1825), who 
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thought that morals and politics were the consequence of 
universal gravity, and Auguste Comte (1798-1857) were 
busy establishing their positive society, Jeremy Bentham 
(1748-1832) and James Mill (1773-1836) in Britain were 
applying, in their Utilitarian philosophy, Newtonian 
principles to private morals and public affairs. These 
gentlemen saw the possibility for enacting a science of 
legislation that would manifest an objective social order, 
guided entirely by mechanistic principles. The hallmark 
of social and personal morality was the compliance with 
the mechanistic laws of human nature. People were like 
social atoms, having similar weight and gravity and moti-
vated by the same springs of human action. A society 
built upon sound, scientific principles was only a matter 
of time. 
The Second Coordinate: Teleology as Progress 
The ceaseless preoccupation with empirical obser-
vation, applied mathematics and experimental method-
ology harvested a series of discoveries and reports that 
revolutionized man's self-understanding and utterly dis-
credited the cosmos synthesis. 
The medieval acceptance of the Aristotelean doc-
trine of a radical difference between celestial and terres-
trial matter, whereby the former was accorded properties 
of immutableness, perfection of form, uniform and 
semi-eternal motion, greatly enhanced the idea of a teleo-
logica! hierarchy of being, qualitatively measured, on a 
scale approaching perfection as it receded from the dense, 
material center of the earth. While the astronomers showed 
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that the heavenly bodies followed universal and regular 
laws, their additional observations ascertained that these 
bodies were not perfectly circular, nor moved in circu-
lar patterns, nor at a uniform speed, nor was their matter 
substantially otherwise then terrestrial matter. And with 
the experimental confirmation of the Copernical theory 
removing it from the level of sheer mathematical calcu-
lation into physical reality, man and his planet were no 
longer at the immobile center of the categorically fixed 
cosmos. The vertical symbolism of an organic cosmos was 
transformed into a more linear uniformity of nature. The 
older, qualitatively-graded categories of existence, depict-
ing a scale of more and more perfect beings was aban-
doned. 
To cross the threshold into the modern spirit, the 
world of the "New Philosophy," as Bacon, its greatest 
prophet, named it, consciousness turns from its former 
passive contemplation upon an invariable and unalterable 
cosmic order to a deliberate activity of mind that will 
transfigure mankind into a Utopian future. The interpreta-
tion of reality through the lenses of "final, set causes" is 
eschewed. The only intellectually productive way engaging 
the universe is through the empirical methods of natural 
science. The old gnosis from medieval times which saw 
the world alive with purpose, and inferred divinity never 
far beyond the surface of nature's appearances, must yield 
to a superior vantage point. The importance attached to 
final causes as fixed determiners of nature restricted 
natural processes and its productivity to a limited number 
of stereotyped results. The medieval scope of inquiry with 
its traditional categories was too limited in assigning to 
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nature its narrow round of cycles and processes. 
It was not a time for the redemonstration of ancient 
knowledge, but a time for the experiments and experiences 
of new facts, probing into the unknown but beneficial 
future. The body of knowledge bequeathed by our ances-
tors was now to be critically tested by new experiments. 
Man must seize hold of nature with a conquering spirit, 
for her secrets do not lie on the surface, available to mere 
contemplation. There must be an active and aggressive 
investigation. Merely repeating the older categories of 
learning blunts the spirit of investigation and confines 
human intelligence to the risk of degenerating into un-
warranted dogmatism and superstition. 
By deemphasizing the importance of the customary 
final causes as categories of methodology and redirecting 
the emphasis to the efficient and material causes, the 
malleableness of nature became the novel object of ex-
ploration and discovery. The retention of older truths 
justified themselves by their useful assistance in detecting 
new truths. The realization of preconceived ends sub-
ordinate within the feudalistic boundaries of yesterday 
could be overcome by construing the world as an un-
limited mechanical field for exploration. 
Moreover, when consciousness desists from thinking 
in terms of fixed essences and absolute hierarchies, then 
the application of mechanical formulae can be turned to 
human profit. When nature is regarded as mechanical, 
then systematic invention and construction of machines 
relevant to nature's activities can supercede the former 
fixed limits of traditional change. A new, indefinite 
teleology emerges. Nature becomes subdued to human 
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purpose, allowing an unlimited horizon of new ends and 
aims to be substituted for the older molds of activity. 
The Desacralization of Nature 
This symbolic revision of life's meaning was pro-
trayed by Bacon as a world in which the incremental and 
systematic growth of knowledge, in time, would render 
assertive control over the idiosyncracies of matter and 
motion. The twin partnership of cumulative knowledge 
and power over nature encouraged a practical and pro-
gressive idealism in action. And the central force, the per-
fect means for achieving the "New Atlantis," was nothing 
less than the highest form of consciousness—scientific 
rationality. This anti-teleological beacon, all the more 
heralded for its impersonal and objective constitution, 
illuminated the universe for the next three hundred years 
in its earthbound teleology. 
History embarked on a new age where the scientific 
temper joined with the mechanical arts and crafts to 
eliminate the woes of mankind. The symbolic import of 
scientific rationality was further legitimatized by receiving 
sufficient biblical support in those passages of Genesis 
regarding man's dominion over nature. Given the religious 
feeling of the times, a better correlation could not have 
been made. Furthermore, the scientific-technological 
paradigm interacted with philosophical humanism and its 
concerns for the social betterment of the people. With the 
anien regime becoming an historical anachronism, a new 
egalitarian mood introduced two new words, bienfaisance 
and humanité6 into the social tracts of the enlightened 
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philosophers. 
The social thrust of the era was more than a secu-
larized charity; it summed up a colossal movement of 
radical reform. One finds an unprecedented conviction 
for the improvement of the human race and singularly the 
perfectibility of the individual man that borders on abso-
lute omnipotence. The transfer of interest from the 
supernaturalism of the medieval age to the view of man as 
the sole purpose unto himself allowed the cult of posterity 
to become the teleologica! replacement for the hereafter. 
The Retirement of God's Power 
The last vestiges of viewing nature as embedded with 
final causes dissolved through man's impressive manipula-
tion of empirical reality. The rights of man to become 
possessors and dominatore of nature could take place 
without alluding to divine forces or supernatural inten-
tions. From the religious perspective, what was being 
disputed, as F. Baumer mentions, "was not God's exist-
ence, but his power."9 
The notion of God's sovereignty became understood 
as that of a king who reigned but did not rule. The work-
a-day God of Boyle and Newton, the deity who in-
augurated and managed the churning of the universe, 
receded to the God of the Sabbath, where he exercised a 
vague providential care, always at a distance, over his 
developing world. 
The industrial revolution continued unabated. Al-
though the promise of the future disdained any allusions 
to the medieval teleologica! suppositions, the enlightened 
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humanism of this period kept enough mechanical finality 
in its vision by making a curious substitution. Foremost 
in its visionary projection stood man—not divinity—as the 
centrifugal force from which spread scientific advance-
ment and mechanical inventions, politics and ethics, the 
whole array of enligjitened ideas and concrete structures 
that will continually produce catastrophic turns for 
mankind's betterment in the unfolding determinism of 
history. 
An Unexpected Ally: Evolution—a Third Coordinate 
If we may anticipate the major contribution of the 
nineteenth century to this unfolding picture, the complete 
portrait emerges. 
With the doctrine of Progress combining with the 
classifications of life, reaching back into the roots of time 
to join origins with the perfectible future, the transcen-
dental God of the Newtonian world of mathematical 
holiness seemed to be dissolved into the ageless mists 
of organic evolution. The philosophers of evolution could 
now support the mechanistic portrait of man by inter-
preting him even more from the physical laws inherent 
in organic evolution. Biological thought continued to 
lean more toward strictly material causes for organic 
development. 
Thus, for Thomas Huxley (1825-1895) the progress 
of science meant the unlimited "extension of the province 
of what we call matter and causation, and concomitant 
banishment from all regions of human thought of what we 
call spirit and spontaneity."10 Darwinian evolution 
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climaxed the Newtonian worldview by furnishing the 
"basis for the final reduction of the organic and human 
world to the physical laws governing the inorganic uni-
verse."11 Ernst Cassirer referred to this event as "the 
same iron ring of necessity that encloses both our physi-
cal and our cultural life. In his feelings, his inclinations, 
his ideas, his thoughts, and in his production of works of 
art, man never breaks out of this magic circle."12 
Darwin's presumption reflected the broader momen-
tum of the era: the general pattern of evolutionary 
development could not be a retrograde process of a 
morally indifferent one; it must be an ascending progress. 
Compared to the medieval cosmos with its eternally fixed 
categories o f undeviating purposes repeating their ortho-
dox cycles, the world of evolutionary progress presents 
a linear history of successive beings in which man's in-
definite nature becomes the revolutionary symbol, the 
comprehensive summary of nature's non-purposeful forces. 
The heralding of evolution proved to be most 
congenial to the strange optimism of these modern cen-
turies—strange, in that the mounting estimation of man's 
grandeur, inherited from the Enlightenment, was in direct 
proportion as men approved their reduction to enlightened 
automatons. For them the universe was an engineering 
masterpiece of energy and matter vacant of final causes 
and human subjectivity. 
Nearing the end of the nineteenth century (the 
Romantic movement notwithstanding), the cultural pre-
servation of scientific rationality was so assuring in its 
promises as to be highly regarded. Its evolutionary pre-
sence in human aspiration was so prevalent in intellectual 
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circles that any revival of interest in the older notion of 
finality within nature or, for that matter, in any trans-
cendental sense, was looked upon as superstition and 
unnecessary in understanding the meaning of human 
nature or its progressive destiny. 
The loss of the sense of transcendence in the pro-
fessional and academic realms, and the discrediting of 
teleology as a viable category of knowledge narrowed the 
natural polymorphism of consciousness, witnessed since 
the Hellenic period, to the only legitimate interpretation 
of existence—scientific rationality. It soon became the 
modern paradigm of all knowledges worthy of the respect 
for accuracy and truth. The cumulative effect of the 
West's fixation with the terrestrial feats of the physical 
sciences and their related technologies produced such a 
unified impact upon the formation of cultural conscious-
ness that modern man presumed it the ultimate and com-
prehensive meaning of life. 
A Reflective Comparison 
Until the sixteenth century, Western man accepted 
the place of teleology in his cultural outlook because he 
understood himself and the dynamism of the world as a 
developing reality whose meaning was better compre-
hended in terms of goal-like categories. To understand 
life at all its levels was to use concepts and symbols that 
depicted the various kinds of order prevailing in reality. 
Although there could be moments of chaos, life was 
essentially a universe of forces and energies, dynamic po-
tentialities and regular occurrences that elaborated an 
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interdependent and organic scheme of relationships. To 
speak in the above manner, along with the use of terms 
like "ends" and "means," "purposes" and "goals," "con-
nective associations," is to supply the symptoms for the 
intelligent pursuit of meaningfulness in a meaningful 
world. In a word, these terms are symptomatic of 
teleology. 
Emerging from the inspection of the eras and epochs 
of man's attempt to understand himself, the world of 
nature and culture is a teleologica! history of the concrete 
goals expressed by human consciousness. In every major 
period that we have examined so far, there is a unity of 
purpose binding the cultural totality, and thus giving a 
final meaning to the complex. The finality itself may be 
looked upon from different perspectives. In the medieval 
period, the finality took on a somewhat rigid formation 
in the minds of its citizens, allowing for development of 
course, but only within certain boundaries that history 
showed could be more open than expected. Where a cul-
ture fails does not disqualify the existence of teleology, 
but only shows (usually upon later analysis) that man's 
consciousness assumed a superficial stance in interpreting 
the teleologica! categories of his time. On the basis of its 
self-understanding, the medieval complex could not be-
come the modern era. And yet this development took 
place in an unprecedented manner—with its own purposes 
in mind. Even when a society rejects the formal category 
of final causality or teleologica! import, the necessity of 
the human consciousness still employs teleologica! struc-
tures and content in order to give meaning and direction 
to its exercise. The modern era is no exception. 
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Even in its rejection of the medieval synthesis, the 
modern era still proposed its own version of teleology. For 
the basic assumption postulated that human progress can 
be related to technological improvement and the advance-
ment of scientific rationality. When scientific and tech-
nological progress was allied with the concept of emergent 
evolution, then the last hesitation about abandoning a 
sense of transcendence was demolished. Man's destiny 
was sealed within his finite, but unlimited, world. And the 
assumption that this interpretation of reality is full of 
ultimate significance will eventually ring hollow, as we 
shall point out later. 
In the place of the medieval synthesis and its cosmic 
implications, the momentum of the modem era gradually 
composed its own sense of ultimacy, guided by its myth 
of modernity. An almost implacable, steady, persistent, 
mechanical progress was expected since the breakthroughs 
of the sixteenth century. Exactly how evolutionary theory 
fitted into this complex interpretation of reality needs to 
be inspected in order to show how the belief in progress 
persisted, yet proved empty of its promise. Moreover, 
since our century has inherited the resulting momentum 
of this frame of mind (i.e., the myth of modernity), we 
can best appreciate our state of health, so to speak, by 
noting the factors which have produced the consequences 
affecting our cultural situation. It is included in this 
chapter on teleology because, in spite of its disclaimers 
of being associated with final causes and similar terms, it 
is covertly teleologica!. It is very definite in its purpose, 
is goal oriented, convinced of the authenticity of its 
means for achieving the Utopian future, and, for some, 
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assured of its success by the inspiration of certain passages 
in the Bible that endorse its cultural program; for others 
this last note was irrelevant. Kant had already shown that 
conventional religion was a private affair, divorced from 
the realm of scientific advancement. For now belief in the 
mechanical progress of society was the dominant attitude 
of mind that received a spectacular boost when it was 
associated with Evolution theory. Let us now examine 
its specific contribution. 
Progress and Evolution: The Completion of 
the Myth of Modernity 
The outlook for Western civilization was enamoured 
by the optimistic momentum of the Enlightenment under 
the impetus of the idea of man as a progressively develop-
ing being. The material advances in the technical con-
veniences of life with the increased control over the forces 
of nature gradually abridged space, economized time and 
eased bodily encumbrances in society. Technical inven-
tions proceeded uninterruptedly. The educative oppor-
tunities in all branches of knowledge and the unparalleled 
expansion of industry and commerce "accustomed the 
least speculative mind to the conception that civilization 
is naturally progressive and that continuous improvement 
is part of the order of things."13 
The idea of general Progress broadened its base 
and reoriented its future when it was associated with the 
notion of evolution. In the previous century (the world 
of Saint-Simon, Comte and others), men had understood 
their notions of a necessary law of social development in 
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history without viewing it, however, in terms of a simi-
larity to those laws which prevailed in the sub-human 
realm. Now, in positing the emergence of the human 
species from a non-human ancestry, similarity gave way to 
continuation of those same laws. Hence evolution pro-
voked inescapable questions and revisions regarding the 
origin and development of every aspect of human culture, 
not the least of which would be questions of religion. 
The solutions to these issues assumed full-scale theories of 
social evolution, sometimes referred to as "social Darwin-
ism."14 
Darwin's Contribution 
Charles Darwin's (1809-1882) publication of the 
Origin of Species (1859), as it was called, startled the 
world. The ferment produced by a biological theory that 
advocated progress through conflict was extended, fairly 
or not, to explain the origins of the entire universe as well 
as the progress and destiny of every aspect of human cul-
ture. People in every profession were arguing sides for its 
plausibleness. It seemed not only to confirm the New-
tonian universe, but supplied a factor that enhanced the 
mechanistic understanding of life. The notion of change 
and development was rooted in the contingencies of 
matter and could now serve as the basis of a law of evolu-
tionary progress. 
Darwin specifically rejected the notion, commonly 
accepted, that plant, animal and human species originated 
from a special act of divine creation, a transcendental 
source, which firmly fixed their forms forever.15 
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Evolutionary change, not immutability, he proclaimed, 
is the law of life. All living organisms are the products of 
minute alterations gradually extending throughout vast 
periods of time, tracing their ancestry to ancient forms 
that are usually quite different from the current species. 
Darwin observed a ceaseless struggle taking place 
in the non-human realms. Organisms unable to adapt to 
their environment failed the struggle and left no descen-
dants-, those who possessed sufficient variations in adap-
tation to their changing circumstances survived and 
transmitted these favorable capacities to their progeny. 
The entire process became termed as "natural selection." 
Later editions of his book used the expression "survival 
of the fittest," a term borrowed from his friend, Herbert 
Spencer (1820-1903).16 The process of evolution that 
involves significant alterations in species must be appre-
ciated over eons of time, incorporating billions of random 
variations. 
Actually Darwin did not invent the idea of evolu-
tion. Before him, philosophers and scientists had written 
about evolution in their speculations and theoretical 
hypotheses. Scientists like Lamarch (1744-1829), Buffon 
(1707-1788), Wells (1828-1898), and especially Darwin's 
contemporary, Alfred Wallace (1823-1913), who had 
already written on natural selection, had proposed much 
the same notion without startling results from their peers. 
For almost twenty years, Darwin carefully studied his 
specimens, reenforcing his accumulating knowledge with 
his observations of animal husbandry. 
Just as farmers breed their herd for superior charac-
teristics, so nature selects the best organisms for survival. 
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Darwin's reading of Malthus's concern when the increase 
of world population exceeded the available food supply 
helped convince him that in the realm of nature the 
struggle for existence would allow only the fit to survive. 
Darwin mentions that "being well-prepared to appreciate 
the struggle for existence which everywhere goes on, from 
long-continued observation of the habits of animals and 
plants, it at once struck me that under these circumstances 
favorable variations would tend to be preserved and un-
favorable ones to be destroyed. The result of this would 
be the formation of new species. Here, then, I had at last 
got a theory by which to work."17 In an age of intense 
commercial expansion and competition, Darwin's proposal 
that the process of evolution is a struggle for the survival 
of the fittest seemed to make sense in every field of human 
endeavor. In its way, it gave a breath of insight into the 
creative and destructive sides of matter and life. 
Evolutionism as a Worldview 
With the release of his new book, Descent of Man 
(1871), Darwin attempted to universalize his basic insight 
into the origins of life itself as well as be the total summa-
tion of history. A master idea that brought man into the 
continuity of animal descent and origin, it claimed that 
human nature differed only by degree, not kind, within 
the animal kingdom.18 Value by survival, evolution 
because the sufficient and pragmatic explanation for 
every natural entity and its activity from astronomy and 
economics to religion and psychology. The inherent dy-
namics of survival through struggle and adaptation became, 
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in much the same fashion as Newton's contributions, an 
ultimate resolution to the riddle of existence. Biological 
evolution evolved into evolutionism. Controversy ensued. 
In 1889 Alfred Wallace, considered the co-discoverer 
of evolution, wrote a critique entitled Darwinism. He 
challenged Darwin's prevailing inclusion of body and spirit 
along the pattern of common descent with modification 
by natural selection.19 He insisted that biological evolu-
tion pertained only to that realm, and that man's psycho-
social faculties derived from a different origin. Throughout 
his career he continued to write and disagree with a whole 
host of "social Darwinians," among the more influencial 
being Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-1895), W. G. Sumner 
(1840-1910) and Herbert Spencer. 
Huxley defined mankind as "conscious automata" 
and maintained that "all vital action may . . . be said to 
be the result of the molecular forces of the protoplasm 
which displays it."20 When the new field of sociology 
placed the drama of human life within an evolutionary 
context, Sumner announced that "we are convinced that 
this way of looking at things frees our treatment from a 
current tendency, which we regard as confusing and un-
productive, to refer societal results to conscious, reasoned 
and purposeful action on the part of the individual."21 
The biological confirmation of the Newtonian world 
seemed to explain the progressive temper of the age, 
enthralling and captivating, as J. Barzun remarks, "a 
generation of thinkers whose greatest desire was to get rid 
of vitalism, will, purpose or design as explanations of life, 
and to substitute for them an automatic material cause."22 
Darwin himself was quite aware o f the cultural implications 
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of his theory, for in the concluding chapter of the Origin, 
he mentions: "In the future I see open fields for far more 
important researches. Psychology will be securely based 
on the foundation already well laid by Mr. Herbert Spen-
cer, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental 
power and capacity by gradation. Much light will be 
thrown on the origin of man and his history."23 
Even before the publication of Origin, Spencer had 
espoused a total evolutionism that incorporated the idea 
of progress: "The ultimate development of the ideal man 
is logically certain—as certain as any conclusion in which 
we place the most implicit faith; for instance, that all 
men will die. Progress, therefore, is not an accident, but 
a necessity. Instead of civilization being artificial, it is a 
part of nature; all of a piece with the development of the 
embryo or the unfolding of a flower."24 The perfect 
society results necessarily from man's biological adapta-
tion to the laws of nature. 
Spencer's optimism for the inevitable perfectibility 
of man was questionable on scientific grounds for many 
scientists. But the event that muted his theory in the eyes 
of many was the tragedy of World War I. While the funda-
mental social consequences of the industrial revolution 
were evident in the continual transformations of cultural 
life, even Huxley was resisting a too broad application of 
biological survival as the criterion of progress, for he 
quickly recognized that if "improvement" of any species 
means a higher advantage gained in competition in a given 
environment, then there is no satisfactory appeal to pre-
vent one nation from trying to prove its fitness by invading 
another country.25 
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Although the idea of change and continuous devel-
opment was becoming the scientific ideal for interpreting 
reality, serious consideration of its universalization 
brought up tensions and antinomies. For even Darwin 
discovered the curious irony of his belief in evolution. 
He speaks of the "impossibility of conceiving this immense 
and wonderful universe, including man with his capacity 
for looking far backwards and far into futurity, as the 
result of blind chance or necessity. When thus reflecting 
I feel compelled to look to a First Cause having an intel-
ligent mind in some degree analogous to that of man: and 
I deserve to be called a Theist . . . . But then arises the 
doubt, can the mind of man, which has, as I fully believe, 
been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by 
the lowest animals, be trusted when it draws such grand 
conclusions."26 
Some scientists and theologians wanted to equate 
the operation of natural selection with teleology. They 
admitted that the evidence of geological and biological 
accounts forced a nonliteral belief in the events recorded 
in the seven day presentation of creation in the opening 
chapter of Genesis. The process, while it may be attribu-
ted to God as the instigator, certainly took longer and 
was more complex than expressed in those simple des-
criptions announced in the Bible. Darwin would have 
nothing to do with this faulty explanation. He insisted 
that to posit each variation as providentially arranged 
makes natural selection entirely superfluous, and effective-
ly removes the presence of new species from the domain 
of science. For Darwin, the variations over time are due 
to "unknown causes, and are without purpose, and in so 
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far accidental."27 Adaptations were more final results 
than final causes. Evolutionism thus climaxed a trend 
that definitely abandoned belief in God as a scientific 
principle. 
For the nineteenth century, the watchmaker creator 
of the Enlightenment has vanished. With the advance of 
rational scientific accounts of how the world came into 
being, many religious men still believe in a creator behind 
those long processes, but they do it on religious rather 
than on scientific grounds. When the mechanistic world 
and its rational deciphering by science is now based upon 
evolution, a disquieting ambiguity emerges. In heralding 
an idea that unifies the understanding of nature and 
society through the dynamism of change and progress, 
the scientific acceptance of evolution strangely reinforces 
the irrationalism that the Enlightenment attempted to 
overcome. If the material changes and the higher life forms 
are the product of enormous large number of spontaneous 
variations occurring entirely independently of each other, 
then the final result is accidental and unpremeditated. 
The lawful regularity of nature and the design of species 
are only temporal arrangements, temporarily appearing 
as order until their autonomous and mechanical forces 
randomly alter them once again. The function of reason 
is only a specific form of biological adaptation. Human 
culture is now part of nature. The growth of mankind is 
the history of group struggle. The viewpoint of evolution-
ary biology joined with the prevalent mechanization of 
reality and influenced every sector of culture into the 
twentieth century, revealing human nature not merely as 
the deterministic consequence of mechanical laws but as 
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the random aggregate of laws whose foundation is blind 
chance. 
Conclusion 
Before the turn of the century when the newer 
discoveries in energy revolutionized the scientific com-
munity, mechanistic principles were submitted to reinter-
pretation within the context of evolutionary theory. 
Mechanical analysis of reality was not so much threatened 
as broadened by placing it within its history and revising 
it into an evolutionary method. Since all fields of knowl-
edge shared a history, they could equally qualify within 
the spectrum of evolutionism. 
Biological experiments at this period indicated that 
organic processes could be explained by chemical reac-
tions. The phenomena of life apparently shows no funda-
mental discontinuity from non-living matter. Every new 
phenomenon is the rearrangement of primary matter 
already present within the universe. The ready acceptance 
of evolutionary theory softened the rigid determinism of 
Newtonian mechanics by legitimizing the factor of change 
and development. 
The major notions in Darwin's books sustained 
their impact within a mechanistic framework, and thus 
avoided a scientific conflict that would later emerge in the 
twentieth century when biologists began resisting the 
mechanistic reductionism of life. The Newtonian world 
now included mechanistic biology. By utilizing evolution-
ary theory to explain everything from astronomy to 
ethics and mankind's origins, history was itself "deified 
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ала made into a sacred force with which mortal hands 
must not meddle; for the course of human events was 
held to be guided by some vague but purposive power, to 
interfere with whose designs was sacrilege. It was the 
prevalence of this teleologica! view of history that made it 
easy to assimilate the new evolutionary philosophy when it 
pressed in from biology; Darwin seemed only to have 
furnished an exact scientific confirmation of the presence 
of this cosmic power."2 8 
This is a strange teleology, in that looking to the 
origins of any process, belief or custom for its value, one 
attributes the process of development to fortuitous heredi­
tary variations or mechanical selection from the environ­
ment—in a word, abiding chance. Mankind was living in 
a Newtonian world whose rationale was ultimately the 
outcome of blind chance. The prevailing mood of many 
scientists saw the evolutionary proposal as a comprehen­
sive synthesis that explained reality still within sufficient 
continuity with the inherited Newtonian worldview, and 
were very soon to appreciate even more the upsetting role 
of chance in the trend that physics took. 
6 
The Collapse of Belief in Progress: 
Modernity Reinterpreted as a 
Secular Universe Founded Upon Chance 
The Disquieting Twentieth Century 
The foundations for supporting the myth of 
modernity, as the nineteenth century proposed it, had 
been fully revealed: mechanism, progress and evolution 
were the interlocking coordinates that structured the 
entire universe. 
With these principles pervading reality, the upward-
bound movement of history would elaborate the per-
fectibility of human society. Man himself held the key 
to his destiny—he could literally make the future almost 
what he wanted. By destroying the ignorance of the past 
and returning to a rational cultivation of nature, man 
could be educated and labor toward an ideal society. A 
veritable millennium was now at hand. 
Three events that occurred with the passage of this 
apparently undeviating history shook the myth to its 
foundations. (1) First of all, there was the scientists' 
own discovery, however reluctant, that the universe 
was richer in its complexity than the Newtonian portrait 
displayed it. (2) There was the unsettling reactions to the 
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inability of nations to live in harmony with one another, 
as depicted by World War I and its lingering consequences. 
(3) There was, as a result of these two persistent factors 
influencing culture, the scientific and cultural resignation 
that life is ultimately meaningless; one takes his chances 
with existence because that is all one has: random oppor-
tunities that have no ultimate rhyme or reason. 
Our attention now must be focused upon these 
major factors that have left their mark on the twentieth 
century. The largest area of concentration shall be the 
third factor since those who uphold this position propose 
it as a determination of ultimacy—the death blow to 
teleology forever. 
(1) Decline and Revision of Mechanism 
According to historians, Newtonian physics was not 
seriously challenged until the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century. Then "the great change was brought about," 
as Einstein (1879-1955) recounts, "by Faraday, Maxwell 
and Hertz—as a matter of fact half unconsciously and 
against their will."1 Their startling research into electri-
city, magnetism and light was unable to be interpreted 
upon a mechanical model. 
The resistance of these discoveries to fit into the 
inherited classical picture kept many scientists from 
fully appreciating their implications. Dampier remarks that 
the followers of classical science "assumed that they them-
selves were dealing with realities, and that the main lines 
of possible scientific inquiry had been laid down once for 
all."2 With more crucial experimentation being reported, 
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the atomic world o f energy was detected to be less literal 
than classical physics had supposed. Maxwell's (1831-
1879) electromagnetic theory, coupled with the dis-
coveries of radioactivity processes at the atomic level, 
upset the customary idea of the indivisibility of the atom 
as well as its mathematical determinism. Scientists soon 
discovered that radioactivity does not have an absolute 
mathematical predictability but obeys only statistical 
laws. The determinism of the Newtonian world was in 
peril. 
The early premonition of a new, nonmechanical 
and nondeterministic concept of nature, sensed by few 
and resisted by more, reopened the closed conceptual 
world of mechanics. The mechanical universe which had 
been so fruitful in its technology and so certain in its 
theory was becoming unintelligible, and even contradic-
tory, at the microphysical level of nature. As early as 
1892, K. Pearson (1857-1936) could write that "step by 
step men of science are coming to recognize that mechan-
ism is not at the bottom of phenomena, but is only the 
conceptual shorthand by aid of which they can briefly 
describe and resume phenomena."3 
Hertz (1857-1894) continued in the direction of 
Maxwell and gradually took a similar stance. Instead of 
purporting to give the inherent essence of natural phenom-
ena, scientific propositions are only as valid as the limited 
aspects of nature they attempt to describe. Thanks to 
Maxwell's research, the classical understanding of mech-
anical matter was being challenged by the newer concepts 
of fields of force. With Einstein's relativity theory, space 
and time lost their independence and absoluteness, for 
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"what was true for electical action could not be denied for 
gravitation. Everywhere Newton's actions-at-a-distance 
gave way to fields spreading with finite velocity."4 
But the discovery that became the "basis of all 
twentieth century research in physics"5 was Max Planck's 
(1857-1947) quantum theory where energy is released 
in discontinuous packets or quanta and not in a continu-
ous stream as presumed. This discovery further upset the 
mechanistic view of the universe by undermining the 
latter's version of the continuity and uniformity of causal-
ly related events in nature. 
Two more reports hastened the revolution. First, 
Niels Bohr's (1885-1962) theory of the atom in 1913 
showed that the internal organization of matter was due 
to the presence of quanta.6 Although his theory was later 
improved upon, scientific thinking about nature was 
moving past the determinate world of classical mechanics 
into the unknown region of indeterminacy. 
The second event confronted head-on the inherited 
judgment that inner determinism of nature, in principle, 
permitted complete predictability. In 1927, Heisenberg 
showed that the kind of knowledge required for exact 
prediction—the simultaneous apprehension of position 
and velocity—as presumed in classical physics, was un-
available in the realm of microphysics.7 The very instru-
mentation employed at the microphysical level of reality 
affected the object of measurement. 
The rigid world of mechanistic certainty was pro-
gressing in its investigations of the atomic realm into a 
strange world where, simply put, the investigators cannot 
"observe the course of nature without disturbing it."8 
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The conception of the universe as an independent reality 
utterly separated from man and therefore objectively 
observable in an inevitable progress had been the Baconian 
inspiration for science. This ideal along with the Cartesian 
dichotomy between man and nature, the Galilean specta-
tor, the detached mathematized version of the Laplacean 
world, were all receding at the atomic level before man 
as the participant-observer in the very processes of reality. 
Instead of being only the mechanically-minded spectator, 
measuring the external world, man's intervention to obtain 
information "creates, despite all the universal order of 
the world, a new, a unique, not fully predictable, situa-
tion."9 
At the same time, scientists were deciding another 
issue regarding the ultimate constitution of matter, or, as 
it was now being called, energy. To explain certain phe-
nomena, a corpuscularian or particle theory made sense; 
a different range of phenomena could best be served with 
a wave theory. Bohr applied to the same set of phenomena 
his principle of complimentarity—where both theories 
were valid and gave a complete explanation. Each theory 
could accommodate a range of data but both could not 
be applied to the same set of phenomena equally; neither 
could each one by itself explain enough. The two theories 
needed each other in alternative explanations with a 
certain "tolerance of ambiguity."10 
With the realizations that the presumed objectivity 
of their predecessors was almost a dream, scientists began 
to revise their thinking about the restricted character of 
their knowleable world and their methodology. For some 
scientists, the impact of the dual or particle-wave relation-
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ship of matter and Heisenburg's principle of indeterminacy 
forced a revision of the global reductionism of nature 
away from the deterministic model of classical mechanics. 
Whereas before even living organisms were subjected to 
efficient and material causes solely, the mechanization of 
life processes was now seen as an unwarranted extrapola-
tion from the former success of classical physics. The 
realms of biology and psychology, in spite of the protes-
tations of Huxley and Freud, are radically different levels 
of phenomena than the conduct of inert matter. In rec-
ognizing the necessity of making these important dis-
tinctions, scientists like Bohr pointed out that "there is 
set a fundamental limit to the analysis of the phenomena 
of life in terms of physical concepts, since the inter-
ference necessitated by an observation which would be as 
complete as possible from the point of view of the atomic 
theory would cause the death of the organism. In other 
words: the strict application of those concepts which are 
adapted to our description of inanimate nature might 
stand in a relationship of exclusion to the consideration 
of the laws of the phenomena of life."11 
(2) The Cultural Contradictions of the 
Mechanized World 
Along with the disturbing events occurring in the 
physical sciences, the reliance upon scientific objectivity 
and the belief in the undaunted beneficent future re-
ceived an additional and mortal setback by the tragic 
occurrences of a world-wide war. The implicit short-
comings of the Newtonian worldview were present all the 
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time, but the circumstances apparently needed such 
paramount catastrophes as war, famine, unemployment, 
the rise of fascism and other negative experiences to show 
up the inadequacies of basing the meaning of culture 
upon a technological future. The shattering experience of 
World War I was the single most devastating argument 
against the optimism of the nineteenth century. 
(3) The Secular Mood of Chance 
The twentieth century felt the full consequences of 
its inherited belief in the optimism of the preceeding 
century. While we cannot pretend to cite all the factors 
responsible for the cultural and religious changes in our 
century, the loss of confidence in the Newtonian world-
view produced by science's own investigations, and the 
human catastrophes taking place between nations and 
within society brought about a fundamental change in 
man's self-understanding. He no longer saw himself living 
in the midst of a rationally discernable, coherent order 
of nature, but a world of forces that could release untold 
damage and demolish the best of plans. Man could still 
believe in his personal ends and private purposes but 
these, like the larger context of his existence, were not 
subject to any overall consistency that could be relied 
upon in future years. Simply, there is no ultimate mean-
ing to life. Evolutionary theory is more true than man 
thought at the beginning of this century: man is utterly 
finite. His thought and speech, if it is meaningful and 
intelligible, must confine itself to the immediate changing 
circumstances that he is in touch with. His values, projects 
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and knowledge are his choice within the limitations of 
the current trends and possible alterations that his prag-
matic needs dictate. There is no sense of transcendence or 
of the sacred available to his experience of existence. 
This lingering attitude, that one lived in a chance-
filled universe without any ultimate meaning, had 
profound effects upon man's self-understanding. The 
explanatory power of chance as substituting itself for the 
ultimate interpretation of existence is vividly depicted in 
Bertrand Russell's summary of human existence: "Man 
is the product of causes which had no prevision of the 
end they were achieving; his origin, his growth, his hopes 
and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome 
of accidental collocations of atoms . . . blind to good and 
evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on 
its relentless way . . . . It is for Man, proudly defiant of 
the irresistible forces that tolerate for a moment his 
knowledge and his condemnation to sustain alone, a weary 
but unyielding, Atlas, the world that his own ideals have 
fashioned despite the trampling march of unconscious 
power."12 
Russell's judgment here is more mythological than 
scientific. But this in no way lessens its validity of obser-
vation during those times. The secular reduction of life to 
chance is aptly formed by his words which cast the general 
feeling of human existence within a this-worldly context. 
If this judgment is accurate, then it also receives 
additional help from the scientific logos. Bringing the 
distinction of being a Nobel prize winner, Professor J acque 
Monod, molecular biologist and former Director of the 
Pasteur Institute, insists that the world's configurations 
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are the blind result of non-teleological forces. In his own 
Cartesian manner, he mentioned in a BBC broadcast that 
" . . . anything can be reduced to simple, obvious, mechan-
ical interactions. The cell is a machine; the animal is a 
machine; man is a machine."13 
While the disillusionment over the end of the New-
tonian world and its inherent belief in humane progress 
came to an abrupt scepticism, it was now reinforced by 
the very science that had been its assurance of an un-
limitedly, positive future. Monod's position is represen-
tative of many professional thinkers. His position would 
reduce biology to physics, the human person to instinct 
and conditioned behavior, and intelligence to machines— 
a position, in other words, that Russell already bequeathed 
to the twentieth century. 
Yet Monod's preference for a certain mechanistic 
methodology that allows him to conclude to these state-
ments with a universal conviction and sense of ultimacy 
contrasts with many other scientists. W. H. Thrope points 
out that Monod's understanding of scientific knowledge 
proposes to "replace religion, not only as a source of 
knowledge of the world, but also as a source of authority 
which determines the whole of man's being, even his inner-
most feelings and aspirations."14 The core of modern 
man's religious consciousness is chance. Being familiar 
with the findings of quantum theory and relativity con-
cepts, Monod's position is somewhat extraordinary in 
that, as Thrope continues, "physicists are implying that, 
fundamentally and in its totality, inanimate matter is not 
mechanical; whereas molecular biologists are saying that 
whenever matter is recognized as being alive, it is 
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completely mechanical (that is, it is reducible to a rather 
superficial nineteenth century type of physical chemis-
try)."15 
It is this problem of chance as the ultimate expla-
nation of existence, the essence of man and the destruc-
tion of teleology that requires our attention. 
7 
A Critique of Chance 
as the Ultimate Meaning of Reality 
Monod's Position 
In his Chance and Necessity, Jacques Monod pro-
poses that nature's creative secret to success is the action 
of chance alone. There is no design anywhere in the uni-
verse, and random natural selection accounts for nature's 
variety. 
He is quite adamant that chance alone is at the 
source of every innovation, of all creation: "pure chance, 
only chance, absolute but blind liberty, is at the very root 
of the prodigious edifice of evolution: this central notion 
of modern biology is no longer today an hypothesis among 
other possible or even conceivable ones. It is the only 
conceivable one, being compatible alone with the facts of 
observation and experience." He assures us that "nothing 
permits us to suppose (or to hope) that our ideas on this 
point need or even could be revised."1 
In living organisms, genes are the fundamental 
units of biological heredity. They "tend to be stable 
elements, for the most part, capable of exact duplication 
in the process of reproduction."2 Any alteration in the 
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genetic pool, for Monod, is entirely accidental. Random 
disturbances are the exclusive source for new modifica-
tions in the stability of species, which, in turn, reintegrate 
themselves in a new repository for hereditary endowment. 
The advances of progress that evolution seemingly indi-
cates is not purposive, but the accidental result of blind 
materials and forces drifting together. Human nature is 
no exception. In fact the essence of human nature is 
nothing else but fortuitous chance. Like a player at Monte 
Carlo, man has emerged a winner by chance. Yet his 
accomplishments can hardly give him comfort or inspira-
tion, since "man knows at last that he is alone in the 
indifferent immensity of the universe whence he has 
emerged by chance."3 
The Crux of the Problem: the Case for 
Scientific Objectivity 
The grandeur of Monod's position has not gone un-
noticed among his peers. The organizational and hier-
archical levels of molecule, cell, tissue, organ, organism, 
breeding population, species, are broadly accepted by 
scientists as factual realities rather than as arbitrary con-
veniences. These findings about the universe, especially 
in the organic realm, led Monod to interpret their origin, 
growth, and continuance to pure chance and mechanical 
necessity. These same classifications measured by Bragg, 
Swanson, Thrope, Bertalanffy, Haldane and others, indi-
cate order, design, purpose and final causes.4 The question 
is: how can the same objective evidence be competing for 
contradictory explanations? 
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Resolution to this serious question lies not in the 
organizational evidence. Broad agreement upon the facts 
is fairly well established among scientists. The difficulty 
may be traced to the interpretation, that is, the criteria 
for appraising the evidence. There are, for Monod as well 
as for other scientists, preferred criteria, definite and 
explicit presuppositions for scientific "objectivity." 
In the early portion of his book, Monod explains 
his philosophy of science in a series of postulates. Nature, 
for Monod, is that which science describes. This descrip-
tion of natural phenomena is guided by certain criteria. 
Primary among these canons of methodology is the "pos-
tulate of objectivity" which permits the apprehension of 
knowledge in a scientific manner.5 When applying the 
postulate of objectivity to the evidence of relative order 
and stability in nature, the teleologie dimension of nature 
never appears. The use of this postulate only leads back 
to chance as the fundamental explanation of nature. 
The reason for this inevitable reduction is that the 
meaning of objectivity requires the "systematic denial 
that 'true' knowledge can be reached by interpreting 
phenomena in terms of final causes, that is, purpose."6 
Science is thus explained in a negative way and certain 
questions immediately arise. It may be considered advan-
tageous to exclude data that cannot measure up to the 
criteria, but can one safely assume that all meaningful 
phenomena will accommodate this vision of science? Are 
there facts that may go unexplained because they cannot 
be circumscribed by objectivity? If the quest of science 
is the fair attempt to explicate reality, then to place re-
strictions upon itself before listening to nature's evidence 
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may minimize its findings. From the postulate itself, it 
does not necessarily follow that the structures of the 
evidence will oblige the rationality of a science completely 
determined beforehand. In this regard, it becomes highly 
questionable, to say the least, whether "objectivity" on 
these specific terms is truly commensurate with the 
intelligibility of the universe.7 
Except for Monod's private use, his reduction of 
scientific objectivity to as much or as little as the denial 
of final causes cannot be used as the foundation, either in 
the past nor the present, for the entire scientific enter-
prise. If reality is the source of knowledge, then its 
multiple levels and dimensions reveal a depth and breadth, 
partially obtained by many sciences over the course of 
centuries, that does not seem equivalent to a negative 
principle of disclosure. 
Part of the confusion here lies in Monod's mis-
identifying the sources of knowledge with its scientific 
justification, thus effectively narrowing the truth pro-
cess, while keeping his non-purposive conclusions constant. 
Even here the postulate of objectivity is not broad enough 
to explain the remarkable stability of the universe amidst 
perturbulations. Instead of explaining it as teleology, he 
substitutes teleonomy. E. Boesiger mentions that Monod 
"ascribes to proteins almost a kind of teleonomic intel-
ligence, permitting them an oriented, coherent and con-
structive activity."8 Monod insists that objectivity obliges 
us to recognize the teleonomic dimension in living organ-
isms. The teleonomic recognition of nature, however, does 
not follow, stricdy speaking, from the postulate of ob-
jectivity, as Monod supposes, but only when organisms are 
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studied as living beings. 
It would not be difficult to resolve Monod's episte-
mologica! con-tradiction. By his choosing not to uphold 
the alleged universality of the postulate of objectivity, 
the evolutionary patterns of living organisms could be 
better explained than by chance and necessity only. The 
word "choose" is his own undertaking. He informed his 
colleagues at an international conference that "epistemol-
ogy is a normative endeavor," and before one constructs 
an epistemology "you must have made a choice of 
values."9 Instead of choosing to make the postulate of 
objectivity "consubstantial with science," he could open 
the postulate to allow the structures and processes of the 
organic realm to speak, as it were, for themselves.10 
In this way, the observer would be informed pri-
marily by the power of the a posteriori feedback of 
reality. Scientific knowledge would preserve an under-
standing of the complexities of the universe, especially in 
the life systems, that include numerous relationships which 
cannot always be defined precisely nor mathematized, but 
which enable scientists to comprehend phenomena with 
more illumination than through a designated number of 
exact or measurable relationships. For it may well be the 
case that the valid explanation of the phenomena under 
investigation cannot meet the requirements of Monod's 
scientific rationality. 
Whitehead was aware of this tendency among 
scientists to avoid certain problems by appealing to their 
methodology as vanquishing the difficulty. "You cannot 
limit a problem," he states, "by reason of a method of 
attack. The problem is to understand the operations of an 
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animal body. There is clear evidence that certain opera-
tions of certain animal bodies depend upon the foresight 
of an end and the purpose to attain it. It is no solution of 
the problem to ignore this evidence because other 
operations have been explained in terms of physical and 
chemical laws. The existence of a problem is not even 
acknowledged."11 
Chance and Hierarchical Organization: 
the Recovery of Purpose 
The association of chance with the universe is 
undeniable. Chance happenings abound. At the same time 
there is undeniable evidence for dynamic stability per-
vading the universe. Nature, it seems, is a combination of 
perdurance and fluidity. Impressive in its maintenance of 
dynamic equilibrium across broad expanses of inorganic 
and organic matter, nature in its proliferation and expan-
siveness allows for novel accidents in the random assertion 
of chance. These occurrences indicate a certain unpre-
dictableness in nature's historical development. But to 
infer from the feature of unpredictableness that the 
entire universe is therefore the product of chance expands 
the fact of chance too much. To see chance as the leading 
exponent of nature is to obscure the orderly processes in 
nature that are seen in evidence even more than random 
spontaneity. To explain the factual breath of organiza-
tional hierarchy in nature by unbounded chance begs a 
great deal in the minds of some scientists. 
Monod would prefer to understand man as a living 
machine and thus complete the explanation of his nature 
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in the chance result of the laws of physics and chemistry. 
The analogy between a man-made machine and man as a 
living machine can be useful in understanding certain levels 
of similar organization. But Monod overlooks a basic 
feature in the comparison. "If there is any problem," as 
Thrope points out, "in the organization of a computer, 
it is the unlikely constraints which, so to speak, harness 
these laws to perform highly specific and directive func-
tions which have of course been built into the machine 
by the expertise of the designer. So of course the real 
problem of life is not that all the structures and molecules 
in the cell appear to comply with the known laws of 
physics and chemistry. The real mystery is the origin of 
the highly improbable constraints which harness these 
laws to fulfill particular functions. This is in fact the 
problem of hierarchical control."12 Pattee concurs by 
insisting that "theoretical biology must face this problem 
as fundamental, since hierarchical control is the essential 
and distinguishing characteristic of life." l î Chance is 
simply not an explanation for the various unitary contin-
uities of patterns amidst their changes of details in the 
vast population of elements and composed entities. 
J. Bronowski has the same problem as Monod in 
using chance to explain the emergence of complex entities: 
"There is therefore a peculiar irony in the vitalist claim 
that the progress of evolution from simple to complex 
cannot be the work of chance. On the contrary, as we see, 
exactly this is how chance works, and is constrained to 
work by its nature. The total potential of stability that 
is hidden in matter can only be evoked in steps, each 
higher layer resting on the layer below it. The stable 
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units that compose one layer are the raw material for 
random encounters which will produce higher configura-
tions, some of which will chance to be stable. So long as 
there remains a potential of stability which has not be-
come actual, there is no other way for chance to go. It 
is as if nature were shuffling a sticky pack of cards, and it 
is not surprising that they hold together in longer and 
longer runs."14 Let us examine his remarks in light of 
what has already been said in view of hierarchical control. 
Bronowski affirms the progress of the 'simple to 
complex'; he speaks of the 'potential of stability' that is 
'hidden in matter'; he sees these potentials 'evoked in 
steps,' which implies an orderly procedure; he speaks of 
'stable units' that are the material for 'higher configura-
tions'; and he compares nature to a pack of 'sticky cards' 
which 'hold together' in 'longer and longer runs,' every-
thing revealing 'how chance works.' 
In his defense of chance, if he may be paraphrased, 
he cites plainly the nuances of order. If nature is essential-
ly the outcome of chance then it is not consistent to pre-
sume chance responsible for stability, affinity, cohesion, 
interconnection, regularity and positive potentiality in 
nature. What Bronowski underscores about nature is that 
it has unrealized capacities to effect changes in a depen-
dent sequence or steps resulting in modified or new stable 
forms arranged in a harmonious manner in the hierarchical 
biosphere—which setting, according to him, involves the 
entire structured process and is the inexorable result of 
pure chance. When nature performs consistently, doing 
what it is supposed to do repeatedly, he calls it chance. 
If this is the evidence foY chance, what is order? His 
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reasoning simply equivocates chance for the evidence of 
order. Since he admits that the primitive building blocks 
of nature have the 'potential of stability' then the proper 
actualization of that potential produces, in common 
language, specific actions which are 'designed for' specific 
purposes. His semantics cannot avoid evidence of order. 
To broaden the implications of making chance the 
ultimate explanation of the universe, let it be pointed out 
that if there is a dependable order among the events or 
beings that make up the world, why make that order 
difficult to understand by postulating factors and forces 
that presumably are completely independent of each 
other? A chance view, given pluralistic presuppositions, 
makes order itself a constant anomaly. 
Among the critics of Monod, mentioned above, 
recognition is increasing for appreciating the orderly and 
purposeful dimensions in nature, especially in regard to 
organic structure and behavior. Mechanistic explanations 
are being trimmed to modest proportions. H.G.Wolff 
mentions that in this century "the revolt in physics 
against the Cartesian concept of a mechanical universe 
raised doubts about the ideal model for science imposed 
by physics. Far from being disrupting, this change made 
it easier for many biologists to admit into the study of the 
form and function of parts of living systems their purpose 
in relation to the goals of the living organisms and to 
accept the thesis that biological concepts can emerge from 
a study of integrated systems in which new and different 
relations between creature and setting engender new and 
different behavior patterns."15 
The study of organisms shows that they manifest 
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complex hierarchies of levels of organization and be-
havior, including integrating many systems. In man, for 
example, there is simultaneous integration of the meta-
bolic, nervous, glandular, etc. systems. In fact, the overall 
performance of the organism completely exceeds the 
expectation at its chemical level. J. H. Woodger indicated 
this undeniable feature of living beings when, in 1929 he 
wrote: "Suppose the iron has the form of a poker or a 
padlock, then although the iron is still chemically anal-
yzable in the same way as before, it cannot be fully 
described in terms of chemical concepts. It now has an 
organization above the chemical level. In the same way an 
organism is a physical entity in the sense that it is one of 
the things we become aware of by means of the senses, and 
it is a chemical entity in the sense that it is capable of 
chemical analysis just as is the case with any other physical 
entity, but it does not at all follow from this that it can 
be fully and satisfactorily described in chemical terms."16 
The higher level phenomena exhibited by the whole 
entity on a sufficiently regular basis could not be obtain-
able if randomness pervaded the entire structure. Equally, 
a mechanistic analysis of the organism would have to 
neglect the larger activities of the unit in question, in-
cluding the phenomena of organization. 
Monod assumes that all the laws of nature, including 
the field of biology and neurology, which cover all the 
facts of life and mind, follow from one basic mechanical 
and rational system. His position means that, at the 
human level, values are impossible, that wholes become a 
crowd of random aggregates not organizations, measured 
only by statistical laws, and that real development and 
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emergence of novelty is likewise impossible. For Monod, 
the parts of an entity are more ultimate and more real 
than the entity itself. To assume a reduction to the atomic 
level one has to overlook the evidence of properties and 
behavior that experience shows is irreducible to simpler 
elements. Bertalanffy writes that the "biological order is 
specific and surpasses the laws applying in the inanimate 
world, but we can progressively approach it with con-
tinued research. It calls for investigation at all levels: at 
the biological level of the cell and the multicellular organ-
ism; at the level of supra-individual units of life. At each 
of these levels we see new properties and new law."17 
The multi-leveled approach to the topic is not an 
arbitrary preference of biologists but an exigency derived 
from a careful investigation of the· subject matter. The 
interdependence of levels, the intrinsic directiveness of 
processes, the functional relations of parts of a living 
system to the whole, the fluid architectural composition, 
the constancy of activity and the wholeness of develop-
ment are together some of the major features that enable 
biologists to admit that vital processes cannot be other-
wise explained than by telic means and ends. "Such 
teleology," according to E. W. Sinnott, "far from being 
unscientific, is implicit in the very nature of organism. 
The biologist need not shudder at these words, for pur-
posiveness of this sort is not only unobjectionable in his 
science but lies at the very heart of life itself."18 Even 
when scientists may resist the above words, they cannot 
help but see the irony in Whitehead's remark that "scien-
tists animated by the purpose of proving that they are 
purposeless constitute an interesting subject for study."19 
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Teleology Revisited 
In retrospect, the teleologica! interpretation of 
nature, with its empirical methodology of searching for 
physical causes, was never disproved. From the sixteenth 
century onward teleology was gradually ignored in the 
flush of exciting possibilities provoked by equating knowl-
edge with power over the forces of nature. By viewing the 
world as a machine, one can deploy quantitative methods 
which can avoid nature's evidence for vital purposes. It 
is more a choice, a preferential treatment toward the 
subject matter that ells under investigation. A machine 
is functional and deterministic, objectively and uniformly 
certain in its operations. 
From the seventeenth century the investigation 
of nature assumed these manageable proportions. A 
mechanistic perspective can overlook vital purposes. The 
regularity of natural processes, instead of being discerned 
in their purposeful nexus, can be interpreted as uniformly 
operating forces, measured by and translated into mathe-
matical symbols with a reliable margin of predictable 
results capable of empirical verification. Since the laws of 
a machine are externally imposed (no machine can choose 
its own design), it would not seem illogical to think that 
nature is equally deterministic. Thus, for Descartes, 
animals are machines; for Hobbes, consciousness and 
society are machines; for La Mettrie, the human body is 
a machine-, and in our times, from Pavlov to Skinner, 
among the behaviorists, human behavior is machinelike. 
As already pointed out, the reduction of the multi-
varied strata of nature to a mechanical model does not 
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mean that nature is a machine, because nature is primarily 
organistic and not a series of aggregate parts. Even though 
the organism as physical body will exhibit the same 
general characteristics as do other aggregate bodies of 
matter, there are special activities pertaining to organic 
bodies that upon scrutiny will efface almost entirely their 
material identifications. 
The key activity that differentiates an organ from an 
aggregate is metabolism. Here we are not speaking of a 
mechanical exchange between the organ and its environ-
ment, where part is received and the organ makes room 
for its new presence by pushing other parts away. When 
a living body is considered a metabolizing system, then 
the reception of parts from the outside is a constant be-
coming of the so-called machine itself, which becoming in 
turn is a performance of the machine. There is no analogue 
for this biological phenomenon in the world of machines. 
A mechanical perspective or a mathematical des-
cription can only deal with dynamic wholes in nature by 
abstracting from the more immediate identities of the 
total substrate. Instead of allowing consciousness to be 
allied to the inseparable persistence of the life process with 
its various forms, there is delineated a quantitative form 
that measures the remaining affinities within the substrate. 
In its performance, the mechanistic and mathematical 
approach can be indifferent in its univocity to teleologi-
ca! evidence. This homogeneous abstractive view misses 
the whole point in reality—life itself. At best, the mech-
anist or the follower of the chance theory of life can see 
only a relative perserverance of an aggregation, reducible 
to the immediate identities of its parts. 
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This viewpoint is completely incapable of appre-
hending systems of matter that are unities of a manifold 
indicating a wholeness of self-integration, where form is 
the cause rather than the result of a material collection. 
Man as the most complex of organic forms continues to 
exist as an active self-integration of life which gives sub-
stance to him as a living, meaningful being. This active 
integration of his surroundings comes back to him as 
various categories of teleology, such as his efforts at art, 
recreation, business occupations, involvement in social 
problems and like activities wherein he knows the mean-
ing of his actions and himself through the finality of 
their performance. 
Even at the mundane but essential level of biologi-
cal survival, teleologica! implications are in evidence. 
Human life being a continuous achievement retains still 
a certain freedom over its material dependencies even in 
the act of assimilating them. Whatever the human enti y 
incorporates into its various systems never remains tne 
same as it was in its previous formal structure. If it is 
accepted by these systems, then it is transformed into a 
different order, completely unpredictable from its former 
functional capacities. A soybean, for example, could never 
be suspected of becoming, say, the living protein of a 
muscle. The dynamic identity of a living form, such as 
man, uses the material contents of its environment for the 
successive phases of its growth and self-continuation. 
This process gives a -new teleology to matter itself. Thus, 
our metabolic continuity with matter is predicated upon 
something more than its own activity, for it is related in 
its continuity as part of the process of self-continuation in 
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consciousness. A certain polarity exists between man and 
the world, for in preserving his internal identity, his con-
tinuity in self-consciousness exercises a finality other 
than the exigencies of the organic realm of his being. 
While taking into account the ends of his organic nature, 
man still exerts a freedom over his corporeal being which 
includes purposes and meanings that defy the equalizing 
forces of physical homogeneity. Man's self-consciousness 
gives him a sovereignty of possibilities more than the 
sufficiency of mere matter in its transitory potentials. 
The unraveling of the physio-chemical analysis of 
life brings only the evidence of inorganic or lifeless parts. 
But his scientific act of analysis is an act of life made by a 
living scientist. Even the preference of Professor Monod 
and others to posit the denial of teleology for the integrity 
of scientific procedures is not the direct and immediate 
inference from the data investigated by the scientists, but 
a choice. It is a living act of self-consciousness, which for 
the sake of their personal purposes excludes the possibility 
of discerning the evidence in a certain way. The dismissal 
of teleologica! categories for the sake of scientific objec-
tivity is an act of intentional purpose freely admitted by 
its subscribers. 
Since science admits a correlation between its 
viewpoint and the dimension or realm taken under study 
by that viewpoint, then a successful enclosure of a level 
or aspect of reality cannot logically expand its presump-
tion by stating on that basis that other approaches or 
viewpoints are trivial. Bolen remarks that the scientific 
viewpoint "requires on the part of the scientist a quanti-
fying and abstractive attitude by means of which he 
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disengages himself from the qualitative concreteness of 
his everyday world and constitutes the abstract network of 
mathematical and functional relationships of his scientific 
world. The scientific way of being-in-the-world, therefore, 
or the "attitude" of the positive scientist determines the 
objectifying, abstractive, limiting and quantifying charac-
teristics of the "methods" of the positive sciences."20 
By the nature of its logic, scientific objectivity 
cannot be the comprehensive tool for understanding 
reality, for it admits by its attitude and methodology the 
decision not to be bound by the differentiated self-mani-
festation of being. Thus, scientific objectivity's insistence 
upon its own mathematical-empirical approach makes it 
less rigorous in its thinking than it supposes. The attempt 
to equate scientific thinking with the essence of rational 
discourse as the standard of consciousness, exposes this 
immediate flaw. The exactness of mathematical abstrac-
tion is not commensurate with the immediate hetero-
geneous features of reality. If human knowledge requires a 
strict attention to the exact aspects and characteristics of 
reality, then the exact methods of scientific precision are 
not strenuous enough to minister to the wholeness of 
being. The special construction of these methods lacks the 
versatility to contact the various dimensions or evidences 
of reality. 
Scientific Rationality Reexamined 
This criticism does not imperil scientific rationality. 
Nature obviously can yeild knowledge by its methods. But 
the attempt to hypostatize these methods, to perpetrate 
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them as the ultimate norm of scientific meaning becomes 
unscientific. The overidentification of scientific objectivity 
with mathematical intelligibility forces the experience of 
a lived contradiction. The exclusive universality of this 
position may be held but its credibility is unascertainable 
by experimental verification. Thus it is scientifically un-
tenable. Also to deny the status of true knowledge to 
those disciplines and methods that do not match the exact 
requirements of mathematical precision is to confuse a 
contrary with a contradictory episode. The criterion for 
scientific authenticity in all fairness to the richly varied 
objectivity of the world must include pluralistic ap-
proaches in order to deal intelligently with the manifold 
of being. 
When science seriously attempts to understand the 
world, then it may have to widen its mechanical conform-
ity to its current paradigm of scientific rationality in 
order to explicate those aspects of phenomena which par-
take in the total disclosure of reality. 
In this regard, H. Skolimowski points out "that 
concepts, like tools, must be suitable for the task, and that 
we hinder our task from the start when we try to render 
dynamic processes through static concepts; . . . that 
growth concepts, which explain or attempt to account for 
qualitative changes, are not less rational than physical 
concepts; . . . that the transformation of life into hier-
archically more and more complex forms is not less a 
fact (but perhaps more) than the existence of electrons; 
. . . that the function of rationality is to illuminate and not 
to obscure, and that the compassionate understanding, if 
it leads to illumination, is perfecdy rational, for rationality 
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is to be judged not by a priori procedures but by the out-
come of the rational process."21 Scientists, especially in 
the biological field, are noticing that although we have 
physical, chemical, mathematical and other concepts 
describing the properties of matter, their usefulness must 
not preclude the articulation of higher levels of living 
matter by concepts which befit the adequate explanation 
of the reality.22 
If science bears an intellectual responsibility to the 
experiential facts, data and evidences of reality, then it 
does not seem unreasonable nor unscientific to allow the 
correlation between knowing and being to be expressed 
in concepts that reflect this substantial unity. In this 
case, for example, "growth concepts will allow us to 
describe without distortion living phenomena in the pro-
cess of change, particularly in the process of qualitative 
change. Normative concepts will allow us to describe 
without mystification living entities guided by specific 
values and directed to specific goals."23 Man in his 
self-understanding as homo sytnbolicus embodies activities 
and properties over and above the physico-chemical 
properties of matter. A scientific analysis of any major 
organ of the human body, say the eye, would be ulti-
mately meaningless without relating the results to the 
living act of seeing. The structure and behavior of organ-
ism is not alternative or chance preference in description. 
Mechanical factors, as explained before, cannot establish 
organic modes of being. The creativeness of science re-
quires an intellectual fidelity to the differentiated mani-
festation of being, and, based on this common and 
universal experience, the scientific enterprise demands 
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pluralistic and complimentary interpretations. 
If scientific rationality continues to ignore its own 
limitations, then it exposes itself as a self-destructive 
attitude without a genuine future. If man and the world 
are nothing but chance products, then thought and reality 
are not related in any substantive way. Thought itself is 
reduced to unpredictable contingency making both sub-
jective and objective knowledge a meaningless collage. 
Scientific thought loses its identity with itself and for-
feits its truth value. When science refuses to acknowledge 
the presence of teleology in reality, then it loses its own 
justification for meaningfulness, and involves itself in an 
endless series of contradictions. If it admits a certain 
perseverance of natural entities to retain structure and 
recognizable behavior, then it articulates this performance 
by calling upon the primitive to account for the more 
complicated, the unstable for the stable, disorder and 
chance for becoming and being. 
It does no good for chance to be associated with 
the concept of the world as a machine. The strict implica-
tion of mechanistic causality is a finalistic concept, even 
though the final cause, its teleologica! import, may not be 
discernable empirically. The condition for its operation 
demands an antecedent design in an agent outside its 
boundaries. If chance were really the foundation of reality 
then science's attempt to promote itself, to advance over 
its mistakes and pioneer new discoveries could never take 
place within culture. Chance eliminates any consistent 
attitude from exerting its unified presence. The implica-
tions of chance as the fundamental explanation of reality 
forces science to call attention to its achievements by 
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eliminating itself. If science constantly tries to explain its 
progress upon the basis of chance, then ultimately it 
leaves its account of rationality incomplete. It asserts of 
the sufficiency of chance an accountability that chance in 
its unintelligibility cannot sustain. By refusing to examine 
the evidence for teleology, science denies to its thinking 
a basis of possible validation in a consciousness determined 
by the thoughtless. Heralding chance, scientists must 
declare all scientists illusionists. 
When we reflect upon this modem development in 
science, which refuses to examine the evidence for tele-
ology, this scientific refusal, in the light of the history of 
teleology, reveals a mythological problem rather than a 
scientific one. All the more is this assessment of crucial 
importance since the issue involved positions itself in 
terms of ultimacy. From the viewpoint of religious con-
sciousness, we are dealing here with a religious crisis, and 
so man is forced by these circumstances to search anew for 
another explanation. 
The Religious Crisis 
The crucial issue is not the intrinsic worth of these 
inventions as much as it is the cultural and religious con-
sequences of the scientific and technocratic attitude that 
minimizes the possibilities of fuller human insight into 
reality other than the inventive manipulation of matter. 
When important human concerns and questions of person-
al survival are opposed or nullified, a priori, as being 
insignificant because they are unsubmitable to quantitative 
criteria, then the accelerated implimentation of ever new 
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mechanistic policies and systems of technological control 
supplies its own grand illusion. The elimination of human 
misery and fulfillment of human authenticity are predi-
cated upon the supremacy of scientific rationality and 
automated abundance. 
This extreme portrait of a surfeited culture that 
doubts the humanistic dimensions of life, the organistic 
features of nature, and the symbolism of transcendence is 
consistent with the logic of scientific objectivity in its 
precluding the possibility for discerning purpose and final 
causes in reality. Scientific rationality informs the human 
community that its security in the everyday world of 
solid realities, the Newtonian deterministic world, is only 
an appearance, for at bottom, things are the uncontrollable 
pressure of sheer random formation. Geroge Santayana 
captured man's modern sense of contingency when he 
said that "matter is the invisible wind which, sweeping 
for no reason over the field of essences, raises some of 
them into a cloud of dust: and that whirlwind we call 
existence."24 On these terms, thought cannot proceed 
further beyond the empirical surface to clarify the depth 
of reality. 
Whence is the ultimate coherence to life? Reality is 
without essence. That is, in its depths there is no intel-
ligibility, no structure of meaning, only the empirical 
strata that randomly alters through time and space with 
occasional manipulation by man. Since man possesses no 
nature, there can be no ordered set of dynamisms out of 
which he might act with purpose and coherence. As it is 
with him, so it is with the world—both are the unrehearsed, 
temporary products of unpredictable chance. 
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The implications for religion are similar. In the 
Hellenistic and Medieval periods, the Age of Teleology, 
man's sense of contingency—like the occurrence of chance 
episodes in nature—were understood against an ultimate 
frame of reference. In a changing but fundamentally 
ordered world, contingency and chance pointed beyond 
themselves to a necessary and ultimately divine reality. 
In the context of a causal universe, the cosmos, the tem-
poral and transigent structures of existence always 
depended upon the permanent and the eternal. Modern 
man's sense of contingency is just the opposite. His accep-
tance of the scientific denial of purpose in nature and his 
loss of continuity in the historical progress of evolution 
have drained religious symbols of their meaningfulness and 
validity. Man deals with a contingent universe where 
"necessity is a conspiracy of accidents."25 
Religions emerge within distinct phases of history. 
They are the time-bound products of the same flux of 
existence that touches everything. Important and relevant, 
to be sure, are the scriptures, beliefs and rites that inscribe 
the credentials for the particular culture that interrelates 
with these symbols. But, in view of its historicalness, they 
become less engaging for us today as we move into a 
changing future. Since chance is at the core of reality, 
man lives in a plural world of finite connections and tem-
poral entities whose transiency makes it impossible to 
locate any concrete, sacral evidences indicating universal 
and ultimate significance. Huston Smith remarks that 
"in religion modernity demythologizes tradition to accom-
modate it to its one-story universe-, if "God" in principle 
requires more exalted quarters, the nonexistence of such 
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quarters entails his nonexistence as well.' The concept 
of divinity, like that of purpose in nature, becomes an 
unreal and empty symbol of transcendence, merely an 
unnegotiable relic of past language. 
This objective evaluation is not offered as one 
hypothesis among others, nor as only a mode of thought; 
rather, it esteems itself a totality, nothing less than the 
most progressive state of consciousness available to man's 
evolution. Professor Monod and others have proclaimed 
scientific objectivity in triumphal opposition to teleo-
logica! categories and symbols of transcendence, and thus 
have turned their intellectual stance into a religious issue 
with cultural import. Their worldview affirms a single, 
empirical ontology, exhibiting chance and endless change 
as the final meaning of existence. Modern man, then, 
must come to terms, sooner or later, with this compre-
hensive paradigm of meaning, not only in the area of 
industry and commerce where it prevails, but especially 
in the context of self-definition where it affects. 
Part Two 
Nature and Ultimacy 
as Correlates of Religious Consciousness 

8 
Preliminary Remarks 
From our investigation in Part One, certain patterns 
of interest have emerged in man's ongoing history. The 
study of his attempt to interpret the world to himself 
shows that he has deployed various categories of thought 
for this task. These ways of speaking and classifying 
reality can fall within a generalized perspective that at 
times allows our investigation to detect a unified coherence 
in the questions and answers. Man uses a certain plane of 
approach in deciphering reality. One can speak here of 
deploying a modality of consciousness to interpret nature 
and himself. 
Different periods of history have been shaped and 
dominated by these various modalities. Each, in its way, 
has given direction to man's ceaseless pursuit o f the mean-
ing of existence. Each has had far-reaching effects both 
individually and collectively, and none has been jettisoned 
by history except in its particular formation which can 
be associated with a definite period or epoch of Western 
history. These modalities may be described in terms of 
myth, philosophy, theology and science. Together they 
form a scale or series of levels of interpretation. In his use 
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of any one of them, man has attempted to perpetrate 
this use and importance on a grand scale. History is re-
plete with the human endeavor to prolong a preferred 
modality. This preference has to be taken into considera-
tion when discussing the various subjects that pertain to 
any one of them. 
The Teleologica! Constitution of Consciousness 
The persistent presence in man of the pursuit of 
meaning shows its nature to be of a dynamic character. 
Moreover, meaning reveals itself within the symbols of 
the presiding modality of consciousness. In fact, all the 
modalities, as history shows, reveal, even in their relative 
autonomy, a basic, operational thrust toward completion. 
Man senses his incompleteness and generates the desire 
for its alleviation. He feels, thinks and acts in ways to bring 
about the objective completion that he lacks. Smoothly 
performed or otherwise, successful in its accomplishment 
or a failure, the dynamism of the enterprise bespeaks a 
teleologica! process. The quest and the questions that man 
puts to himself about reality within a designated perspec-
tive or plane of approach reveal both a specific and an 
overall directional finality. In other words, the teleologica! 
dynamism of consciousness pervades the heuristic struc-
ture of inquiry and reflection. Human consciousness 
reveals a teleologica! constitution. 
The teleologica! nature of consciousness is not 
rigid. It reveals upon critical examination a flexibility that 
pervades, the natural polymorphic patterns of conscious 
experience. Man can grasp and express his awareness of 
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being at different levels. These levels of awareness are 
the various modalities—from myth and philosophy to the 
aesthetic and practical—that comprise the human ex-
perience of cognitional meaning. Upon reflection, one 
can discern that these levels or designated modalities have 
their own criteria for verifying the authenticity of their 
intellectual experience. A myth, for example, is not a 
scientific proposition about nature, although the reverse 
could be true. The Newtonian worldview was essentially 
proposed upon a scientific basis. But its impact upon the 
culture and historical era that accepted it expanded its 
value into a cultural totality—a full-blown myth arose for 
modern man. 
Human consciousness in its teleologica! dynamism 
includes, then, a natural and historically-grounded poly-
morphic presence. But its presence includes something 
further. The dynamic pursuit of meaning obtainable 
upon these various and elicited levels or modalities of 
awareness possess a definite affinity with the concrete 
universe of being. Between consciousness and being 
resides an isomorphic relationship. In other words, con-
sciousness is able to conform to the intelligible order and 
dynamism of the manifold universe. Man can proceed in 
his investigation of being deploying a modality of con-
sciousness that can be substituted for another, each 
patterning human experience according to its own per-
spective. None of these modalities, however, can exhaust 
the intrinsic possibilities of awareness, for each has its own 
borders and criteria that limit its applicability to the 
plenitude of being. 
Man's knowing is in process-to elicit further insights 
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by asking questions, resolving them, raising additional 
questions to elicit further insight It is not a chance affair, 
randomly composed and executed, but a directed dyna-
mism that does not deny the possibilities of opposition, 
mistakes and failures. These occurrences also belong to 
the heuristic and progressive character of consciousness. 
They serve to remind man to be more careful in deter-
mining adequate criteria for intelligible and humane 
survival. Thus, teleology emerges as the law of conscious-
ness and the myth of nature, for it describes the dynamic 
aspect of their being. 
Our brief study of some of the more prominent 
modalities of consciousness shows that different cultural 
eras have attempted to expand their normal borders of 
meaning by using one modality as the exclusive means for 
discovering and expressing the ultimate meaning of reality. 
Undoubtedly, it has worked for a while. But by doing so, 
it also turned into a myth by which the age recognized 
itself. Its cultural ascendency reaches such a stature that 
it is accepted as the last word, even for human existence. 
The Demands of Religious Consciousness 
Right or wrong, through the use of the modalities 
of consciousness, man has shown an overriding concern to 
search out the final meaning of existence—not just in a 
general way but as concretely as possible. Again, the cul-
ture associated with this effort generally indicates, by the 
contours of its life community, the values, habits and 
customs that are implied by its acceptance. Being the 
bearer of this recurring phenomenon, man tends to unify 
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his life around the ultimate meaning of his choice, which 
may or may not agree with conventional society. 
Also within this search or quest for ultimacy, one 
can detect a reciprocal correlation between man's inves-
tigation of nature, ultimacy and self-knowledge. The 
questions and cultural expression of these areas of interest 
seem to reflect mutually upon one another. The more he 
understands about any one of these areas, the more his 
understanding affects his conceptions of the others as 
well. This pattern of interpretation can be seen in every 
major period of Western cultural history. Nor should this 
dynamic effort be surprising, since consciousness prefers 
to know things in terms of unities and wholes as much as 
it can. Thus man's experience of being produces the 
gathering and the testing of facts and theories which in 
tum mount into the accumulation of insists and higher 
viewpoints that can guide him, both in his immediate and 
long range goals. 
The Tension of Our Modem Age 
Modern man has once again entered a crossroads in 
consciousness. The undisclosed failures of the nineteenth 
century have been visited upon the children of this era. 
Their arrival, however, has been more cataclysmic than any 
dire prediction could have anticipated. Man seems to be 
bereft of all substantial meaning in a world of chance 
collisions. And for a better interpretation, he still clings 
to the one-dimensional worldview, fostered by his scien-
tific and technological awareness. Let us now examine 
its contours and see why it refuses to allow the 
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legitimatization of religious consciousness, before attempt-
ing to show that ultimacy and transcendence are still 
possible in our era. 
The Myth of Scientific Rationality 
Today, man's undaunted reliance upon his reason-
ing faculty (ratio, discursiveness) virtually identified with 
scientific objectivity, has nourished for more than three 
hundred years a continuing tradition of knowing reality. 
Reason assumes that its vision of ultimacy has to be 
synonymous with the scientific efforts of its discursive 
modality of consciousness. For many, it has led mankind 
to the dead-end of chance as the most representative 
interpretation of life. 
Scientific knowledge over these centuries has 
depended essentially upon mechanistic categories and 
methods of inquiry, along with its pragmatic extension, 
technology. Together, these events have fused themselves 
as the dominant myth for our era, giving direction and 
purpose to the impulse for progress and development. This 
twofold ideal symbolizes the central values of modern 
culture, with all its limitations and deficiencies. 
The modern, mechanized culture is not only the 
product of scientific reason but, as a symbol of ultimacy, 
encourages an habituated way of evaluating life. Scien-
tific thinking and its industrialized projects define the 
most legitimate field for human reflection, and thus stimu-
late the motivational center of man. Since a culture tends 
to see only what can be incorporated into its established 
frame of reference, the mechanistic elaboration of life's 
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options is taken as the whole or predominant way to 
interpret reality. In upholding its approved propositions, 
the scientific community hardly avoids a set of attitudes 
that enters into its scientific cogitation, but are not neces-
sarily implied by its so-called objective receptivity to 
nature's intelligibility. H. K. Schilling remarks that the 
scientific community "has its own ideals and characteris-
tic way of life; its own standards, mores, conventions, 
signs and symbols, language and jargon, professional 
ethics, sanctions and controls, authority, institutions and 
organizations, publications; its own creeds and beliefs, 
orthodoxies and heresies—and effective ways of dealing 
with the latter. This community is affected, as are other 
communities, by the usual vagaries, adequacies, and short-
comings of human beings. It has its politics, its pulling and 
hauling, its pressure groups; its differeing schools of 
thought, its divisions and schisms; its personal loyalties ard 
animosities, jealousies, hatreds, and rallying cries; its 
fads and fashions."1 Given the temper of a given com-
munity of scientists, valid but unorthodox views may be 
rejected or ignored simply because the data of human 
experience does not fit into the currently acceptable 
explanatory paradigm. The enormous presumption of 
scientific rationality is that it alone can shed the most 
intelligible light upon the meaning of existence.2 
But as current history recalls, the cultural structures 
and policies founded upon mechanistic meanings are 
susceptible to erosion. When the conditions for human 
fulfillment under the present cultural expectations begin 
showing their aging limits, society suffers from what it 
feels are unfair boundaries, impinging upon the rights of 
186 /Part Two 
its self-expression. It soon recalls technological research 
to invent newer models of rescue. 
The expected reliance upon the new variation of 
the old familiar theme of scientific progress to extinguish 
the ills of man has iteseli become progressively weakened 
in its humanizing hope since World War I. Even though 
these newer remedies of invention may statistically reduce 
the incidence of certain mechanical afflictions in society, 
their insertion into the dynamic complexities of society 
produces equally new strains and pressures in other seg-
ments of the cultural complex. 
When programmed systems of technological ex-
pediency discard humane purpose and design, then the 
human suffering occasioned by a technological failure is 
only a temporary inconvenience until a better invention 
can replace the older model. This type of improvement 
presumes that developing technological auxiliaries can be 
engineered to relieve human pain in all its forms. Scien-
tific rationality will ever correct the unexpected limita-
tions of its cool intelligence. 
A strange teleology evolves. In an expanding mech-
anistic culture, each generation would live from one 
technological reprieve to the next. Mumford remarks 
that "to many credulous people, this whole prospect 
seems entrancing: indeed irresistible. Like those who have 
become helplessly addicted to cigarettes, they are now so 
committed to technological 'progress,' that they ignore 
the actual threat to their health, their mental development, 
or their freedom. Already a life that calls for assuming 
personal responsibility and exerting personal effort seems 
to them a Utopian unreality, not, as it actually is, the 
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the normal state of all living organisms, one reaching a 
climax of conscious purpose in man."3 
Technological Progress: Reality and Illusion 
To sustain his dignity while justifying the techno-
logical treatment of natural resources and the expenditure 
of human energies, Western man has opted for a quanti-
tative usefulness in producing the modern degree of 
cultural prosperity. His vision of himself has changed 
from the medieval insistence of a rigidly defined social and 
static worldview to the dynamic optimism and experimen-
tal modes of contemporary living. By his discursive 
ingenuity, modern man has been exceeding the cultural 
limitations of the past generations. By enlarging the 
abundance of technological advantages to overcome the 
universal problem of human privation and disparity, 
the successful termination of this dreadful recurrence 
would seem to be looming upon the modem horizon. 
Forced by history to inherit the practical conse-
quences of scientific rationality, man finds himself in a 
strange predicament. The concrete betterment of passing 
decades has not always been an edifying episode for every-
one. The echo of recorded history narrates that howso-
ever modern man has enjoyed his newly civilized status, 
the improved standard of living eventually suffered a pain-
ful obsolescence. As society continued to objectify its 
cultural desires, each generation repeatedly found the 
lingering benefits from the past improvements still too 
restrictive for their taste. However well instigated were 
the latest programs for emancipation from the past, 
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history demonstrates that as each cultural advance sta-
bilized, it soon spawned its own version of oppressiveness. 
Ironically, man finds himself cramped, manipu-
lated, even devasted, by the very tools of liberation. The 
scientific enlightenment has brought him from the so 
called "dark ages" to the present level of civilization, and 
its success has also replaced medieval constrictions with 
modem ones. Planned obsolescence is one thing. But as 
exposed in our recent ecological sensitivity, the indus-
trial-technological worldview enforces a way of progress 
that supports its own disintegration. The planetary life-
forces presupposed by every segment of culture are being 
mortally threatened by scientific objectivity in its mis-
application of technological progress. 
Actually the belief in Progress had been seriously 
undermined by the experience of World War I, with its 
unabated social and political upheavals lingering after-
wards. The naive belief in the inevitableness of historical 
progress was devastated. Evolutionary history as its own 
court of judgment could not be reconciled to the opposing 
facts of those years. One cannot accept this tragedy 
simply as a phase in some larger tendency of history. 
Instead one investigates for mistaken choices, misunder-
stood incidents, and a host of critical factors involved in 
this disasterous affair that could explain what choices may 
have been avoided. The doctrine of Progress loses its 
appeal as a single developmental process in which each 
phase plays a mechanical role, subservient to the whole. 
In other words, the widespread intensity of the 
nineteenth century's conviction about Progress could no 
longer be confirmed by the twentieth century's experiences 
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that contrasted so vividly with this inherited supposition. 
Disowned from the stable promise of historical improve-
ment, twentieth century man began to feel his historical 
contingency and temporality. 
Replacing the standard of culture with concrete 
improvement gives hope to human progress. Nature and 
the universe are yielding their secrets to research. In so 
doing, modernity has banked on the faculty of reason, 
the logos as colored by scientific rationality, for the dis-
placement of cultural deficiencies and the upgrading of 
human standards of living. Yet in our time we have 
become more critically aware that the latent tensions 
within culture, the restive feelings of antagonism that 
eventuate from the scientifically based, industrially sup-
portive technology, recur with every succeeding advance. 
This inexorable pressure of survival brings man to 
the brink of existence where he must search anew for the 
meaning of life. To look upon himself as a chance entity 
in a random world of energy changes is becoming less 
creditable in the eyes of science's future. Yet even where 
man enjoys a freedom from Monod's version of reality, 
the challenge of searching for ultimate meaning leaves him 
puzzled in his newly-found autonomy. Even where science 
resists the one-dimensional viewpoint of its rationality, 
still at the everyday level of man's cultural pursuits, there 
remains a sense of scepticism about the future. This 
situation is not unexpected considering the amount of 
confidence that the myth of modernity generated in the 
minds of people. Once again we seem caught up in the 
problem of ultimate meaning. 
As examined in Part One, man passes through 
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various determinations ofultimacy, using various modal-
ities and paradigms of reason. Even where these historical 
determinations or epochs have opposed one another, their 
configuration and dynamism continue to reveal a teleo-
logica! unity embedded in man's quest for self-understand-
ing. Even the failure of any particular epoch, say the 
medieval stance or the Newtonian worldview, have con-
tributed to the dialectical progress of the quest by point-
ing out the insurpassable limitations of attempting it 
within the confines of reason alone. 
To preserve this quest from overidentifying with 
the limited but necessary paradigms of meaning, man 
needs to return to the mythic presentation of experiential 
symbols that exceed the modalities of scientific rationality 
and yet are inviting enough for him to recognize that his 
participation in them affords the self-verification of the 
quest. As the history of teleology and the history of the 
cultural and scientific paradigms have shown, the pur-
suit of ultimate meaning is unrestrictive in its demands for 
man's self-realization. This quest continually implies a 
teleologica! construction to its presence. 
This problem of the teleologica! fulfillment of 
ultimacy or religious consciousness is taken up in Part 
Two in order to remove its possibility for actualization 
from the status of mere fantasy; that there are clues today 
to help man achieve his natural and unrestricted desire 
to find ultimacy. 
9 
The Ambiguity of Secular Autonomy 
The paradox and drama today amidst the super-
abundance provided by Western technocratic attitudes 
is man's profound scepticism in achieving this level of 
autonomy over the forces of nature. He senses his exist 
enee almost totally within a contingent, relative and 
temporal context. The confusion and anxiety about the 
future occasioned by his allegiance to the finality of 
scientific rationality as the basis of culture has left him 
spiritually bankrupt. The aftermath of his belief in Pro-
gress shattered by the social and moral catastrophes of 
these decades has left man with the feeling that there is 
no ultimate coherence or eternal order to life. Human 
existence seems essentially fragmented. The transience 
of life competes more easily and strongly, twentieth 
century social history being what it has been, with the tra-
ditional religious systems of transcendence, bluntly chal-
lenging their authenticity in light of human experience. 
The tenuous meaning that man ascribes to his 
being seems derived from his situation in history, evolving, 
according to evolutionary theory, as a series of chance-
cultural patterns accidentally succeeding each other in 
time. The hallmark of life on these terms would be the 
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successful adaptation to any one period of relative flux. 
But his freedom to select an ideal and work towards its 
completion would be illusory, for human progress be-
comes indifferent to its accomplishments. To what avail 
are teleologica! symbols of transcendence or even one's 
private meanings and purposes, for that matter, "in the 
knowledge that no power in the cosmos will ultimately 
sustain or validate them."1 Man's scientific and techno-
logical sufficiency have replaced the former symbolic 
and mythical referents to dimensions of sacrality and 
transcendence, allowing him to be basically on his own, 
creating out of the finite relativities of his experience 
those limited purposes that guide his temporal existence. 
At stake is the meaning of man's ontological relatedness 
to being—the place, meaning and formation of religious 
consciousness. 
A Recurrent Protest 
While the secular and sceptical mood prevails, it 
is nevertheless still true that each generation raises the 
possibility for ultimate questions. From the protests in 
the market place to the final puzzle of death, men do 
wonder whence their origin, the significance of life, their 
mortal destiny. The fact that scientific objectivity has 
rendered the religious symbols of ultimate concern in-
operative, especially at the professional levels of cultural 
life, is entirely irrelevant to their crucial function, which 
is to symbolize man's acute feelings and thoughts about 
the crises of existence. The joyful or despairing condi-
tions of life provoke occasional pauses about its limits 
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and resistances. J. Wild remarks that "to reflect upon 
these boundaries seriously is to raise the ultimate ques-
tions of our existence. The way we fece them reveals the 
kind of being we are, for the way a finite being holds 
itself with respect to its ultimate limits is the very core 
of that being. . . . But to be aware belongs to the being 
of man. Hence, to become evasive or confused about 
these limits is to confuse our existence at its very core."2 
Along with man's confusion is a concerted effort 
to challenge the limits that scientific rationality places 
upon man's self-understanding in a finite world apparent-
ly without purpose. In spite of technological improvement 
during the decades of this century alone, man has become 
less inclined, because of their tragic misapplications and 
unforseen dire consequences, to continue equating mech-
anical developments with moral and social progress. 
History has shown that inventive ingenuity does not 
necessarily correspond to humane improvement. 
Moreover, there are new teleologica! and holistic 
concepts and trends coming from the human community 
that are pressuring for the revision of the meaning of 
scientific objectivity. Concurrently, questions of mean-
ingful survival and humanistic significance are being raised 
and responded to in larger dimensions of society, critical-
ly reflecting the growing attitude that technological 
improvement has to account for itself beyond its novel 
appearance or its intruding commercial gratification in 
society. The human community as a whole is beginning to 
realize that human survival demands more than techno-
logical expertise. Equally important is society's rising 
protest that man's internal world of self-understanding 
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and the preservation of the universe involves multiple 
symbol systems acknowledging both subjective and ob-
jective dimensions of reality that cannot be absorbed, 
molded or reduced to the paradigm of scientific rational-
ity. For a technocratic society that denies a profound 
value or existence to subjective life forfeits any human 
value to its own highest products. To be consistent, man 
the knower and maker cannot eliminate his own sub-
jectivity without eliminating himself and those dimensions 
of the world that his creative and scientific mentality 
takes as their object of study. 
The Quest for Ultimacy 
If the impulse for ultimate meaning is not only a 
subjective creation but a real potential for human nature, 
then its possibility for completion must be grounded in 
the actual world that confronts man today. Moreover, 
ultimacy must possess a transcendental core or essence, 
for otherwise one cannot escape the transitory and arbi-
trary sense of existence that befalls modern living. Some-
how the clues to ultimacy must be found within culture, 
and yet man must find their full expression beyond the 
limits of cultural existence. Man's freedom must be more 
than the random opportunity to displace obsolete social 
structures; rather it must be the opportunity for finding 
those orderly criteria that engenders the experience of 
transcendence. Otherwise human freedom is a charade, 
played out in endless variation, fulfilling Professor 
Monod's stagnant destiny for mankind. 
On the other hand, if the ultimate and fulfilling 
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purpose of human freedom concludes man's self-trans for-
mation in transcendence, then those positive impulses, 
found in technocratic society—to arrest biological entro-
py, to overcome organic limitations, to synthesize tech-
nology with humanistic values—may be considered as 
recurring aspirations, with all their cultural ambiguity, 
that symbolize freedom's goal. In this way, the explora-
tion for optimal survival may be viewed as the teleologica! 
search for ultimacy. At this point our task will be to 
describe this purposeful quest denoting those clues that 
can justify its presence. 
10 
The Situation: A Search 
for the Rediscovery of Transcendence 
The Multiple Choices of Traditions 
Let us begin by assuming a broad, ontical descrip­
tion of this religious journey, a description which presents 
itself as a problem to be resolved amidst conflicting view­
points of our modern era. Placing the description in this 
manner points up the complex opportunities in which 
modern man's religious groping finds itself. 
An endless variety of religious patterns beckon him 
today. Ancient and ρre-Reformational traditions, New 
Age religions, secret schools of gnosticism, Eastern re­
ligions, and various psychospiritual and occult movements 
vie for man's search for his ultimate meaning and destiny. 
The rapid proliferation of the latest brotherhood, spiritual 
institution, denominational offshoot, or transcendental 
drug experience compete vigorously with the more tra­
ditional main line churches and synagogues. The historic 
Christian and Judaic traditions are no longer accepted 
with full approval. Modern man is becoming more and 
more unafraid to apply the critical edge of his intelli­
gence to the formerly sacrosanct regions of institutional 
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religions. The rulers of these organizations—from Rabbi to 
Pope—no longer bear the unquestioned authority in life 
matters that was formerly attributed to their office. 
The questioning of inherited orthodoxy has been 
symptomatic of a climate whose inhabitants mistrust and 
resent putting their full conviction behind an official 
authority. This questioning climate has received its inspira-
tion less from the official encouragement of Church 
authorities, than from the names of Darwin, Freud, Marx, 
the existentialist movement in philosophy and literature, 
and, most prominently in the second half of the twentieth 
century, the radical positions of the "Death of God" 
theologians. These unsettling events and the overall re-
action to the national and local catastrophes in our times 
have left in the minds of many people a profound uncer-
tainty about the positiveness of life. At a certain level of 
man's anguish over these problems, it is hard to avoid the 
thought that there is more meaning to life without belief 
in God then there is with it. Yet man still shows resistance 
to a negative fate. In sensing the opportunities and limita-
tions of our age, he is continuing the search for meaning-
ful survival by accepting a more profound commitment 
to the personal task of self-responsibility for his destiny. 
If the former statement reflects a major character-
istic in the spirit of our age, then to speak of forming 
religious consciousness is not to identify necessarily with 
an institutional religion. Although institutional religions 
and religious consciousness have been coincidental by 
Western standards for the most part, these two facts may 
be unnecessarily equated. The enactment of a formal 
religion presupposes something more immediately 
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fundamental, namely, the dynamic presence of a personal 
quest for ultimacy. The question of man's ultimate related-
ness to being may very well qualify itself without the 
official symbol system of an organized religion. In the 
leeway of our times, the incidence of official religions 
is no guarantee that the religious impulse—this felt quest 
to give ultimate coherence and purpose to existence—will 
always repeat the standard preferences. The symbols 
consciousness will choose to structure and to satisfy its 
quest cannot be predicted in an a priori fashion, since it 
involves itself so much with the personal capacities and 
cultural dynamics in which it survives. 
Consequently, with his scientific objectivity and 
technocratic culture and the ambiguities of meaning and 
survival that these unabated achievements call forth, the 
description and the problem of modern man's plight is 
twofold—first, to single out the experience of ultimacy; 
second, to compose the symbolization of his relation to 
the ultimate condition of his existence. 
A Description of the Quest for Ultimacy 
The quest of religion ought to clarify the meaning 
of life seen in its final perspective. It is a quest of contact 
with life and its renewal, undertaken individually and 
collectively. It is a teleologica! quest by the very nature of 
its dynamic orientation toward a consciously selected 
goal. Every generation obliges itself to search through its 
finite experiences for signs of its presence in order to give 
purpose and coherence to its existence. 
But the quest must be more than a purely theoristic 
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understanding of an idea, for this circumstance would 
still leave it transitory and limited by definition. The idea 
of ultimacy, however accurate and functional in its sym-
bolization for the sake of communication, remains 
secondary and derivative, leaving man separated from its 
source. Conceptual forms and symbols, though required 
for rational discourse, are insufficient for the full satis-
faction of the quest. It is not a religious exchange of 
ideas—one version of intellectual fulfillment for another— 
that impelís man today. Ultimacy is akin to a holistic 
transformation, in other words, a process o f self-realiza-
tion, consciously leading through successive experiences 
to that absolute, actual unity that embraces and recon-
ciles the total diversity of relative existence. Whether man 
can find evidential traces in his world for this possibility 
remains to be seen in the final chapter. If not, then man 
remains a chance-filled being. 
In gauging the modern temper, R. N. Bellah points 
out that the "fundamental symbolization of modern man 
and his situation is that of a dynamic multidimentional 
self capable, again within limits, of remaking the world, 
including the very symbolic forms with which he deals 
with it, even the forms that state the unalterable condi-
tions of his own existence."1 Modern man, then, sum-
marizes in himself those complex historical factors asso-
ciated in Western culture with the arrival of modern 
freedom. His preference for empirical or positivistic guide-
lines is widening now to include other symbol systems in 
the self-revising social order expressed in the democratic 
trend of society. 
Until recently, man consistently symbolized his 
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pursuit of ultimacy by transforming the quantitative 
dimensions of the universe into mathematical equations. 
In its cultural dominance this one-storied accomplishment 
included mixed blessings. It denied other dimensions of 
reality and man's capacities to know other kinds of truth 
than what scientific objectivity obtains. Society has 
reached a consensus of awareness today where this ex-
clusive presumption is less tolerated as the highest priority 
for personal fulfillment. 
11 
Understanding the Teleology of 
Religious Consciousness 
At this juncture, a typology of religions could be 
explicated. Proceeding in this way would allow the various 
credentials of these traditions to be compared on the basis 
of their symbolic systems. Comparative analysis would 
reveal similarities and disagreements that would be helpful 
in arriving at the historical presentation of religious con-
sciousness. 
But this is not the kind of beneficial clarification 
that would suit our purpose here. Instead, let us attempt 
to clarify the pursuit of religious consciousness in its 
search for ultimacy by postulating a heuristic distinction 
based on the directional polarity of consciousness itself. 
In the concrete experience of religious ultimacy, people 
generally articulate their stance on the basis of a faith 
commitment as the highest possible mode of participation 
in divine truth. There is also a minority that insists that 
life's intra-goal is beyond the limiting guidance of faith or 
dogma; that man should press on to the transcendental 
goal, realizable within his lifetime; and that the burden of 
religious consciousness today is to reformulate those 
symbols that bring about this realization. We may refer to 
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the latter understanding of achieving ultimacy as the 
esoteric stance, while its more conventual counterpart is 
the exoteric stance.1 
The Esoteric Dimension of Religious Consciousness 
Esoteric consciousness is not a product of discur-
sive reasoning. Nor is it a transitory, finite episode in one's 
personal odyssey through life's vicissitudes. It refers itself 
to the existence of an unbounded, absolutely transcenden-
tal reality. Man justifies his affirmation of it by experienc-
ing its unlimited presence and the transformative effect 
upon him. In its illumination total disclosure of human 
nature vis-a-vis reality unfolds. Man achieves an inner state 
of awareness of such magnitude that its descriptions seem 
superfluous and irremediably distorted. The basic question 
of birth and death, like every puzzle of cultural existence, 
vanishes into silent comprehension. 
Among religious traditions (and not just the major 
Western denominations), this transformative experience 
is recognized by the term "Revelation." It is the sub-
stance, foundation and goal of all genuine religious tradi-
tions. Its intrinsic reality is above time, space and 
causation, and beyond birth, decay and death. It is the 
experience of the infinite plenitude of being from which 
all contradictions, dualities and polarities arise and are 
resolved. In itself it is nameless. Tillich refers to it as the 
"Unconditional." He writes that "it is not a being, nor is 
it the substance or totality of things; it is—to use a 
mystical formula—that which is above all beings which at 
the same time is the absolute Nothing and the absolute 
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Something. But even the predicate "is" disguises the facts 
of the case, since we are here dealing not with a reality 
of existence, but with a reality of meaning, and that in-
deed is the ultimate and deepest meaning-reality which 
shakes the foundation of all things and builds them up 
anew."2 
Absolute unity defies visualization. Consistent 
description pales and contradicts, provoking antinomies 
between religious traditions. Yet symbolism is required 
to intimate its possibility to the majority of mankind. 
The ultimate or sacred unity must encompass all possi-
bilities of manifestation in translating its importance to 
men in their cultural diversity. 
The role of external revelation, the oral and written 
tradition, is to inspire man to this transcendental possi-
bility that is the total realization of his nature. Esoteric 
consciousness does not deny the duality and distance 
between himself and this sacred unity. However, this 
opposition is only apparent, a contingent stage to be 
methodically overcome by the practical implementa-
tion of the appropriate teleologica! symbols. It is through 
the personal appropriation of these religious symbols, and 
not merely an intellectual appreciation of them, that 
one experiences their directedness toward the Uncon-
ditional. The viability of any tradition, then, would 
oblige man to accept the continuing obligation to examine 
their import, demythologizing them, if necessary, in 
order to insure their dynamic status as a vehicle to the 
goal of ultimate consciousness. If their import does not 
guide man to ultimacy, then they have failed their 
meaning. 
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The Exoteric Dimension of Religious Consciousness 
Besides this personal experience of the transcenden-
tal unity from which revelation in all its forms in history 
is derived, there is another more obvious, conventual side 
to religious conciousness. People inclined toward the 
exoteric dimension feel at home among the scriptures, 
dogmas, beliefs and rituals. Their primary pursuit and 
interest is the support of the symbol system, sacred or 
secular, that consolidates the opportunities for, as well 
as the restrictions to, the possibility of ultimate experi-
ence. Though often transcendent in intent, the exoteric 
side nevertheless displays the relative, individualized 
features of the everyday religious attitude and behavior. 
Religious testimony takes place more at the plane of 
sensuous participation in life, urging a certain range of 
activities that designate the individual's preference for a 
private, sectarian or denominational set of symbolic forms. 
While acknowledging an ultimate source, usually under 
the term "God," the exoteric finds his security in empha-
sizing the symbolic complex that elaborates his unique 
religion. Similarly, it is upon this directional plane of 
consciousness that one can appraise the doctrine of pro-
gress, scientific rationality and chance as forms of religious 
consciousness. 
How These Dimensions Oppose Each Other 
Consequently, these two sides of religious con-
sciousness often stand ambivalent toward each other. 
The esoteric respects the dogmas, rites and other symbols 
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so revered by the exoteric. The problem is not in their 
functional use as a means of expressing the formless truth 
of ultimacy. The tension occurs when the exoteric attri-
butes to a conditioned form—be it scripture or ritual, 
dogma or private sentiment—an absoluteness that only 
the formless and total Truth itself possesses. The very 
necessity of communication, of soliciting for new follow-
ers, of declaring publicly the symbolic signs of religious 
allegiance, can sometimes harden these credentials, thus 
restricting the universality of truth and its validity to these 
very finite expressions. A tendency develops, individually 
and in community, that sustains an autonomy and self-
sufficiency about the symbolic structures that negates the 
possibility for transcendence on any other terms. One is 
saved, redeemed, bom again only in this manner or in 
this community. In mistaking form for substance, man 
can entrap himself in a parochialism that maintains the 
limitations and insufficiency of the forms themselves. 
Exotericism by itself can threaten the possibility 
for man to develop beyond the symbolic structure. Instead 
of understanding the significance of these truths in a 
limited, symbolic way, the exoteric's assessment pre-
sumes these expressions on an exclusive basis. The ex-
cesses of sectarianism are bom in this instance. It is an 
imminent risk in all organized religions. Maslow remarks 
that "what happens to many people . . . is that they 
simply concretize all of the symbols, all of the words, all 
of the statutes, all of the ceremonies, and by a process of 
functional autonomy make them, rather than the original 
revelation, into the sacred things and sacred activities. 
That is to say, this is simply a form of the idolatory (or 
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fetishism) which has been the curse of every large religion. 
In idolatry the essential original meaning gpts so lost in 
concretizations that these finally become hostile to the 
original mystical experiences. . . . "3 Likewise Bellah 
stresses that "only Vhen the symbol has been torn from 
its experiential context and taken literally as a belief 
"about" something must we assert its fictional nature. 
As part of the experience itself the symbol is perfectly 
and supremely real."4 
The exclusivism of the exoteric would deny to 
revelation its historical truth, namely, that it can have 
multiple and equal instances o f ultimate meaning breaking 
into cultural history. According to the esoteric, to deny 
this possibility to the absolute, supraformal Truth com-
promises its indefinite universality of meaning for man-
kind, which exists in different cultures and climes. By 
the same token, the rigid emphasis upon confusing the 
form for the meaning eventually forfeits the validity of 
the symbol by identifying consciousness too closely with 
its conditional presentation. Belief in the conceptual 
elements of the symbol substitutes itself for the direction-
al power of the symbol to lead consciousness beyond its 
necessary relativism of truth to experience and to actualize 
ultimate meaningunrestrictively. 
An outward dogmatization of universal truths is 
not meant to be disparaged here. Given the distractions 
of life and the competitiveness of cultural existence, 
it is not easy to keep the transformative process, leading to 
direct, unmediated divine awareness, as the constant focus 
of human consciousness. Man needs reminders—codes, 
rituals, dogmas, even taboos—to help sustain the 
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motivation, and in most cases be the social adhension that 
reenforces the commitment. For most men the achieve-
ment requires some kind of communal support. 
In his spiritual growth, man is less than the Uncon-
ditional. He learns piecemeal, bringing together what 
appears as disparate strands of meaning into a unified sense 
of order and cohesion, gradually converging his finite 
efforts to cross the threshold of the polymorphic levels 
of his mind into the superconsciousness of ultimate mean-
ing. Dogmas engage those finite levels rendering the 
service of a road map. The esoteric cautions the exoteric, 
like a prophet of old, not to confuse the excitement of 
reading a travel brochure with the actual entrance and 
residence of the designated country. Staying merely at 
the level of accurate information, however comforting, is 
not the same as experiencing the voyage. Dogmas, like 
everything else that pertains to the essential relativity of 
a religion, should inspire man beyond his present con-
ception of himself in the existential worid. His security 
with religious symbols must not plateau his unrestricted 
desire to grasp the Unconditional, but produce in him 
an unyielding drive to exceed their finite relevance. This 
tension within man is the paradox of religious symbol-
ism—it must engage him at the stage of his immediate 
existence and yet allow him to intuit beyond the compo-
sition of its finite meanings to the transcendental sphere, 
the experience of insurmountable fulfillment. 
The Crucial Development of Religious Symbols 
Tillich remarks that "substance or import is grasped 
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by means of a form and given expression in a content."5 
It is unavoidable that the communicative forms will be 
less than the reality—that absolute transcendental unity 
of existence they purport to express. These limiting 
features do not make them less valuable. Ordinarily, men 
do not dwell in pure intuition of divine reality. Conse-
quently, they require symbolic structures and activities to 
understand one another and communicate meaning—no 
less forultimacy. 
Likewise, transcendence of the Unconditional does 
not appear immediately to the senses and rational dis-
course. In the unfinished condition of his existence, and 
attempting to overcome the dichotomies of ordinary 
conceptualization, man is forced to employ relational 
symbols that intimate transcendence. His developing 
being clearly illustrates the necessity for the relative 
nature and analogical construction of the sacred truths 
found in the theoretical conceptions and doctrinal state-
ments at the exoteric level. These give purpose, drawing 
him to their goal. 
Both the exoteric and the exoteric admit the truth-
bearing quality of transcendental symbols. Basing himself 
on an irreducible dualism between the Unconditional 
and man the conditional, the exoteric accepts his alle-
giance to the finite quality of the symbols as the best his 
consciousness, and thus his being, can grasp. The esoteric, 
basing himself on the isomophism of consciousness with 
reality, recognizes their importance provisionally, viewing 
them as a temporary, regulatory vehicle facilitating con-
sciousness to encounter absolute transcendence. A dis-
tinction that goes to the heart. 
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With this perspective, the esoteric frees himself 
from the monopolistic and doctrinaire tendencies that 
are so much a part of the exoteric's allegiance. Yet he 
appreciates the necessity for the exoteric forms to pro-
vide the intimations of the absolute found throughout 
the religious traditions of the world. He respects the 
responsibility of an organized religious community to 
translate the experience of ultimacy into special words 
and deeds that unify the membership in their orthodox 
performance. He assumes, however, that every genuine 
religious tradition is a possibility, an historical actualiza-
tion of the absolute creativity of the Unconditional. In 
this way, esoteric consciousness avoids the denomination-
al aggression that has otherwise spoiled the sacred inten-
tions of Western religions. 
In equal respect to the symbolic and discursive 
conditions of human intelligence, esoteric consciousness 
refuses the exoteric's conviction that the particular mode 
of revelation invested in scripture, ritual, dogma or even 
an incarnation of the Unconditional is the only or supreme 
mode of manifesting transcendence. Not having achieved 
the transcendental experience, exoteric consciousness 
finds it virtually impossible, viewing ultimacy as it does 
from its single perspective, to grant equal and analogous 
credibility to other revelations. 
Since direct and immediate experience of the Un-
conditional as he understands its presence is fer above 
and beyond his presumed human capacities, the exoteric's 
principle of identity, his center of consciousness, resides 
in the authoritative symbols and conceptions elaborating 
his commitment to ultimacy. The exoteric's commitment 
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to his teleologica! symbols would fall short of man's in-
herent capacity for transcendence. For him, there can 
be only one, true religion whose symbols postpone trans-
cendence. 
The Necessary Plurality of Cultural Symbols 
For the exoteric, the fundamental unity of all 
revealed religions or experiences is not impaired by their 
cultural diversity. These sacred traditions appear through-
out history in varying degrees of explicitness, revealing 
intimations and embodied realizations of ultimacy. No 
religious constituency has the monopoly on encountering 
the Unconditional or achieving the state of holiness, as a 
study of the history of religions can demonstrate. Nor 
does this unseeming latitude of acceptance imply a com-
promisal attitude or relativism. For esoteric consciousness, 
sacred, absolute undifferentiated truth is one in its trans-
cendental essence, but necessarily multiple in its historical 
manifestations. The idea of a plurality of religious forms 
emerging in cultural history is not surprising, except to the 
exoteric who finds it prejudicial to his exclusive pursuit 
of salvation. Moreover, the esoteric argues that there are 
no indisputable proofe that support either the exoteric's 
claim to the exclusive possession of sacred truth or the 
unmodifiable orthodoxy of any religious form. A form 
by its definition is a limit, and so must compensate for 
what it excludes by analogously repeating itself outside 
its initial boundaries. For the esoteric the distinction 
between universal ultimacy and its mode of expression is 
harmfully lost when these two related orders are 
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compressed into the ideology of "true believers"—a not 
unfamiliar symbol among institutional religion. 
The composition of religious symbols in revealing 
intimations of ultimacy must sustain a certain tension 
between the existential conditions of its audience and the 
transcendental goal that completes man's nature. In 
light of major changes in cultural conditions, symbolic 
revisions may be necessary. Unless man responds per-
ceptively to this constant challenge, symbolic substitutes 
can emerge and present themselves culturally as pseudo 
alternatives. Our brief study of the scientific investigation 
of nature shows its correlative development with the 
formation of religious consciousness that has both positive 
and recessive attractions for man. Equally, modern his-
tory can show that where teleologica! categories of trans-
cendence have been culturally rejected, consciousness has 
relied upon a secular worldview to fill in the fundamental 
requirement of man for ultimate meaning. Amidst the 
flux of culture, then, the question must be asked regard-
ing the criteria for recovering and preserving the possibility 
of transcendence. 
Religious Symbols Demand a Praxis of Transcendence 
The relation of the Unconditional to the condi-
tioned meaning is the crucial responsibility of religious 
symbols. Not to finalize its symbols in definitions but 
to render them as an indefinite acceptance is more appro-
priate for religious consciousness in presenting its total 
view. Since reality cannot be less in its totality than in 
man, there is a definite correlation between the substance 
212 /Part Two 
of religious consciousness and the objectivity of meaning 
in life itself. Not every religious symbol incorporating 
man's understanding of life can effect the possibility of 
transcendence. But if human consciousness possesses a 
foundation of teleology within itself, then the develop-
ment of religious consciousness is not an arbitrary exer-
cise but can become an ordered experience that is most 
effected by those dynamic symbols explaining its achieve-
ment. The question here is not of an abstract formula, 
a theoretical paradigm relating man in the worid to the 
Unconditional, but of evoking a participatory experience 
that achieves the unconditional, transcendental reality 
signified by the symbol. 
In a similar way, W. Smith suggests that a contin-
ual test for the depth or value of a religious symbol is 
". . . how much transcendence it can be made to carry for 
those who have chosen its particular shape to represent the 
pattern of their religiousness. The sacred must always be 
not only ambiguous but unlimited: it is a mystery, so 
that no specific significance can exhaust it—there is always 
more waiting to be explored. A religious symbol is success-
ful if men can express in terms of it the highest and 
deepest vision of which they are capable, and if in terms of 
it that vision can be nourished and can be conveyed to 
others within one's group . . . one must think of the 
symbol in terms not of its meaning something, but of its 
focusing on crystallizing what life means, what the uni-
verse means, to those who through this symbol find that 
life and the universe can be seen (or felt) to have coherent 
meaning."6 
Formerly, the religious belief function of the symbol 
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was supportive, bridging the distance between man and 
absolute coherence. In today's world a different challenge 
is present. Contemporary man finds it increasingly diffi-
cult to speak with confidence about that which exists 
beyond the limits of his finite existence. Thus the burden 
of religious symbolization is to represent the presence of 
transcendence within man's experience of being in the 
finite world. 
If esoteric consciousness is correct, then no cultural 
presentation of ultimacy has exhausted its vital source. 
Yet in its symbolic constellation of meaning, the forma-
tion of a particular set of religious symbolization may no 
longer engage the historical circumstances speaking to 
contemporary man. H. W. Richardson addresses himself 
to this problem of ultimacy by stating that "what is 
needed today, therefore, is a new transcendence and 
identity myth as the foundation of the psycho-social 
order. There are signs that such a myth is emerging. Its 
theme is integrity and transformation. . . . It is, rather, his 
own self-transformation into a higher being, his spiritual 
rebirth, his divinization. . . . By his integrity to this vision, 
man gains for himself his own positive identity, his own 
aseity of being. . . . To be "integral," then, is not to need 
to complete ourselves through others (or from outside) 
but to need to express and expand ourselves from with-
in. . . . The kind of transcendence correlated with the 
myth of integrity and transformation is that of self-trans-
cendence, expanded consciousness, spiritual rebirth, and 
divinization."7 If Richardson's description is in sufficient 
accord with our presentation of esoteric consciousness, 
then man himself becomes the paradoxical immanence of 
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the transcendent. 
So as not to get lost in admiring the theoretics of 
this proposal, the important issue now is whether this 
new effort and insistence for ultimate meaning has any 
basis in the cultural reality that engages man today. It is 
a question of finding those clues, signs and testimonies 
that offer purposeful assurance of its success. Otherwise 
it remains another pius but vain attempt to rescue trans-
cendence in a postreligious, secular age. 
Consequently, today's requirements for religious 
symbols of transcendence demand more than agreement 
on its formal concept or theoretical meaning. Rather, to 
face the existential situation of man's cultural thinking, 
one must demonstrate the operational and behavioral 
implications of its meaning. It must be a pragmatic ex-
perience that affects the constitution of man's conscious-
ness. It is out of this expansion of self-consciousness that 
the theory can be grounded. Turning the process around, 
one might ask whether symbols can deliver their expec-
tations? Are they teleologically effective in activating 
man's self-transformation? 
12 
The Teleologica! Clues 
for Rediscovering Transcendence 
In searching for the concrete experiences and data, 
if any, that can justify reinterpreting contemporary man 
in his chance-filled autonomy, it is not to our advantage 
to return to the traditional symbols of ultimacy since 
these have been discredited by the cultural experiences 
of today. It is the very meaning of these credentials 
publicly associated with belief in an institutional religion 
that makes them suspect in light of man's attempts to 
fathom his secularly lived situation. 
Granted this mood of scepticism regarding religious 
symbols of transcendence, our search shall proceed, 
nevertheless, along the lines of an ontic investigation, 
examining certain dimensions of ordinary human ex-
perience as well as certain scientific disclosures for signs 
of an order or region of purpose that frees man from his 
empty secularity. In beginning this way, our procedure 
can minimize the objection that the attempt necessarily 
presupposes a universal logos structuring reality. 
Our ontic investigation will not be exhaustive in 
ferreting every possible dimension or human experience 
that could indicate a sense of ultimacy. Instead, the 
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procedure will be selective of those experiences in human 
consciousness that accumulatively can offer criteria to 
challenge the restrictions and impositions that both 
organized religion presumes and secular consciousness 
takes for granted in light of modern science. Finally, a 
discussion regarding the meaning and power of this evi-
dence for its implications in religious consciousness and a 
revised understanding of the potentials of human nature 
will complete the last chapter. 
Four Experiments in Human Consciousness 
1. Let us start by considering the phenomena of 
everyday human consciousness in its broadest outline, 
namely, the customary states of functioning experience. 
In the various acts of thinking that comprise one's work-
ing days and leisure hours, regardless of the importance 
given to a particular train of thought, or how prominent 
or anonymous the thinker may be, there is a special 
activity performed by the mind in conjunction with 
ratiocination. In the very act of thinking about a topic or 
content, even in remembering ideas and experiences, one 
can be aware of the activity as it proceeds. One can step 
back behind the stream of discursive activity, as it were, 
and simply observe the busy functioning of the discur-
sive process at work in one's own mind. No matter how 
the thinking mind may be occupied at the moment, one 
can simultaneously be aware of the occupation. One can 
be aware of oneself in the act of discursive reflection. 
2. If the identity of my self-consciousness were 
entirely equivalent to the discursive process, then it would 
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be next to impossible to perform two other states of 
consciousness. In the ordinary periods of daily life, one 
experiences two additional phenomena that are not 
characterized by discursiveness. One passes through the 
state of dreaming and sleeping. While dreams may have 
discursive elements within their unfoldment, the experi-
ence of being awake and thinking is essentially different 
from the properties of dream experience. So with sleep. 
In acknowledging the wakeful state of thought, in 
recalling a dream and in waking up from sleep, the ques-
tion is, Who did the thinking, dreaming and sleeping? In 
none of these experiences of consciousness does the 
person cease to exist and then be recreated. Since one can 
proceed through these states in experiential sequence, 
self-consciousness can not be fully identified with any 
one of them. Yet the same self perdures through these 
three states of experiencing, surviving each one and sus-
taining itself in continuity with them. This triple arrange-
ment or sequence infers that consciousness is more than 
any one or their total. There is a certain indefiniteness to 
consciousness that permits it to experience these three 
definite states, over and over again, without being per-
manently fixed therein. Human consciousness is thus more 
than the finite forms that it experiences as well as more 
than the states that normally occupy its attention. 
3. In addition to the experience of non-discursive 
awareness and the three states of consciousness, there are 
unpredictable phenomena that occur infrequently when 
struggling with a problem. In contrast with the harsh pace 
that some drive themselves at work, people are often sur-
prised to find another experience of knowing that is not 
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obviously and immediately the result of their strained 
efforts. Unexpectedly, like a "bolt from the blue," a 
sudden disclosure of insight illuminates the mind. The 
problem is solved. This breakthrough can occur at the 
oddest moments when it is least expected or deliberately 
desired. The "eureka feeling" that swells one with ásense 
of wonder is simply an experience of knowledge that can-
not be reduced to the labor of discursive reasoning. The 
creative breakthrough distinguishes itself from the ex-
ertion of discursiveness by its effortless appearance, akin 
to the way the truth of a landscape simply offers itself to 
the eye of the beholder. Almost through no fault o f one's 
own, awareness seizes, surpassing one's straining efforts, 
coming as a gift. 
There are other experiences that consciousness 
enjoys and finds meaningful, such as the awareness o f the 
beautiful or the virtuous in life, that makes man realize 
that he is more than his rational consciousness. But let 
us take up one more daily experience that confronts 
man, especially in these times. 
4. Let us consider the experience of the limit or 
the negative in life. The thrust of self-consciousness to 
objectify itself into the worid promotes a sense of iden-
tity. In needing to know the world, at least for a sense of 
personal identity, man chooses to exercise his discursive 
faculty. In presuming that personal survival requires 
knowledge of the external world, man uses his discursive-
ness to secure this presumption. The emergence of desire 
tends to function in a selective process for locating those 
aspects of the phenomenal worid which correspond 
to the exigencies or ambitions of his personal survival. 
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Buoyed up as well as compelled by the quest to experience 
life, the mind's embodiment into the phenomenal worid 
necessitates relentless waves of desire to satisfy its con-
tinuing presence there. To satisfy its quest for survival 
and fulfillment, it would seem to be in the mind's best 
interest to prolong concern with worldly fashion and 
experiment with the latest trend. 
Human experience, on the other hand, demon-
strates again and again that concrete desires have satura-
tion levels. It is only a matter of time before they pro-
duce ennui in the experiencer. The irony of the mind is 
that the quest is characterized by an indefinite finimde 
that desire specifies without being totally fulfilling. In 
association with the mind, one remains on a treadmill of 
desire to satisfy its promptings. 
Similarly, in the realm of cultural survival, man 
finds himself in society with all his sincere hopes and 
model systems to alleviate his complex desires producing 
only temporary success. The finite quality of the satis-
faction uncovers, often unintentionally, newer forms of 
cultural limitation. A certain estrangement emerges from 
the mind's own quest. Presuming the mind's discursive 
arrangement the norm of waking consciousness, one 
would expect accumulative fulfillment to resolve the 
continuing quest to find satisfaction and eliminate the 
ills of existence. But the more I experience, the more 
the quest beckons. The mind impelís itself to try to close 
the gap between fulfilled desires and the unrelieved quest. 
In complying with desires, the mind is realizing its nature. 
Everything seems to be in proper order. But consciousness 
cannot evade sensing the distance between the mind's 
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completed goals and the uncompleted quest. No matter 
how often the mind completes its desires, one is always 
running competition with the painful void of non-ful-
fillment. The awareness of the uncompleted void leaves 
room for oneself to reconsider self-consciousness beyond 
the boundaries of rational desires. Man faces within him-
self an unrestricted desire for experiencing knowledge 
with no end in sight. He remains in a constant dilemma. 
He knows what he wants, but even in attaining it, he 
senses a discrepancy between his accomplishments and the 
enrichment that can still be his. Life seems to be a relent-
less effort to overcome the negative finiteness of his 
desires, perpetuating man to live from one cultural re-
privement to the next. 
The question of faulting the human spirit's indom-
itable quest, repeatable in Western culture, may not be 
attributable to the presence of desire per se but to the 
attempt of satisfying it only or primarily at the level of 
discursive consciousness. The hidden flaw may be the 
continuing effort to exchange one rational scheme for 
another, always remaining on the same level of conscious-
ness and thus inexorably constructing boundaries, which, 
as societies demonstrate, sooner or later bring one's 
attention to their limited contribution. Since the advance 
in the expansion, renovation or replacement of cultural 
boundaries does not require a radical alteration of con-
sciousness, the improvement over cultural limitations is 
merely exchanging one set of worn out plans for better-
ment for another. The change remains within the same 
modality of consciousness as previously employed. Pro-
gress here is only lateral, realizing further potentials of 
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cultural ingenuity within the zone of rational parameters. 
Thus one cannot speak of transcendence but only of 
supercedence, more of the same finite, transitory re-
placement. Discursive consciousness, even in its most 
prized form of scientific rationality, has unlimited varia-
tions in articulating reality, but the intelligibility of its 
cognitional process remains basically the same in its 
applications to different subject matters. Even taking into 
account the wide differences between thinking about 
astro-physics, geometry, making a shopping list for a 
church bazaar and doing one's income taxes, the reasoning 
process stays analogously similar. These are all acts of 
human reason, none of which require a complete altera-
tion of consciousness itself nor its field of apprehension. 
Conclusion 
These four experiments are not startling or neces-
sarily rare events in daily life. Together or by themselves, 
they do not present unimpeachable evidence for the ad-
mission of a transcendental order. Since experiments 1, 2 
and 4 are capable of being duplicated almost at will with-
out too much difficulty, these events of consciousness are 
not arbitrary or freaks of nature. Most importantly, their 
experiential evidence protests identifying human con-
sciousness entirely within the field of discursive activity. 
Five Experiments in Human Consciousness 
Suggestive of Transcendence 
At this juncture, let us supplement the above 
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conscious phenomena with an unusual series of experi-
ments that was conducted under the eyes of trained 
researchers within the confines of a research laboratory 
environment. 
In the Spring of 1970 at the world's largest mental 
research center, the Menninger Foundation of Topeka, 
Kansas, an unusual series o f experiments was conducted 
upon the range of human consciousness. It had been, and 
in some quarters of medical science still is, an accepted 
truism that human consciousness is restricted in its vol-
untary control over bodily organs and systems. The 
majority of physiological activities from the rate of cell 
repair to the movement of the digestive and heart organs 
is beyond the pale of rational control. The autonomic 
nervous system is not considered to be under the awake 
mind's direct and immediate utility. Most of the human 
body's activities and functions fall under the domain of 
the unconscious. Subjective purpose, in the sense of con-
trolling both thought and body, is quite limited. There 
seems to be little credibility to anyone asserting that he 
could control his heart beat at will, accelerate or slow 
down the aging process, produce tumerous growths instan-
taneously or remain awake while permitting his brain and 
nervous system to sleep. 
In order to discover whether these limitations were 
truly representative of consciousness' range of operations, 
the following experiments were conducted on the same 
indivfdual. 
1. The leads of two thermistors (a sensitive detecting 
device that registers temperature changes at the surface of 
the skin), were connected to the subject's right palm. He 
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predicted beforehand that he would alter the temperature 
between each side of his palm. Within a period of fifteen 
minutes, there was a simultaneous warming and cooling 
of the ήφι hand, causing the "left side to become pink 
and the right side grey." The temperature between the 
sides was eventually 11 degrees fahrenheit—an increase of 
9 degrees over the original temperature. As the director of 
the experiment pointed out, "without moving or using 
muscle tension he 'turned on' one of them [parts of the 
hand] and 'turned off the other."1 
2. While remaining motionless, and upon a given 
signal, the subject's heart beat slowed in less than 60 
seconds from a pumping rate of 74 beats per minute to 52 
beats. At another time, the heart rate increased from 60 
beats to 82 beats per minute in less than 8 seconds.2 
3. In an experiment to stop the heart and yet remain 
alive, the steady heart beat of 70 suddenly produced an 
atrial flutter wherein the heart rate average became 306 
beats per minute for a 16.2 second interval. Actually the 
length was closer to 30 seconds, for the technicians were 
surprised by the event of the dramatic heart alteration and 
conversed for some moments before fully recording the 
procedure. No blood can be pumped through the heart 
chambers when they open and close with such rapidity. 
The subject mentioned that this performance could be 
sustained for 30 minutes. This type of heart stoppage is 
often associated in cardiac arrest, producing unconscious­
ness, where "a section of the heart 'flutters' in oscillatory 
mode at its maximum rate, the chambers not filling 
properly, the valves not working properly and the blood 
pressure dropping."3 
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4. Sitting motionless, the subject "caused a 14-inch 
aluminum knitting needle mounted horizontally on a 
vertical shaft 5 feet away from him to rotate toward him 
through 10 degrees of arc." This exact direction and 
degree were requested by a member of the professional 
audience just as the experiment began. The experiment 
was immediately repeated with the same results.4 
5. Announcing that he would sleep for exactly 
25 minutes, brain-wave detecting equipment was con-
nected to the subject's head, and thus monitored and 
verified the sleep state. Upon awakening at the precise 
minute, he repeated the various words and sentences of 
every one in the room which were articulated between 
them during his sound sleep, also mentioning the various 
activities the people performed while he was asleep.5 
In addition to these laboratory scheduled experi-
ments, the same individual, in a less formal setting, per-
formed the following: 
a) Demonstrated that a form of light energy could 
irradiate from the center of his chest and a polarized pic-
ture was taken "in which most of his chest was obscured 
by a disc of pale pink light."6 
b) In a casual conversation with the Director of 
Research at Menninger about tumors, he asked the direc-
tor to place his hand at a certain spot on his body. The 
director felt a lump under the skin resembling a moveable 
cyst. Then, on call, it simply vanished. He repeated the 
same congestion of cells at another part o f his body which 
the director ascertained by touch and it disappeared upon 
call. Similar cysts were also produced that projected slight-
ly upward, resembling a wart. These were produced on 
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call within a fraction of a second and disappeared or 
receded into the body within a fraction of a second at 
will. On one occasion a biopsy was obtained of two cyst-
like formations, one on each forearm. The report of their 
analysis was as the subject predicted: on one forearm the 
cyst was benign; on the other, cancerous.7 
c) By the softest touch, he caused the middle por-
tion of a solid piece of wood, a 12-inch ruler, to fracture 
into pieces. Similarly, using a metal edged ruler, held by 
someone at both ends, he merely pointed his index finger 
at the center part in a slow downward motion of his hand, 
causing the wood to split apart and the metal edge to 
twist.8 
d) A clinical psychologist entered his office for a 
visit and he urged her to ask him any four questions about 
any topic of her choice. After getting over the initial sur-
prise of this request, she asked him four distinct and un-
related questions. Upon the completion of the wording of 
the fourth question, he handed her a folded piece of paper 
upon which were written the exact four questions and his 
answers. He had written these sentences before she came 
to his office that day.9 
What is of special note here is the manner in which 
the majority of these experiments were accomplished. 
The intentional process whereby consciousness achieved 
the desired effects proceeded without the customary use 
of the laws of physics which govern mechanical activity. 
To alter the blood flow, say, in the palm of my hand, 
certain causal relations are detectable empirically among 
the nerve fibers and members of the body to produce 
this result. Yet in most of the experiments the effect took 
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place at designated portions of the body that, in terms of 
its volitional occurrence, goes unexplained biologically 
speaking. Exactly how this force operates upon organic, 
human matter exceeds the conventional methods of 
empirical detection. 
13 
The Implications 
for Revising 
the Boundaries of Consciousness 
The exercise of human consciousness in the above 
experiments is unparalleled in the history of Western re-
search upon the range of consciousness. Clearly, the 
position of the mechanists and the behaviorists, who 
deny to consciousness the power to manipulate the 
autonomic nervous system and view consciousness as a 
function of the brain, is refuted by the evidence.1 The 
human agent revealed his intentions for every experiment, 
placing the entire phenomena within a purposeful context. 
A new teleologica! horizon was open to man's potentials. 
Chance becomes questionable as a fundamental factor 
in reality. If chance is the rule, then what took place was 
an ordered ambivalence of delicate control, planned and 
executed repeatedly, requiring means and ends, in direct 
opposition to random operations. The subject knew what 
he was doing and predicted the outcome. 
But the exercise of this kind of control in a demon-
strated ability to dominate the bodily constitution is not 
the ordinary production of discursive consciousness. 
Though coming from the human agent it presupposes a 
different level of consciousness. One has to propose a 
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richer schema here, rather than seeing this performance as 
a new or unannounced version of rationality. The exten-
sion of decision over matter and cognition revealed above 
is a widening of self-consciousness that takes leave of the 
boundaries of discursiveness or scientific rationality. The 
voluntary production of that type of phenomena cannot 
be reduced to, nor explained by, a rational, mechanistic 
portrayal of human nature. 
A Pluralistic Universe Implies a Pluralistic Consciousness 
A comparison may be in order. The beginning of 
this century saw the remarkable advances in penetrating 
the atomic and sub-atomic levels of physical reality in 
which the older paradigm of Newtonian mechanistic 
understanding could no longer account for the existence 
and activities of the microworld. Reluctantly, physical 
science is being pressured under these discoveries to 
recognize the limitations of the mechanistic worldview 
and admit a pluralistic universe. We have noted also the 
operations of organic beings in their living complexity 
manifest a level of operation that cannot be subsumed 
under the laws of the older paradigm. The intelligibility 
of the various levels of material existence, inert and 
living, must involve concepts and symbols that are com-
mensurate with the insight into those regions of reality. 
' The advance in physics, however, which led to 
quantum and relativity theories, whereby the scientist 
can now admit the multivalent levels of material energy, 
is still not an illustration nor an experience of transcen-
dence. The hidden reality of the atomic and sub-atomic 
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levels was available, always in principle, to rational pur-
suit. Its discovery awaited the proper instrumental and 
experimental refinement to disclose the data. In other 
words, man himself, in the making of this discovery, was 
not transformed ontologically; his awareness only expand-
ed laterally, that is, the experience of the breakthrough 
was entirely within empirical and discursive parameters. 
The being of man's consciousness remained essentially 
unaltered in the depth of its operation. Our description 
here does not rule out the contributions made by the 
unexpected occurrence of intuitions and the like, men-
tioned in the first series of experiments before as events 
of consciousness. But any student in physics today can 
repeat the experiments of any pioneer discovery to arrive 
at the identical conclusion about the existence of these 
energy levels. The student removes his ignorance about a 
particular area of reality, but the predicaments of life and 
its ultimate meaning still loom before him. The experi-
ence of this kind of scientific knowledge has not banished 
the disvalues of secular existence in his consciousness. 
Yet the discovery of a pluralistic universe, whose 
interpretation demands conceptual adjustment, is begin-
ning to point in its own way to a certain convergence 
between consciousness, nature and ultimate meaning. 
It was William James' judgment that "our normal con-
sciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but one 
special type of consciousness, while all about it, parted 
from it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms 
of consciousness entirely different. We may go through life 
without suspecting their existence; but apply the re-
quisite stimulus, and at a touch they are there in all their 
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completeness, definite types of mentality which probably 
have their field of application and adaptation somewhere. 
No account of the universe in its totality can be final 
which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite 
disregarded. How to regard them is the question—for they 
are so discontinuous with ordinary consciousness. Yet 
they may determine attitudes though they cannot furnish 
formulas, and open a region though they fail to give a 
map. At any rate, they forbid premature closing of our 
accounts with reality."2 
Nature as a Multiple Unity 
The wonder of the senses is still a finite marvel. 
Human eyes and ears only register a slender width on the 
total electromagnetic spectrum. We do not perceive 
through our senses cosmic, gamma, x, light, radar or 
radio waves and rays. The world that exists for us through 
our senses and rational discernment may be only one 
possibility existing simultaneously with unlimited others. 
Given a radically different capacity of awareness or sense 
receptors, we would experience an unimaginably different 
world from the structures available to ordinary apprehen-
sion. Already in this century, we have discovered that our 
everyday Newtonian world is actually not the ground floor 
but one of the middle levels of reality. Below it, so to 
speak, is the microworld of quantum physics and above it 
is the astro realm of relativity theory. Nor can science pre-
sume that even these worlds close the accounts on reality. 
But the point here is that the major concepts comfortably 
adjusted to the Newtonian outlook can not be adjusted 
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to the upper and lower levels. The apparent apprehension 
of empty space and solid bodies pertaining to the ordinary 
sense experience of our world loses its meaning once one 
ventures beyond the boundaries of middle physics. 
The logic of our everyday world which assumes the 
independence and isolation of bodies would seem to 
accompany the modern sense of personal autonomy that 
characterizes our age. Yet something very different occurs 
at the atomic level. F. Capra points out that "a careful 
analysis of the process of observation in atomic physics 
has shown that the sub-atomic particles have no meaning 
as isolated entities, but can only be understood as inter-
connections between the preparation of an experiment 
and the subsequent measurement. Quantum theory thus 
reveals a basic oneness of the universe. It shows that we 
cannot decompose the world into independently existing 
smallest units. As we penetrate into matter, nature does 
not show us any isolated 'basic building blocks,' but rather 
appears as a complicated web of relations between tne 
various parts of the whole. These relations always include 
the observer in an essential way. . . . In atomic physics, we 
can never speak about nature without at the same time, 
speaking about ourselves."3 
While there are different interpretations of quantum 
theory, there is general agreement among scientists that 
the universal interconnectedness of things and activities 
is undeniable. In this regard, D. Böhm remarks that "one 
is led to a new notion of unbroken wholeness which 
denies the classical idea of analyzability of the world into 
separately and independently existing parts. . . . We have 
reversed the usual classical notion that the independent 
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'elementary parts' of the world are the fundamental real-
ity, and that the various systems are merely particular 
contingent forms and arrangements of these parts. Rather, 
we say that inseparable quantum interconnectedness of 
the whole universe is the fundamental reality, and that 
relatively independently behaving parts are merely parti-
cular and contingenet forms within this whole."4 
The seemingly polar opposites and independent 
events that occur at the ordinary experiential level of 
human perception give way at the atomic and sub-atomic 
levels to a dynamic unification where matter is both con-
tinuous and discontinuous, a field of force and unitary 
bursts of energy, a wave-like phenomena as well as a 
particle-like unit. Reason and language strain to concep-
tualize and symbolize this dynamic unity of opposites 
that cannot fit the three dimensional world of middle 
physics. Scientific research seems to be saying that reason 
is most comfortable at the grosser, readily empirical, 
macroscopic realm. At this level of insight mechanistic 
concepts are easily verifiable and human language has 
little difficulty correlating its references. But the more 
consciousness delves into those regions of reality less 
congruent to the normal conditioning and receptivity of 
the senses and discursive analysis, the more rational con-
sciousness has difficulty in imagining and articulation. The 
mind stumbles upon situations in reality that are simply 
not discoverable at the ordinary, empirical realm nor 
would be expected or permitted by the logic developed 
from the macroscopic experience. The phenomena are 
incoherent within a mechanistic, common-sense approach 
that typifies everyday encounters with life. 
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In attempting to find the ultimate building blocks 
of nature, physics has discovered instead dynamic patterns 
which are not isolated entities, and they perform as 
integral parts of an inseparable network of interactions. 
A dynamic interplay occurs in which particles are formed 
and un formed—created and dissolved, if one prefers— 
without end into continual variations of energy patterns. 
Stable structures emerge, order persists in event and 
activity, but nothing remains static. Once reason attempts 
to seek meaning beyond the macroscopic dimension of 
tangible matter, organic concepts have to replace the 
mechanistic ones. While these new conceptions may have 
little pragmatic use for technology, they are indispensable 
for explaining the subtler regions of fundamental energy 
exchanges exposing the cosmic unity among nature's 
inhabitants. 
An intriguing question at this point is the remark-
able stability of the universe to sustain levels of complex-
ity amidst the unimaginably ceaseless flow of energy that 
is being emitted and absorbed, colliding and fusing, attract-
ing and repulsing, where exchanges and interactions occur 
at such lightening-like speed releasing radiant power that, 
in turn, affect the entire complex, reaching even beyond 
our galaxy. In the world of matter, nature only allows 
temporary identity. Order in nature persists in a transitory 
manner yielding to the emergence of newer patterns, 
which may occur in a flash or take eons of preparation. 
Chance and novelty take place, but are always dominated 
by the processional harmonies of energy integrating them 
into the universal matrix of the cosmic whole. While the 
evidence in nature is less compared to analyzing human 
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purposeful actions, there is sufficient stability, order, and 
variable consistency to back up the teleologica! processes 
more discernable at the level of organic reality. 
14 
Consciousness and the Order of Nature 
Physics has uncovered exceptional regions of reality 
that are more fundamental than the world the Newtonian 
paradigm conceived for centuries. Regardless, society will 
still employ mechanistic ideas and gross, empirical con-
cepts for their everyday understanding of life. Neverthe-
less, scientific research is hinting at ontological and epis-
temologica! revisions that society may be in dire need 
for rescuing itself from its technocratic and secular ex-
clu siv ism. 
Physics becomes a case in point to illustrate the 
breakdown of viewing the world from a single ontological 
level amenable only to a mechanistic epistemology. Scien-
tific rationality is being recognized as a deliberate form 
of consciousness, an epistemologica! vector that is con-
structed for designated purposes. A legitimate manner of 
proceeding to explore reality, to be sure, but a method 
that leaves out other purposes and dimensions of reality 
from its partial grasp. Thus, it cannot do full justice to 
the fullness of reality—even at the subtler regions of 
atomic and sub-atomic events. For Physics has come upon 
regions within the horizon of scientific exploration that 
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deny its customary mechanistic woridview. These richer 
domains of reality have forced a revolution to understand 
the workings of nature to the extent that the scientist 
himself has entered into the discovery and its explanation. 
The sense of reality that emerges from contemporary 
physics portrays the universe as an interconnected cosmic 
web in which man is not an observer but a participator in a 
participatory process. Human consciousness can no longer 
be accepted as a bystander, extrinsic to scientific insight. 
This qualifying factor is especially evident at these subtler 
regions of energy exchanges. 
E. Wigner states that "it was not possible to formu-
late the laws of quantum theory in a full consistent way 
without reference to consciousness."1 Scientists are 
suspecting more and more that the presence of human 
consciousness at an experiment may have, although in-
advertently, a definite effect upon the outcome of the 
phenomena. The final evidence of the experiment may be 
due to the confluence of both mind and matter, rather 
than the presumed total objectivity of the observer. 
Toward a Unity of Consciousness and Nature 
A specific illustration of the possibility for con-
sciousness to affect living matter was cited by a series 
of experiments involving a polygraph machine (commonly 
referred to as the lie-detector). By carefully connecting 
the machine's sensitive electrodes to various plant life, 
the plant registered reactions upon the graph paper similar 
to those tracings found with human subjects in emotional 
states. The researcher discovered that the mere intention 
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of harm or well being toward the plant immediately pro-
duced the appropriate tracing upon the machine. More-
over, "once attuned to a particular person, plants appeared 
to be able to maintain a link with that person, no matter 
where he went, even among thousands of people."2 The 
plants were able to react to human emotions around them 
as well as to the injury or death of other organisms within 
their proximity. The researcher experimented further with 
"infusions of all sorts of singje cells, such as amoeba, Para-
mecium, yeast, mold cultures, scraping from the human 
mouth, blood, and even sperm. All were subject to being 
monitored on the polygraph with ch arts just as interesting 
as those produced by the plants. Sperm cells turned out 
to be surprisingly canny in that they seemed to be capable 
of identifying and reacting to the presence of their own 
donor, ignoring the presence of other males."3 From 
these experiments, the polygraph expert, assisted by Dr. 
H. Miller, a cytologist, hypothesized that man's "five 
senses . . . might be limiting factors overlaying a more 
'primary perception,' possibly common to all nature."4 
Both science and religion may be on the brink of a 
joint breakthrough in their mutual search for ultimacy. 
Does the direct control of the human consciousness have 
to stop at the presumed limits of the body? Could not 
consciousness extend to impersonal matter as well? In his 
study, The Mystery o f the Mind: a Critical Study of Con-
sciousness and the Human Brain, W. Penfield mentions 
that the decades of examining the mechanisms of the 
brain have slowly forced upon him the distinction be-
tween the mind and the brain. He sees mind as "a basic 
element in itself . . . The mind seems to act independently 
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of the brain in the same sense that a programmer acts 
independently of his computer. . . . It will always be quite 
impossible to explain the mind on the basis of neuronal 
action within the brain. . . . Mind comes into action and 
goes out of action with the highest brain-mechanism. But 
the mind has energy and the form ofthat energy is differ-
ent from that of neuronal potentials that travel the axone 
pathways."5 
When the subject of the Menninger experiments was 
asked for the basic principle of his performances, he men-
tioned that the entire body was within the mind but the 
mind was not entirely within the body. His training gradu-
ally expanded his awareness past the boundaries of rational 
discernment into further reaches of consciousness that no 
longer viewed reality in terms of polar opposites. The 
rational dimension and the energy structures available for 
apprehending the Newtonian world or everyday life are 
true, but in a limited and relative manner. When conscious-
ness expands itself, one becomes aware of further levels of 
universality that directly correlate with the intelligible 
penetration of the ontological values of the pluralistic 
universe. Just as physics hints at the surprising connec-
tions between the observer and the experiment at the 
subtler regions of energy, so human consciousness can 
actually cross the gulf that reason perceives as separating 
man's physiology and the impersonal, physical world of 
science. By expanding inner awareness to the subtler, 
more fundamental and more universal levels within its 
range of apprehension, the unity of life dawns. 
To some extent, no human adult is a complete 
stranger to the experience of a self-transformation in 
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consciousness. The fact of puberty, for example, involves 
a remarkable expansion of the entire person that does not 
leave the outer world untouched by this natural transition. 
A radical, irreversible change takes place, both in the 
physiology and the cognitive and affective aspects of the 
human being. There is a greater depth of appreciation of 
self and life in which many values in reality are now first 
discovered. The personal and social dimensions of life are 
enhanced in ways that could not be understood without 
this experiential transformation. Definite relationships 
undiscerned for years are now possible for actualization. 
One sees and evaluates life more comprehensively than 
before because of the wider vision and power residing 
within this natural growth transformation. Granted that 
this change was not personally selected, yet the overall 
transformation in man broadens his field of human 
choices, allowing him to discern meaning that was pre-
viously undisclosed due to the limitations of his rational 
awareness. 
The convergence of evidence may allow man to 
hypothesize that as consciousness transcends its rational 
borders, the power of this expansion stretches across to 
unify the ordinary polarity between the mind and its 
external objects so that one can now control the move-
ment of the particles of matter just as well as one does 
his thoughts. One integrates hidden laws of conscious 
control that embrace the multiple energy levels compris-
ing nature. The psycho-somatic unity of mind and body 
is extended to include the micro-dimensions of reality as 
well as the astro-dimensions. 
15 
Man: The Paradoxical Immanence 
of the Transcendent 
Man can demonstrate not only remarkable control 
over the body with the ordinary use of reason, but he can 
further demonstrate, on the basis of the Menninger experi-
ments, a certain control over his bodily activities and the 
natural world that exceeds the range of his everyday 
capacity. The significance of this recent discovery has 
ramifications for both the scientific and the religious 
understanding o f man's nature. 
What is emerging from the dialectics of discussing 
the meaningful implications of the evidence is the neces-
sity for revising the notion of transcendence, as well as 
admitting its presence. 
In the typical, Western religious sense of the word, 
the highest symbol denoting transcendence is God. The 
viewing of this symbol conveys elements of meaning that 
vary according to the denominational context that uses it. 
Associated with its global, cultural significance is a whole 
list of implications for man's natural limitations in his 
religious growth. On a comparative basis, the Menninger 
experiments would have to be classified as miraculous. 
The instantaneous congealing of either benign or 
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carcinogenic cells and their equally instantaneous demise, 
the deliberate alteration of matter at a distance, the 
apprehension of sensible impressions without the use of 
bodily senses both during sleep and while blindfolded, are 
but a few of the events that would be attributed within 
the customary evaluation by a religious group to divine 
powers. Yet the subject of the experiments explained 
the phenomena upon the general laws of consciousness, an 
entirely natural process, not at all exceeding the normal 
range of competency for a trained human being. 
Our point here is not to dispute the religionist's 
insistence of divine powers occurring within the human 
sphere, but only that the results often attributable to 
divine intervention may be available to man's potentials 
without the requirement of a denominational belief 
system. Moreover, the older dichotomy between heaven 
and earth, the natural and the supernatural, the divine 
and the human, requires a careful reexamination in view 
of the indisputable results obtainable by human conscious-
ness. At the same time, a revision of the nature of reality 
as a single ontological plane is feasible in light of the 
same evidence. Scientific experimentation and predicta-
bility may be more comfortable without admitting plural-
istic levels of reality, but it cannot accomplish its overall 
purpose of rendering an intelligible account of the uni-
verse without them. 
In reflecting about the import of the above consi-
derations a totally different view of the nature of man 
emerges from either the secular or the religionist's version 
prevalent today. For one thing, on the basis of these events 
of consciousness, there is an enormous increase of freedom 
242 /Part Two 
over the material conditions of human nature that have 
become so much a part of man's cultural understanding of 
his destiny. The enlargement of self-control over the entire 
field of matter, including man's bodily systems, proposes 
new relief into the recurrent problems of bodily pains and 
cultural discomforts. 
In conjunction with this freedom over matter, there 
is the additional evidence of freedom beyond matter in 
the cognitive apprehension and the creative influence of 
empirical reality without the use of bodily senses or 
mechanistic instrumentation. These verifiable experiences 
go unexplained within the paradigm of the rational/animal 
or brain/body correlate. This paradigm can certainly ex-
plain phenomena at grosser levels of human operation but 
it is insufficient for explaining the possibility of these 
experiments. Unless man wants to avert his eyes from 
confronting these repeatable phenomena, he must then 
admit that it is not unreasonable to suppose that the map 
of ultimacy may be redrawn with new paths in addition 
to those marked by scientific rationality or institutional 
religion. 
The newer discoveries regarding the depth of human 
consciousness present themselves in somewhat of a Coper-
nican revolution that understandably finds great resistance 
from the secular and technocratic trend of our culture. 
Nevertheless, the quality of intentionality and purposeful 
control exemplified by the above experiments force the 
necessity for reexamining the limitations presumed in the 
cultural explanations of man's nature. 
The quality and range of self-consciousness in-
dicated by these accomplishments suggest that the former 
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dichotomy between natural/supernatural, mind/body and 
their mutual implications, can be recast ultimately as a 
continuum. The ordinary polarities of life discerned and 
reacted to at the discursive level of awareness are appre-
ciated, however, for their value within a broader outlook 
on reality. Instead of pronouncing an impassable separa-
tion between the finite, transitory realm of existence and 
the sphere of transcendence, these levels of reality are 
distinguishable upon an ontological continuum that leads 
man from the densest restriction of matter to the trans-
cendental experience of total awareness and control of 
reality. 
The principle of integration for realizing this pos-
sibility is the range of human consciousness. Thus, human 
progress in self-knowledge would appear as a continuum 
of awareness involving a willful and purposeful process 
whereby the individual realizes in conscious succession 
the necessary interconnection of the modalities of aware-
ness for finally experiencing ultimacy or the Uncondition-
al. One may distinguish between bodily awareness and all 
its attendant properties and limited activities, and the 
range of awareness attributed to rational and scientific 
discursiveness with its properties, and even more distinct 
the vaster realm of awareness characterized by transcen-
dence or superconsciousness. The latter achievement 
assumes the more constricted levels of bodily and mental 
operative awareness, enhancing them further in their 
natural activities, or else dispensing with their operation 
and exerting its natural power without these vehicles. 
From the side of nature, its energy configurations 
are understood in correlation with the degree of conscious 
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awareness achieved by the individual. A natural isomor-
phism spreads between the levels of reality, the universe 
at large, and the actualization of the depth of conscious-
ness. Since the ontological levels of reality relate to epis-
temologica! awareness, one's concept of selfhood would 
reflect this correlation. The hidden dimensions of nature's 
spectrum of intelligibility awaits man's immanent pro-
gress to awaken, so to speak, the proportional degree of 
awareness to experience them. The achievement of trans-
cendence, the superconsciousness state, is not a temporary 
peak of experience (Maslow), a transitory breakthrough of 
intense neotic clarity (William James), that fades with 
time. No, the kind of transformation that describes trans-
cendence is of such vision and power, of such noetic 
plenitude, that it counters all of life's predicaments con-
tinually resisting rational solutions. Transcendence is akin 
to a permanently ontological expansion of consciousness 
that preserves the potentials for bodily and rational aware-
ness by incorporating them into a unitary experience of 
self-awareness. Reason cannot prove this claim. But it is 
self-validating because it reconciles among life's opposites 
and contraries the secular disvalues and dogmatic dualisms 
of cultural history, appraising their diverse worth now 
within the ultimate context of experiencing the absolute 
unity of being. 
The experience of transcendence indentifies knower 
and known in an absolute unity that excludes nothing save 
distinctions. Reason, being not the totality of conscious-
ness but only a limited function, cannot consistently 
symbolize this paradox any more than it can visualize and 
conceptualize light being simultaneously wave and particle, 
Man / 245 
or that electrons leap orbits without traversing the inter-
vening space. 
The esoteric solution appears ambiguous if not 
nonexistent to reason in its appropriate division of reality 
into subject and object. Unconvincing in the past to the 
majority, it may, in light of the reexamination of the 
demonstrated range of human consciousness under scien-
tific conditions, yet present itself for renewed interest to 
the problem of the ultimate meaning of religious con-
sciousness in cultural history. 
16 
Summary and Conclusion 
In our era, man's increased knowledge of the laws of 
the formation of the self, as well as that of the structure 
of the pluralistic world, have opened a future of almost 
unlimited new directions for cultural development. Am-
biguous as these opportunities may be, there are still 
many who prefer to continue the symbolization provided 
by earlier institutional forms, forgoing the cultural impetus 
to reinterpret the paradoxes of experiencing a multivalent 
world. This statement does not imply that men are abso-
lutely free at this moment. Ours is rather an exceptional 
epoch in which the knowledge and the tools for dis-
closing self, nature and transcendence provide man with 
a freedom in history that forces upon him an intense 
responsibility commensurate with the symbols he chooses 
for the ultimate meaning to his existence. 
The unfinished quality of his existence is no longer 
an instance for permanent regret. On the contrary, it sig-
nifies rich potentials--hopefully a sense of growth and 
improvement which recognizes that upgrading the quality 
of life requires more than the superstitious belief of being 
born into technocratic progress. The painful chore of 
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removing ignorance along with the anxiety over what 
appears to us as contingent, personal existence, should 
caution one from identifying too closely with any finite 
paradigm, scientific or otherwise, purporting to explain 
the totality of life. 
Man's insertion into cultural history as an unfinished 
being exposes the felt necessity for unconditional com-
pletion. Growth and renewal are thus sought in all possible 
forms. The continual rejection of the boundaries of ig-
norance and privation are instances of man's choosing a 
purposeful existence for wholeness rather than an arbi-
trary career in random independence. Yet the unavoidable 
modern feeling of the transigency of life, the impersonal 
relativism and senseless autonomy, so prevalent in our 
scientifically oriented culture are basic issues of daily 
existence that must be resolved in the conscious dimension 
of life where they meaningfully subsist. This may be why 
the exact configurations of the historic religious symbols 
have lost their communicative power to overcome the 
contemporary negations of life. They have knowingly 
limited their appeal more to the historical period in which 
they were formed than the cultural and existential ques-
tions of the day. One senses the disjunction between the 
religious content of their symbols and the contemporary 
lived conditions which tolerates them. The discrepancy 
only compounds the anguishment over finding coherent, 
ultimate meaning in the wo rid. 
Given our cultural preference for experimentation 
and experiential validation, the formation of religious 
consciousness can present itself on these terms. In this 
way, insight into ultimacy tends to be a growth process, 
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admitting revision as one integrates successive degrees of 
awareness. The possibility for explaining himself as ulti-
mately meaningful resides, subjectively, in the inner, 
differentiated horizon of consciousness within which man 
symbolizes his final boundaries. The continual interaction 
with life stimulates consciousness with the experiential 
ground for adopting the symbols' meaning and perspec-
tive. In developing his unfinished potentials, man attempts 
to render an ultimate rationale to his origins, his presence 
in history and his future. Ordinarily, his symbols of 
ultimacy include an explanation of the universe as well. 
History shows that there is a mutual influence between 
his understanding of his terrestrial environment, his self-
hood and his choice of religious symbols. 
History also shows that in conjunction with, or even 
in spite of, man's daily confrontation with life, the range 
and content of these experiential boundaries form for 
him the symbolic meaning of his apprehension of ulti-
macy. In experiencing these symbols, he finds the irre-
ducible significance of his existence, a meaningful 
existence from which he desires to see life steadily and to 
see it whole. This continual interaction then, individually 
and in community, with the boundless manifestations of 
life provides the cognitive and affective resources for 
establishing, enforcing or revising man's symbols of ulti-
macy. The choice is his own—as he changes so will the 
world around him. 
The dialectical expansion of insight between con-
sciousness and life takes time and preparation. Growth in 
cultural awareness is usually uneven and awkward, subject 
to mistakes and revisions of conviction. The dynamics of 
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insight, like symbolic renewal, are often best illuminated 
by opposing stands. The accepted cultural paradigm, for 
example, the current myth that coalesces many facts and 
feelings, judgments and values, into a unified pattern of 
explanatory power may preserve its self-sufficiency only at 
the cost of humanistic growth. A feature not to be for-
gotten here by historic man is that his choice of symbols 
may be only a partial dispensation of ultimate meaning. 
Reason has a hard time with ultimates. In its effort 
to clarify and distinguish, it sometimes overlooks the 
indefinite correlation between the goal of transcendence 
and its symbolic articulations. Consequently, the content 
of religious consciousness in its mythic import and cul-
tural value may not always be considered sacred or trans-
cendental in its precise formulation. The symbolic struc-
ture of ultimacy may just as easily be expressed in 
scientific formulas as in a political statement. For exampl·'", 
a cultural form of man's sense of ultimacy can be ex-
pressed collectively or by a minority, situate him through-
out his life or merely geographically, marshall a nation to 
war or be symtomatic of a fid. Whenever man suspects 
the whole meaning of life is at stake, he is verging into the 
realm of ultimacy. Religious scriptures as well as scien-
tific pronouncements can support whatH. Smith mentions: 
"The guise in which Transcendence appears varies with 
the mode of life's deficiency. Those who suffer from bond-
age and confinement see it as promising liberation and 
expansion. Those who suffer from darkness look to it for 
light. To those who groan under the weight of death and 
transitoriness it intimates eternity. To those who are rest-
less it betokens peace."1 While the symbolic content of 
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ultimacy has differed in history, its teleologica! universal-
ity remains constant. 
In any event, the unrestricted desire to comprehend 
life, to experience fiilfillment, however it is symbolized, 
impelís man's consciousness to relieve his defective con-
dition and try change, experiment with different courses 
of action, the goal of which supplies the evidence for 
purposeful motivation. The road to sounder health, better 
living conditions, the elimination of social privations, the 
vision of an increasingly humanistic culture, as well as the 
religious challenge of ultimate significance, implies a 
fundamental, teleologica! dynamism in man. Otherwise 
there would be no substantive consistency between 
thought and action. Likewise, without teleologica! prin-
ciples involved in being itself, there would be no 
intelligible dynamis to the universe. Coherent growth in 
self-definition and meaningful survival in cultural existence 
would be impossible in a world of sheer chaos, bereft of 
purpose. 
The Need for a Heuristic Approach to Transcendence 
The recurring quest to render meaning to his exis-
tence in its totality has produced wide varieties of tra-
ditions and cultural instances, Eastern and Western, godly 
and godless, ritualistic or not, that specify ultimacy. 
From our interpretation, these varieties can be accommo-
dated on the interior grounds of an indefinite horizon in 
human consciousness which attempts total realization of 
its nature. The thematization of ultimacy in a culture is 
sustained in its particular configuration of meaning by the 
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universal and constant imperative within man to explain 
his ultimate significance in actual existence. The type of 
symbolism which men develop to signify their commit-
ment to higher or ultimate values and to define their 
authenticity varies, as we have seen, in historical perspec-
tive. 
A culture rarely justifies itself entirely upon its 
empirical performance; it rather scrutinizes its develop-
ment and sustains its commitment in light of its unrealized 
goals or values. Without this teleologica! context, without 
purposeful categories, there is no assurance, to say the 
least, of progressive attainment for man or society. And 
yet these categories and symbols that sustain man's cul-
tural endeavors must bear a sense of transcendence, an 
eschatological dimension, if one prefers. For each and 
every system of ultimate meaning, in order to avoid the 
accusation of cultural extemporizing (and thus become 
a pseudo solution), must reflect the source beyond them-
selves to which they relate. 
Herbert Richardson asserts this caution for us to-
day: "The total cybernetic system must be fortified by 
an eschatological symbolism which can provide it with 
general goals and assist men to make the continual transi-
tions an increasingly complex system requires. A cyber-
netic system determines a rate and form of change, but it 
does not determine the ultimate end of change. Rather 
it is guided by some encompassing social vision of the 
good society. This vision cannot be conceptually precise— 
for then it would be static rather than dynamic. But it 
must be symbolically precise if it is to give real direction 
to the social processes."2 
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He goes on to point out that the "guiding power of 
a myth or symbol" must be conceptually "vague," other-
wise it cannot guide rational development. For "such a 
'vague' symbol is open to continual conceptual specifica-
tion; hence it is capable of providing direction to a total 
cybernetic society. It is conceptually imprecise, but 
symbolically precise. Such symbolism must be religious 
. . . the very transcendent character of religious eschatol-
ogy is the condition of its adequacy for guiding a cyber-
netic society; for trans-historical symbolism always retains 
the 'vagueness' and conceptual openness that prevent man 
from expecting any absolute fulfillment in time. . . . Only 
religious symbolism can preserve the system from falling 
into an intra-historical stasis."3 
Accordingly, the historic, traditional symbols of 
denominational religions, as well as those summary sym-
bols, such as Being, Life and Consciousness, which attempt 
to grasp reality as a whole, may not be jettisoned, but 
re-mythologized in order to explicate the teleologica! 
interplay between life's experiences and the corresponding 
growth in self-awareness. Accepting life's experiences as 
the proving ground for symbolizing transcendence may 
now incline man from upholding a belief in ultimacy 
merely on the abstract logic of a dogmatic assertion. A 
too rigid affirmation of conceptual form misplaces the 
motivational basis for personal commitment upon a 
theoristic fixation instead of focusing the symbolic under-
standing upon life's meaning. 
Instead, belief in transcendence can symbolize a 
heuristic approach to ultimate reality enabling man to find 
through its symbolization a convergence of interpretation 
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and experience that exonerates the belief. Without includ-
ing a heuristic intentionality in regard to his ultimate 
symbols, man may lose that healthy edge of discontent 
that projects the critical growth process towards trans-
cendence. By lazily compromising with the pragmatic 
evidence for the self-realization of his transcendent nature, 
man can twist his natural motivations into grotesque 
cultural parodies, assigning them the favor of ultimacy. 
In a technocratic culture where humanistic values are 
adumbrated or declared professionally invalid, a higher 
standard of living is another name of progress in self-
deception. Genuine transcendence is counterfeited; human 
nature is devalued—for only so long. 
The Practical Formation of Religious Consciousness 
Based upon a Teleologica! Praxis 
History shows that man can substitute finite goals 
for his spiritual center of ultimate meaning and with 
sufficient consenses a cultural myth may emerge giving a 
sense of security and meaning to human existence. But 
given man's natural capacity for cultural transcendence, 
sooner or later, a process of alienation sets in. Man's con-
sciousness has a quality of self-awareness that is wider 
than the highest ideals he can rationally set for himself; 
it is from this indefinite zone of awareness that he can 
criticize their meaning as finite absolutes. 
Part of man's hope of survival is his continual 
ambivalence toward cultural paradigms that pass them-
selves off as ultimate concerns. Anything less than the 
experience of genuine transcendence, any substitute, 
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however fashionable or profitable, becomes eventually an 
agent of disillusionment. Yet the infidelity of his symbols 
to sustain his expectations can become a positive factor 
in recovering a realistic approach to ultimacy. Here the 
negative experience of alienation should not be wasted, 
but transmuted into an abiding critical attitude that 
tests in human experience every proposal for transcen-
dence. 
A continuous mutual clarification ought to emerge 
between the conscious interaction of life's experiences 
and their symbolic content. The gradual psychosomatic 
transformation resulting from this heuristic participation 
in life's dynamism measures itself by opposing the secular 
mood of contingency, relativity, temporality and random 
autonomy with growth in self-awareness that establishes 
a personal sense of order and stability with progressively 
higher integrative insights. 
As man's inward vision increases, that is, as his 
development in consciousness expands toward the esoteric 
threshold, the lonely separation (as Monod describes it) 
felt in a blind, mechanical and arbitrary world is recog-
nized as a superficial judgment taking only nature's normal 
flux into account and ignoring, as scientific rationality 
proposes, the evidence for nature's orderly processes that 
require teleologica! categories for their proper explanation. 
A double resource is available to man for redis-
covering the teleologica! principles of operation in nature: 
either by examing the data without the anti-teleological 
bias inserted into scientific methodologies; or by the inner 
dynamics affecting man's polymorphic consciousness in its 
acceptance of transcendental symbols. The first approach 
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falls within the domain of reason, a scientific inquiry that 
recognizes that the modes of evidence for teleologica! 
principles relate diversely and analogously to the level or 
field of reality under study. While the investigations of 
nature yield less than expected as they move more away 
from the study of man and living organisms, nevertheless, 
there is sufficient stability of structure and function, 
cohesive design and regularity of operation throughout 
the pluralistic universe to implicate finality and relative 
purpose. 
As for the second approach, it must be kept in mind 
that the theoretical propriety of ultimate symbols, how-
ever precise and hopeful in their meaning, is, on that 
basis alone, insufficient to meet the critical demands of 
man's sense of estrangement toward himself and the world. 
Imperative, then, is the pragmatic exercise of the trans-
cendental symbols. For it is only in the exegesis of testing 
them upon himself that man can ascertain their mediative 
worth. Unless the symbol initiates the personal dynamics 
of concrete experience, it remains hypothetical, a pure 
promise that is powerless to remedy the secularity of 
today's circumstances. 
One has to embark, consequently, upon a personal 
experiment—an individual, critical experience of praxis. 
Hopefully, it will produce an evolving but integrated self-
hood whose human authenticity embodies those vital-
izing symbols that renew the irrepressible search for 
ultimate meaning. One enters into the existential implica-
tions of the symbol—its intentional structure—discovering 
thereby the possibility for experiencing the Unconditional, 
or drawing nearer and nearer to the esoteric realm, the 
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superconscious state, until the teleologica! process be-
comes a transforming actuality. 
In this way, through the humane integration of all 
the levels of his being, man gains for himself, in fidelity 
to the emerging meaning of the transformative process, a 
positive identity which recognizes that he needs nothing 
outside the realization of his self-consciousness in order to 
establish fulfillment. The polarities of cultural existence 
are acknowledged as relatively necessary, belonging, as 
nature and developing culture would have it, to uneven 
and sometimes spontaneous stages of his growth in self-
awareness. From his expanding integral vision, a certainty 
about the logic of transcendence guides him knowlingly 
through the mass of events that overtake him in daily life. 
In the expanding criteria of his self-consciousness, he dis-
covers the intelligibility of the totality of things. 
In his experience ofultimacy, and his unconditional 
freedom, man bridges the separations of the empirical 
and the transcendental, the secular and the sacred. In 
other words, he totally resolves the alienations that secu-
larity has resigned to culture in despair. The internal 
harmony resulting from the integration of all his levels of 
being expands man's consciousness to discover in self-
awareness his unity with all the manifoldness of reality. 
The ultimate coherence of life and the universe, the past 
and the future, which he already detected within the 
phenomenological field of his rational vision now becomes 
self-evident. The cognitive illuminability of this state of 
consciousness supercedes and guides, contextually, his 
freedom of thought and action, rendering stability, pur-
pose and direction to his cultural existence. 
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Our limited study has shown that while the forma-
tion of religious consciousness has varied greatly in history, 
not every epochal form of ultimacy has been enduringly 
successful in establishing man's relationship to the ultimate 
conditions of his being. In our century, the experience of 
scientific consciousness, as well as the denominational 
forms of exoteric consciousness, do not stand up to the 
very conditions needed for religious consciousness to 
realize itself. 
In opposition to these instances, the formation of 
religious consciousness as a self-transformative process 
leading to an ontologically self-integrative experience of 
transcendence claims its surplus of meaning goes unde-
tectable because of the epistemologica! preferences of 
science and conventional religion. In the face of the 
latter's cultural dominance, the ambiguity of realizing 
transcendence is not a failure of intellect as it is a stimula-
tion to consciousness to expand its experience of life 
beyond these limited paradigms. The ambiguity of self-
transcendence would indicate a summons to purify 
consciousness in order to fulfill the conditions for 
experiencing ultimacy. 
The challenge today lies in taking cognizance of 
those telic clues that nourish and vindicate the progressive 
quest for ultimate meaning. In the pursuit of this goal, 
the existential meaning of transcendence is not ante-
cedent to its experience but consummatory. Man must 
forge those practical symbols whose personal appropria-
tion gradually transforms and unifies his essential being 
and his historical existence. In their functional employ-
ment, these symbols have a provisional finality, for they 
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enable man to regulate and order life's experiences toward 
his goal—establishing a center of ultimate awareness 
wherein he can commit himself to its meaning as the 
foundation of his total self and reality. 
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SAMENVATTING 
Naar een theorie betreffende godsdienstig bewustzijn, 
met betrekking tot het begrip, 
dat de Westerse mens heeft van de natuur, de uiteindelijkheid 
en de studie van uiteindelijke oorzaken. 
door Justin O'Brien 

Deel I: De natuur en de uiteindelijkheid als onderwerp in de 
geschiedenis van het Westen. 
Men kan een constant zoeken naar uiteindelijke betekenis 
vinden in de getuigenis van de intellectuele en culturele geschiedenis 
van de Westerse mens (cultuur wordt in dit geval bedoeld als symbool 
van de totaliteit van het menselijk leven). Van vroege Helleense 
gemeenschappen tot onze huidige kernatomische en technologische 
maatschappij vindt men in het bewustzijn van de mens een onbeperkte 
wens om een fundamentele verklaring van het bestaan te geven. De 
mens wenst zich een godsdienstig bewustzijn te vormen. 
In de vermenselijking van deze weerkerende taak, openbaren 
het ontluiken van het denken en het doen het doel als een intrinsiek 
principe. Gedurende het proces van vervolmaking van zijn natuur 
wordt een teleologische oriëntering vis a vis de werkelijkheid veronder-
steld in verband met de zelf-realizatie van de mens. De mens is een 
doelbewust wezen. Hij begrijpt zijn natuur door de keuze en toe-
passing van het middel en het einddoel. Het groeiend zelfbewustzijn 
van wat er van hem vereist wordt, om een betekenisvol bestaan te 
leiden, keert tot hem terug in teleologische vorm. Op deze wijze opent 
de transformatie van zijn biologisch en intellectueel bestaan verschil-
lende, maar opeenvolgende levenservaringen, welke de mens zich 
eigen maakt, ten einde richting te geven aan zijn groei als menselijk 
wezen. 
Bovendien ziet men in de loop van de culturele geschiedenis, 
dat het zoeken en de strijd van de mens om een scheppend leven en 
uiteindelijke betekenis zich steeds opnieuw meer specifiek uitdrukt. 
Het bestendigen van zijn begrip van de totaliteit van het leven, waarin 
hij een groep symbolische vormen en handelingen bevestigt, die hem 
verbinden met de uiteindelijke voorwaarden van zijn bestaan, zijn 
immer opnieuw herzien. De mens heeft te midden van de beweging 
van de culturele veranderingen, die de verschillende perioden van de 
Westerse geschiedenis inluidden, steeds gezocht naar uiteindelijke 
betekenis. Deze dissertatie tracht in feite aan te tonen, dat bij de 
betekenisvolle formulatie van godsdienstig bewustzijn altijd specifieke 
en toch veranderlijke connecties tussen de ideen over de natuur, de 
uiteindelijkheid en God bestaan, en dat de connecties tussen deze 
ideen en de invloed hiervan op de vorming van het religieuze bewust-
zijn overeenkomstig begrepen worden in een teleologische opzet. 
Onze methode van aanpak is om de geschiedkundige reeks van 
pogingen van de mens om uiteindelijkheid te formuleren als een 
bepalende analyse, te onderzoeken. Onze werkwijze houdt dus in die 
ruime gebieden van cultureel belang, die toestaan dat uiteindelijke 
betekenis in algemene zin gezien wordt; wij rangschikten ons onder-
zoek naar het streven naar godsdienstig bewustzijn van de mens in 
chronologische orde, beginnend met de Hellenistische en eindigend 
met onze eigen tijd. Door ons aan deze totale zin te houden worden 
wij geleid door die voorbeelden van Westerse cultuur, die ons helpen 
toespitsen op de connectie tussen de ideen over de natuur, de 
uiteindelijkheid en God. Door de symbolische schok van deze ideen op 
het zelfbewustzijn van de mens te bespreken ontdekken wij hun be-
langrijkheid voor de vorming van religieus bewustzijn en vice versa. 
Wij beweren, dat de symbolen, die de mens schept om de werkelijk-
heid duidelijk te maken: 
1. zijn verbintenis met de natuur bemiddelen 
2. zijn verbintenis met het geheel van de werkelijkheid, zoals hij 
deze begrijpt, bemiddelen 
3. zijn teleologische vastberadenheid om te bestaan in en door 
deze symbolen, inhouden. 
Door deze brede gebieden van culturele geschiedenis aan te 
duiden, beginnen wij de manifestatie van zekere modaliteiten van 
bewustzijn te zien. De mens heeft zekere modellen van begrip ge-
bruikt om de betekenis van het leven weer te geven, zoals de mythe, 
philosofie, de wetenschap en de godsgeleerdheid. Deze modellen van 
expressie zijn uit het menselijk bewustzijn voortgekomen onder 
culturele omstandigheden. Ieder ven deze patronen heeft de weg 
gewezen gedurende belangrijke tijdperken in de geschiedenis om de 
betekenis van het leven voor de mens duidelijk te maken en te 
besturen. Deze modaliteiten schijnen bovendien een blijvend, maar 
zich ontwikkelend vermogen voor aanvat en uitdrukking te hebben, 
dat het menselijk bewustzijn opnieuw schept in de culturele geschie-
denis. Ieder van deze voorbeelden hebben op hun eigen manier 
meegewerkt aan het zoeken van de mens naar uiteindelijke betekenis. 
Het hele eerste gedeelte van de dissertatie door onderzoeken 
wij de ideen van de natuur en de uiteindelijkheid en de belangrijkheid 
hiervah voor het zelf-begrip van de mens, door de verschijning van de 
modaliteiten aan te tonen als patronen van begrijpelijkheid om hem te 
helpen in zijn onderzoek en uitdrukking van de werkelijkheid. Ook 
trachten wij het bewijs bloot te leggen, dat zelfs wanneer ieder van 
deze wijzen van expressie zijn waarde verliest of vervangen wordt, de 
mens toch opnieuw zoekt om dat bewuste teleologische gebod, dat 
hij voelt, om de totaliteit van wat hij kan ervaren, te bevredigen. 
Toch heeft de appreciatie van teleologische categorien een 
ongelijke geschiedenis van belofte en ontkenning gehad. Vanaf de 
Helleense periode tot het einde van de middeleeuwen regeerde het 
geloof in de teleologische dynamiek van de mens en de realiteit. Het 
beoefenen van bewustzijn op de wereld gedurende deze eeuwen bracht 
verschillende mythische, philosofische, wetenschappelijke en teleo-
logische wijzen van denken voort, die een gemeenschappelijke visie 
van de werkelijkheid als een au fond teleologische onderneming met 
een alles overtreffend doel versterkte. 
De middeleeuwse kijk op de wereld heeft evenwel zulke radicale 
culturele veranderingen ondergaan, dat een totaal nieuwe visie op het 
leven ontlook: dat de mens nu leefde in een mechanistisch universum. 
Het moderne tijdperk, dat de middeleeuwse synthese verwerpt, stelde 
niettegenstaande zijn eigen versie van teleologie voor. De menselijke 
opmars kan nu verbonden worden met wetenschappelijke billijkheid 
en technische vooruitgang. Een aan de aarde gebonden teleologie 
begon te concureren met de traditionele transcendentale zin. De 
nieuwe benadering van de natuur als een grenzenloos gebied voor 
mechanistische ontdekkingen, stimuleerde het culturele optimisme, 
dat aan de Enlightenment de kans gaf om de mens te zien als een zich 
steeds ontwikkelend wezen. Technische ontdekkingen, handel en 
industrie gaven zulke konkrete voorbeelden van overvloed en ver-
betering, dat de civilizatie natuurlijkerwijs vooruitstrevend en het 
welzijn van de mens steeds meer vatbaar voor verbetering leek. 
Deze nieuwe mythe van de moderne tijd heeft de mens geleid 
sinds de dagen van Bacon's "New Philosophy," Maar het idee van 
algemene vooruitgang door de ontwikkeling van wetenschappenlijke 
rede en de technologische toepassing daarvan, verbreedde de aan-
trekkingskracht hiervan, toen dit idee later verbonden werd met het 
denkbeeld van evolutie. Het mechanistische universum werd verheven 
door het idee van verandering en ontwikkeling, dat wortel had ge-
schoten in de toevalligheden van de stof.—evolutionaire vooruitgang 
werd de wet van het wetenschappelijk begrijpen en de betekenis van 
de geschiedenis. Een vreemde teleologie van de vooruitgang verrees, 
wier oorsprong en reden voor bestaan berustte op blind toeval. 
Dank zij een wetenschapsmens-philosoof, Professor Jacques 
Monod, die er op stond, dat de fundamentele betekenisvan de natuur 
zinloos is, is de gunstige ontvangst, die aan de theorie is toegekend, 
nog steeds acceptabel in de 20ste eeuw. 
Deel II: De natuur en de uiteindelijkheid als wederkerige betrekking 
van het religieuze bewustzijn. 
Deel II legt de nadruk op het feit, dat de wereldlijkheid van de 
vorige eeuw nog steeds bestaat. Zekere culturele gebeurtenissen in 
deze eeuw hebben het geloof in de wet van vooruitgang ondermijnd. 
Vele wetenschapsmensen en philosofen hebben de doelloosheid van de 
werkelijkheid gehandhaafd. Teleologische categorien van betekenis 
en het religieus geloof in transcendentie zijn vervangen door de weten-
schappelijke nadruk op het verminderen van het karakter van de 
realiteit tot toeval. Deze culturele stemming van wetenschappelijke 
wereldlijkheid is een godsdienstig punt geworden, want deze biedt 
zichzelf aan als de uiteindelijke verklaring van de geschiedenis en 
het zijn. 
Deel II zet de critiek op dit probleem van culturele zinloosheid 
voort, door ten eerste een algemene beschrijving te geven van het 
karakter van het godsdienstig bewustzijn. Deze beschrijving is ge-
baseerd op de ingeboren en onbeperkte ervaring van de mens om de 
totaliteit van zijn wezen en van zijn historische pogingen om de 
betekenis ervan te symboliseren, te kennen. 
Ten tweede onderzoeken wij wetenschappelijke zowel als niet-
wetenschappelijke getuigenis op de kleinste aanduiding van betekenis, 
welke het geloof in de vorming van het godsdienstig bewustzijn kan 
ondersteunen. 
Ten derde stellen wij voor, dat zelfbewuste drang van de mens 
naar uiteindelijkheid zich continue manifesteert in een teleologische 
opzet, zelfs wanneer de specifieke culturele uitdrukking daarvan de 
dynamiek van de culturele geschiedenis niet overleeft. 
Ten vierde pogen wij te bewijzen en poneren wij een theorie, 
welke stelt dat de mogelijkheid of hypothese voor transcendentale 
"zijn," voor het vervullen van een religieus bewustzijn als een actueel 
levende ervaring, berust in de mens zelf. En, dat de immanente bron 
voor dit succes ligt in het teleologisch dynamisme van zijn bewustzijn. 
Het hoofd onderwerp van Deel I geeft de wijzen aan, waarop 
het onbeperkte verlangen om uiteindelijke betekenis te verwezen 
lijken naar voren is getreden. Ook geeft het te kennen, dat de mens 
steeds poogt zich in te laten met de uiteindelijke betekenis van de 
werkelijkheid, binnen de grenzen van welke modaliteit van bewust-
zijn dan ook. 
Onze conclusie is, dat het bewijs van waarde van welk para-
digma of symbool van uiteindelijkheid dan ook getoetst moet worden 
aan de scheppende kracht van het bewustzijn in het actieve proces 
van het samenvallen van die symbolen, die hopelijk het proces van 
transcendentie zouden voortbrengen of in beweging zetten. 

Theses 
1. East-West religious dialogue may not be a threat to 
institutional religion, but given the unfinished character of 
man's nature, these exchanges may indicate the necessity 
and complimentarity of insight into ultimacy. 
2. If the human quest for ultimacy is to become a lived 
reality and not just a theoretical possibility, then man 
must explore critical forms of verifying its actuality. 
3. Religious denominations ought to consider that their 
orthodox credentials may not fully express the religious 
reality that they purport to uphold. 
4. Theological concepts of man's nature will remain 
drastically incomplete unless theologians reflect more 
seriously upon the inherent capacities of human conscious-
ness attested by scientific demonstrations. 
5. The practical success of mystical theology may re-
quire a modern revision of its traditional concept of 
the psychosomatic structure of human nature 
6. It is not to the advantage of modern science nor 
theology since Vatican II, to presume that facts which 
cannot be explained by orthodox theories do not exist. 
7. The fact that we live in an indefinite pluralistic uni-
verse should offer new stimulation to the theology of 
creation. 
8. Even when modem science gradually separated itself 
from religious sanction, it always manages to turn itself 
into the religious issue of ultimacy. 
9. If either science, philosophy or theology posits that 
their own integrity requires the denial of myth, then all 
three have formed their own myth. 
10. Professor Monod's purpose in writing his book was to 
prove that life is purposeless. 


